

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

v.

STANFORD INTERNATIONAL BANK, LTD,
et al.,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:09-cv-00298-N

**APPENDIX TO EXPEDITED REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF
SCHEDULING ORDER¹ AND MOTION TO APPROVE PROPOSED
SETTLEMENT WITH TRUSTMARK, TO ENTER THE BAR ORDER,
TO ENTER THE JUDGMENT AND BAR ORDER,
AND FOR PLAINTIFFS' ATTORNEYS' FEES AND EXPENSES**

Ralph S. Janvey (the “Receiver”) and the Official Stanford Investors Committee (the “OSIC”), file this appendix (the “Appendix”) in support of the *Expedited Request for Entry of Scheduling Order and Motion to Approve Proposed Settlement with Trustmark, to Enter the Bar Order, to Enter the Judgment and Bar Order, and for Plaintiffs’ Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses* (the “Motion”).

¹ Movants request that the Court promptly enter the Scheduling Order, without waiting the twenty-one (21) days contemplated by Local Rule 7.1(e) for interested parties to respond to this Motion, because such Scheduling Order merely approves the notice and objection procedure and sets a final hearing, and does not constitute a final approval of the Settlement Agreement.

Exhibit	Description
APPENDIX MATERIALS	
1.	Settlement Agreement with Exhibits
2.	Declaration of Edward C. Snyder
3.	Declaration of James R. Swanson
4.	Declaration of Scott Powers
5.	Order Approving Attorneys' Fees
6.	Declaration of John J. Little

Dated: January 19, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.

By: /s/ Kevin M. Sadler

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**ATTORNEYS FOR THE OFFICIAL STANFORD
INVESTORS COMMITTEE**

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On January 19, 2023, I electronically submitted the foregoing document with the clerk of the court of the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas, using the electronic case filing system of the court. I hereby certify that I will serve the Court-appointed Examiner, all counsel and/or pro se parties of record electronically or by another manner authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2).

On January 19, 2023, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document and the notice of electronic filing by United States Postal Certified Mail, Return Receipt required to the persons noticed below who are non-CM/ECF participants:

R. Allen Stanford, Pro Se
Inmate #35017183
Coleman II USP
Post Office Box 1034
Coleman, FL 33521

/s/ Kevin M. Sadler

Kevin M. Sadler

EXHIBIT 1

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

THIS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (the “Agreement”) is made and entered into between and among, on the one hand, (i) Ralph S. Janvey, solely in his capacity as the court-appointed receiver for the Stanford Receivership Estate (the “Receiver”); (ii) the Official Stanford Investors Committee (the “Committee”); (iii) individual plaintiffs Guthrie Abbott, Steven Queyrouze, Salim Estefenn Uribe, Sarah Elson-Rogers, Diana Suarez, and Ruth Alfille de Penhos (collectively, the “Rotstain Investor Plaintiffs”); (iv) each of the plaintiffs in *Smith, et al. v. Independent Bank, et al.*, CA No. 4-20-CV-00675 (S.D. Tex.) (collectively, the “Smith Investor Plaintiffs”); and, on the other hand, (v) Trustmark National Bank (“Trustmark”). The Receiver, the Committee, the Rotstain Investor Plaintiffs, and the Smith Investor Plaintiffs are collectively referred to as the “Plaintiffs.” Plaintiffs, on the one hand, and Trustmark, on the other hand, are referred to in this Agreement individually as a “Party” and together as the “Parties.”

WHEREAS, on February 16, 2009, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) initiated *SEC v. Stanford International Bank, Ltd.*, Civil Action No. 3:09-cv-00298-N (N.D. Tex.) (the “SEC Action”), alleging that Robert Allen Stanford, James M. Davis, Laura Pendergest-Holt, Stanford International Bank, Ltd. (“SIB”), Stanford Group Company, Stanford Capital Management, LLC, and Stanford Financial Group (the “Defendants”) had engaged in a fraudulent scheme affecting tens of thousands of customers from over one hundred countries;

WHEREAS, in an order dated February 16, 2009, in the SEC Action (ECF No. 10), the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas (the “Court”) assumed exclusive jurisdiction and took possession of the assets and other tangible and intangible monies and property, as further set forth in that order, of the Defendants and all entities they own or control (the “Receivership Assets”), and the books and records, client lists, account statements, financial

and accounting documents, computers, computer hard drives, computer disks, internet exchange servers, telephones, personal digital devices and other informational resources of or in possession of the Defendants, or issued by Defendants and in possession of any agent or employee of the Defendants (the “Receivership Records”);

WHEREAS, in that same order (ECF No. 10), Ralph S. Janvey was appointed Receiver for the Receivership Assets and the Receivership Records (collectively, the “Receivership Estate”) with the full power of an equity receiver under common law as well as such powers as are enumerated in that order, as amended by an order in that same matter, dated March 12, 2009 (ECF No. 157), and as further amended by an order entered in that same matter, dated July 19, 2010 (ECF No. 1130);

WHEREAS, Ralph S. Janvey has served as Receiver continuously since his appointment and continues to so serve;

WHEREAS, John J. Little was appointed to serve as examiner (the “Examiner”) by an order entered in the SEC Action, dated April 20, 2009 (ECF No. 322), to assist the Court in considering the interests of the worldwide investors in any financial products, accounts, vehicles or ventures sponsored, promoted or sold by any defendants in the SEC Action;

WHEREAS, John J. Little has served as Examiner continuously since his appointment and continues to so serve;

WHEREAS, the Committee was created pursuant to an order entered in the SEC Action, dated August 10, 2010 (ECF No. 1149) (the “Committee Order”), to represent the customers of SIB, who, as of February 16, 2009, had funds on deposit at SIB and/or were holding certificates of deposit (“CDs”) issued by SIB (the “Stanford Investors”);

WHEREAS, by the Committee Order, the Examiner was named as the initial Chairperson of the Committee;

WHEREAS, the Examiner has served as Chairperson of the Committee continuously since his appointment and continues to so serve;

WHEREAS, on August 23, 2009, Guthrie Abbott, Steven Queyrouze, Peggy Roif Rotstain, Juan Olano, Catherine Burnell, and Jamie Alexis Arroyo Bornstein (the latter four of whom were later replaced by substitute plaintiffs Sarah Elson-Rogers, Salim Estefenn Uribe, Ruth Alfille de Penhos, and Diana Suarez on May 1, 2015 (Rotstain ECF No. 237)) filed their Original Petition in the district court of Harris County, Texas (Rotstain ECF No. 1-4)—a putative class action captioned *Rotstain, et al. v. Trustmark National Bank, et al.* (the “Rotstain Litigation”)—naming Trustmark as one of several defendants;

WHEREAS, on November 13, 2009, the Rotstain Litigation was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas (“Transferor Court”) (Rotstain ECF No. 1) where it was assigned Civil Action No. 4:09-cv-03673 and was then transferred to and consolidated with the Stanford Multidistrict Litigation proceeding in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas (“MDL Court”) (Rotstain ECF No. 6) and assigned Civil Action No. 3:09-cv-02384-N;

WHEREAS, on December 14, 2009, Harold Jackson, Paul Blaine Smith, Carolyn Bass Smith, Christine Nichols, Ronald Hebert, and Ramona Hebert (collectively, the “Jackson Investor Plaintiffs”) filed a petition in the district court of Ascension Parish, Louisiana against Trustmark and other defendants (Jackson ECF No. 1-5) captioned *Jackson, et al. v. Cox, et al.* (the “Jackson Litigation”); on January 11, 2010, the Jackson Litigation was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana (Jackson ECF No. 1), where it was assigned Civil Action No. 3:10-cv-00029, was then transferred to and consolidated with the Stanford Multidistrict Litigation

proceedings in the MDL Court (Jackson ECF No. 14), assigned Civil Action No. 3:10-cv-00328-N, and was then stayed (Jackson ECF No. 23);

WHEREAS, on January 4, 2011, the Receiver assigned to the Committee any and all causes of action the Receivership Estate may have had against Trustmark and other defendants (Rotstain ECF No. 865, Ex. 10);

WHEREAS, on December 6, 2012, the Committee successfully intervened in the Rotstain Litigation (Rotstain ECF No. 129), and filed an Intervenor Complaint against Trustmark and other defendants on February 15, 2013 (Rotstain ECF No. No. 133);

WHEREAS, on November 2, 2015, the Rotstain Investor Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Class Action Complaint against Trustmark and other defendants seeking actual damages, costs, and attorneys' fees (Rotstain ECF No. 350), which remains the Rotstain Investor Plaintiffs' operative complaint against Trustmark in the Rotstain Litigation;

WHEREAS, on November 7, 2017, the MDL Court denied the Rotstain Investor Plaintiffs' motion for class certification (Rotstain ECF No. 428), and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit later declined interlocutory review of the class-certification denial in a matter captioned *Rotstain, et al. v. Trustmark National Bank, et al.*, No. 17-90038 (5th Cir.) (Order; Apr. 20, 2018);

WHEREAS, on May 3, 2019, following the denial of the Rotstain Investor Plaintiffs' motion for class certification, hundreds of Stanford investors unsuccessfully moved to intervene in the Rotstain Litigation (Rotstain ECF No. 562), the denial of which: (A) prompted many of these investors to file a separate suit against Trustmark and others in Harris County, Texas district court—*Smith, et al. v. Independent Bank, et al.* (the "Smith Litigation")—which suit was later removed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas (Smith ECF No. 1), was

assigned Civil Action No. 4:20-cv-00675 (S.D. Tex.), and was then stayed without the opposition of the Smith Investor Plaintiffs and in accordance with an order issued in the SEC Action (Smith ECF No. 10); and (B) prompted other would-be intervenors to seek immediate review of their denied motions to intervene in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Rotstain ECF No. 574) which, on February 3, 2021, upheld the MDL Court's intervention denial in an opinion captioned *Rotstain v. Mendez*, No. 19-11131 (5th Cir.) (Op.; Feb. 3, 2021);

WHEREAS, on June 15, 2020, the Committee filed its Second Amended Intervenor Complaint against Trustmark and other defendants seeking actual damages, punitive damages, costs, and attorneys' fees (Rotstain ECF No. 735), which remains the Committee's operative complaint against Trustmark in the Rotstain Litigation;

WHEREAS, on March 19, 2021, the Committee and the Rotstain Investor Plaintiffs filed a notice abandoning all of their respective claims against Trustmark with the exception of (A) their claims for aiding, abetting, or participating in violations of the Texas Securities Act (the "TSA") and (B) their claims for aiding, abetting, or participation in breaches of fiduciary duties (Rotstain ECF No. 976);

WHEREAS, on January 20, 2022, the MDL Court granted in part and denied in part Trustmark and other defendants' motions for summary judgment (Rotstain ECF No. 1150) and recommended that the Rotstain Litigation be remanded to the Transferor Court in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas for further proceedings (Rotstain ECF No. 1151);

WHEREAS, on March 10, 2022, the Rotstain Litigation was transferred back to the Transferor Court in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas where it was assigned Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-00800 (Rotstain ECF No. 1157);

WHEREAS, on November 3, 2022, the Transferor Court denied Trustmark and other defendants' Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of standing (Rotstain ECF No. 1319);

WHEREAS, on November 10, 2022, the Transferor Court entered its Fifth and Final Amended Scheduling Order, setting a trial beginning on February 27, 2023 (Rotstain ECF No. 1326);

WHEREAS, on November 17, 2022, the Transferor Court denied Trustmark and other defendants' Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on the TSA's statute of repose (Rotstain ECF No. 1328);

WHEREAS, Trustmark expressly denies any and all allegations of wrongdoing, fault, liability, or damages whatsoever and is entering into this Agreement solely to avoid the burden, substantial expense, and risks of litigation;

WHEREAS, Plaintiffs have conducted an investigation into the facts and the law relating to the Rotstain Litigation, the Smith Litigation, and the Jackson Litigation (collectively, the "Litigation") and after considering the results of that investigation and the benefits of this Settlement (as defined in Paragraph 17), as well as the burden, expense, and risks of litigation, have concluded that a settlement with Trustmark under the terms set forth below is fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the best interests of the Plaintiffs, the Interested Parties, and all Persons affected by the Stanford Entities, and have agreed to enter into the Settlement and this Agreement, and to use their best efforts to effectuate the Settlement and this Agreement;

WHEREAS, the Parties desire to fully, finally, and forever compromise and effect a global settlement and discharge of all claims, disputes, and issues between and among them;

WHEREAS, the Parties have engaged in extensive, good-faith, and arm's-length negotiations, leading to this Agreement;

WHEREAS, absent approval of this Settlement as required herein, the Litigation will likely take many more years and cost the Parties millions of dollars to litigate to final judgment and through appeals, and the outcome of all such litigation would have been uncertain;

WHEREAS, in *Zacarias v. Stanford Int'l Bank, Ltd.*, 931 F.3d 382, 387 (5th Cir. 2019), the Fifth Circuit confirmed approval of a settlement that was conditioned on bar orders enjoining related Ponzi-scheme suits filed against the defendants in that litigation and entry of the bar orders;

WHEREAS, the Examiner, both in his capacity as Chairperson of the Committee and in his capacity as the Court-appointed Examiner, participated in the negotiation of the Settlement;

WHEREAS, the Committee has approved the terms of this Agreement and the Settlement, as evidenced by the signature hereon of the Examiner in his capacity as Chairperson of the Committee;

WHEREAS, the Examiner, in his capacity as Examiner, has reviewed this Agreement and the terms of the Settlement and, as evidenced by his signature hereon, has approved the terms of this Agreement and the Settlement and will recommend that this Agreement, and the terms of the Settlement be approved by the Court and implemented;¹ and

WHEREAS, the Receiver has reviewed and approved this Agreement and the terms of the Settlement, as evidenced by his signature hereon;

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the agreements, covenants, and releases set forth herein and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the Parties agree as follows:

¹ The Examiner has also executed this Agreement to confirm his obligation to post Notice on his website, as required herein, but is not otherwise individually a party to the Settlement or the Litigation.

I. Agreement Date

1. This Agreement shall take effect once all Parties have signed the Agreement as of the date of the last signature to the Agreement (the “Agreement Date”).

II. Terms Used in this Agreement

The following terms, as used in this Agreement, the Bar Order (defined in Paragraph 19), and the Judgment and Bar Order (defined in Paragraph 19), have the following meanings:

2. “Attorneys’ Fees” means those fees awarded by the Court to Plaintiffs’ counsel from the Settlement Amount pursuant to the terms of the applicable engagement agreements.

3. “Claim” means a Person’s potential or asserted right to receive funds from the Receivership Estate or the funds and assets subject to the authority of the Joint Liquidators (defined below).

4. “Claimant” means any Person who has submitted a Claim to the Receiver or to the Joint Liquidators (defined below). Where a Claim has been transferred to a third party and such transfer has been acknowledged by the Receiver or the Joint Liquidators, the transferee is a Claimant, and the transferor is not a Claimant unless the transferor has retained a Claim that has not been transferred. Where the Receiver or the Joint Liquidators have disallowed a Claim and the disallowance has become Final, then the submission of the disallowed Claim does not make the Person who submitted it a Claimant.

5. “Confidential Information” means the communications and discussions in connection with the negotiations that led to the Settlement and this Agreement. Confidential Information also includes the existence and terms of the Settlement and this Agreement, but only until the filing of this Agreement and related documents with the Court.

6. “Distribution Plan” means the plan hereafter approved by the Court for the distribution of the Settlement Amount (net of any Attorneys’ Fees or costs that are awarded by the

Court) to Stanford Investors who have had their Claims allowed by the Receiver (“Allowed Claims”).

7. “Final” means unmodified after the conclusion of, or expiration of any right of any Person to pursue, any and all possible forms and levels of appeal, reconsideration, or review, judicial or otherwise, including by a court or Forum of last resort, wherever located, whether automatic or discretionary, whether by appeal or otherwise. The Bar Order and Judgment and Bar Order shall include findings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and will become Final when they each satisfy the first sentence of this paragraph and it will then be considered as if such orders were entered as judgments at the end of a case, and the continuing pendency of the SEC Action and the Jackson Litigation shall not be construed as preventing such Bar Order and Judgment and Bar Order from becoming Final.

8. “Forum” means any court, adjudicative body, tribunal, or jurisdiction, whether its nature is federal, foreign, state, administrative, regulatory, arbitral, local, or otherwise.

9. “Hearing” means a formal proceeding in open court before the United States District Judge having jurisdiction over the SEC Action.

10. “Interested Parties” means the Receiver; the Receivership Estate; the Committee; the members of the Committee; the Plaintiffs; the Stanford Investors; the Claimants; the Examiner; the Joint Liquidators; the Jackson Investor Plaintiffs; or any Person or Persons alleged by the Receiver, the Committee, or other Person or entity on behalf of the Receivership Estate to be liable to the Receivership Estate, whether or not a formal proceeding has been initiated.

11. “Joint Liquidators” means Hugh Dickson and Mark McDonald, in their capacities as the joint liquidators appointed by the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court in Antigua and Barbuda

to take control of and manage the affairs and assets of SIB or any of their successors or predecessors.

12. “Notice” means a communication, in substantially the form attached hereto as **Exhibit A**, describing (a) the material terms of the Settlement; (b) the material terms of this Agreement; (c) the rights and obligations of the Interested Parties with regard to the Settlement and this Agreement; (d) the deadline for the filing of objections to the Settlement, the Agreement, the Bar Order, and the Judgment and Bar Order; and (e) the date, time, and location of the Hearing to consider final approval of the Settlement, this Agreement, the Bar Order, and the Judgment and Bar Order.

13. “Person” means any individual, entity, governmental authority, agency or quasi-governmental person or entity, worldwide, of any type, including, without limitation, any individual, partnership, corporation, limited liability company, estate, trust, committee, fiduciary, association, proprietorship, organization, or business, regardless of location, residence, or nationality.

14. “Plaintiffs Released Parties” means the Receiver, the Examiner, the Committee, the Rotstain Investor Plaintiffs, the Smith Investor Plaintiffs, and each of their counsel. Plaintiffs Released Parties also includes each of the foregoing Persons’ respective past, present, and future directors, officers, legal and equitable owners, shareholders, members, managers, principals, employees, associates, representatives, distributees, agents, attorneys, trustees, general and limited partners, lenders, insurers and reinsurers, direct and indirect parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, related entities, divisions, partnerships, corporations, executors, administrators, heirs, beneficiaries, assigns, predecessors, predecessors in interest, successors, and successors in interest.

15. “Releasor” means any Person granting a release of any Settled Claim.

16. “Settled Claim” means any action, cause of action, suit, liability, claim, right of action, right of levy or attachment, or demand whatsoever, whether or not currently asserted, known, suspected, existing, or discoverable, and whether based on federal law, state law, foreign law, common law, or otherwise, and whether based on contract, tort, statute, law, equity or otherwise, that a Releasor ever had, now has, or hereafter can, shall, or may have, directly, representatively, derivatively, or in any other capacity, for, upon, arising from, relating to, or by reason of any matter, cause, or thing whatsoever, that, in full or in part, concerns, relates to, arises out of, or is in any manner connected with (i) the Stanford Entities; (ii) any CD, depository account, or investment of any type with any one or more of the Stanford Entities; (iii) Trustmark’s relationship with any one or more of the Stanford Entities and/or any of their personnel or any Person acting by, through, or in concert with any Stanford Entity; (iv) Trustmark’s or any of the Trustmark Released Parties’ provision of services to or for the benefit of or on behalf of any one or more of the Stanford Entities; or (v) any matter that was asserted in, could have been asserted in, or relates to the subject matter of the SEC Action, the Litigation, or any proceeding concerning any of the Stanford Entities pending or commenced in any Forum. “Settled Claims” specifically includes, without limitation, all claims each Releasor does not know or suspect to exist in his, her, or its favor at the time of release, which, if known by that Person, might have affected their decisions with respect to this Agreement and the Settlement (“Unknown Claims”). Each Releasor expressly waives, releases, and relinquishes any and all provisions, rights, and benefits conferred by any law or principle, in the United States or elsewhere, which governs or limits the release of unknown or unsuspected claims, including, without limitation, California Civil Code § 1542, which provides:

A GENERAL RELEASE DOES NOT EXTEND TO CLAIMS
WHICH THE CREDITOR DOES NOT KNOW OR SUSPECT TO

EXIST IN HIS OR HER FAVOR AT THE TIME OF EXECUTING THE RELEASE, WHICH IF KNOWN BY HIM OR HER MUST HAVE MATERIALLY AFFECTED HIS OR HER SETTLEMENT WITH THE DEBTOR.

Each Releasor acknowledges that he, she, or it may hereafter discover facts different from, or in addition to, those which such Releasor now knows or believes to be true with respect to the Settled Claims, but nonetheless agrees that this Agreement, including the releases granted herein, will remain binding and effective in all respects notwithstanding such discovery. Unknown Claims include contingent and non-contingent claims, whether or not concealed or hidden, without regard to the subsequent discovery or existence of different or additional facts. These provisions concerning unknown and unsuspected claims and the inclusion of Unknown Claims in the definition of Settled Claims were separately bargained for and are an essential element of this Agreement and the Settlement.

17. “Settlement” means the agreed resolution of the Settled Claims in the manner set forth in this Agreement, including its exhibits.

18. “Settlement Amount” means One Hundred Million Dollars (\$100,000,000.00) in United States currency.

19. “Settlement Effective Date” means the date on which the last of all of the following has occurred:

a. entry in the SEC Action of a bar order including findings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and in substantially the form attached hereto as **Exhibit B** (the “Bar Order”);

b. entry in the Jackson Litigation of a judgment and bar order in substantially the form attached hereto as **Exhibit C** (the “Judgment and Bar Order”); and

c. the Bar Order and the Judgment and Bar Order have both become Final.

20. “Stanford Entities” means Robert Allen Stanford; James M. Davis; Laura Pendergest-Holt; Gilbert Lopez; Mark Kuhrt; SIB; Stanford Group Company; Stanford Capital Management, LLC; Stanford Financial Group; the Stanford Financial Bldg Inc.; the entities listed in **Exhibit D** to this Agreement; and any entity of any type that was owned, controlled by, or affiliated with Robert Allen Stanford, James M. Davis, Laura Pendergest-Holt, Gilbert Lopez, Mark Kuhrt, SIB, Stanford Group Company, Stanford Capital Management, LLC, Stanford Financial Group, or the Stanford Financial Bldg Inc., on or before February 16, 2009.

21. “Taxes” means any and all taxes, whether federal, state, local, or other taxes related to the Settlement or the Settlement Amount, and costs incurred in connection with such taxation including, without limitation, the fees and expenses of tax attorneys and accountants.

22. “Trustmark Released Parties” means Trustmark National Bank and all of its predecessor banks, including without limitation Republic National Bank, and, for each of the foregoing, all of their respective past and present subsidiaries, parents, predecessors, affiliates, related entities and divisions, and all of the foregoing’s respective past, present, and future successors, and all of their respective current and former partners, members, counsel, principals, participating principals, associates, managing or other agents, management personnel, officers, directors, shareholders, administrators, servants, employees, staff, consultants, advisors, attorneys, accountants, lenders, insurers and reinsurers, representatives, successors and assigns, known or unknown, in their representative capacity or individual capacity. Notwithstanding the foregoing, “Trustmark Released Parties” shall not include (a) any Person, other than Trustmark, who is, as of the Agreement Date, a party to the Rotstain Litigation or the Smith Litigation; (b) any Person, other than Trustmark, who is a party to one or more of the actions or proceedings listed in **Exhibit G** (i) against whom, on the Agreement Date, the Receiver or the Committee is asserting claims or

causes of action in any such action or proceeding, or (ii) with whom, as of the Agreement Date, the Receiver or the Committee has entered into a settlement agreement relating to any such action or proceeding and such Person's obligations to the Receiver or the Committee remain outstanding in whole or in part; (c) any Person, other than Trustmark, against whom the Receiver or Committee holds a judgment or other court award that remains unsatisfied in whole or in part as of the Agreement Date; or (d) any Person who is, as of the Agreement Date, a party to one or more of the proceedings identified in **Exhibit H**.

III. Delivery of Settlement Amount

23. Stay of Rotstain Litigation as to Trustmark: Within three (3) business days of the Agreement Date, the Rotstain Investor Plaintiffs, the Committee, and Trustmark shall file a joint motion in the Rotstain Litigation to stay the Rotstain Litigation as to Trustmark, including a request to vacate all pretrial deadlines and the trial setting as to Trustmark, pending a final determination concerning approval of the Settlement, the Bar Order, and the Judgment and Bar Order.

24. Dismissal of Jackson Litigation: The Jackson Litigation shall be fully and finally resolved and concluded and considered dismissed as to Trustmark by the Judgment and Bar Order being entered in the Jackson Litigation and becoming Final.

25. Dismissal of Rotstain Litigation: After the Settlement Effective Date, the Committee and the Rotstain Investor Plaintiffs shall fully and finally dismiss their claims against Trustmark in the Rotstain Litigation with prejudice. To effectuate this, within five (5) business days after the Settlement Effective Date, the Committee and the Rotstain Investor Plaintiffs and Trustmark shall file an agreed motion to (i) dismiss with prejudice without costs or attorneys' fees the Rotstain Litigation in its entirety as to Trustmark and (ii) enter a final judgment as to Trustmark and all claims against it in the Rotstain Litigation. It being agreed that there would be no just reason for delay, if claims by the Committee and the Rotstain Investor Plaintiffs against parties

other than Trustmark remain pending in the Rotstain Litigation at the time the agreed motion is to be filed, the judgment that is requested by the agreed motion and required under this paragraph will be a final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).

26. Dismissal of Smith Litigation: After the Settlement Effective Date, the Smith Investor Plaintiffs shall fully and finally dismiss their claims against Trustmark in the Smith Litigation with prejudice. To effectuate this, within five (5) business days after the Settlement Effective Date, the Smith Investor Plaintiffs and Trustmark shall file an agreed motion to (i) dismiss with prejudice without costs or attorneys' fees the Smith Litigation in its entirety as to Trustmark and (ii) enter a final judgment as to Trustmark and all claims against it in the Smith Litigation. It being agreed that there would be no just reason for delay, if claims by the Smith Investor Plaintiffs against parties other than Trustmark remain pending in the Smith Litigation at the time the agreed motion is to be filed, the judgment that is requested by the agreed motion and required by this paragraph will be a final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).

27. Delivery of Settlement Amount: By the latest of (a) thirty (30) days after the Settlement Effective Date, (b) thirty (30) days after the order(s) dismissing with prejudice the Rotstain Litigation in its entirety as to Trustmark and granting a final judgment as to Trustmark and all claims against it are entered and such order(s) become Final, or (c) thirty (30) days after the order(s) dismissing with prejudice the Smith Litigation in its entirety and granting a final judgment as to Trustmark and all claims against it are entered and such order(s) become Final, Trustmark shall deliver or cause to be delivered the Settlement Amount to the Receiver by wire transfer in accordance with wire transfer instructions provided by the Receiver for purposes of receiving the payment.

IV. Use and Management of Settlement Amount

28. Management and Distribution of Settlement Amount: If and when the Settlement Amount is delivered to the Receiver pursuant to the terms of this Agreement, the Receiver shall receive and take custody of the Settlement Amount and shall maintain, manage, and distribute the Settlement Amount in accordance with the Distribution Plan and under the supervision and direction and with the approval of the Court. The Receiver shall be responsible for all Taxes, fees, and expenses that may be due with respect to the Settlement Amount or the management, use, administration, or distribution of the Settlement Amount.

29. No Liability: Trustmark and the Trustmark Released Parties shall have no liability, obligation, or responsibility whatsoever with respect to the investment, management, use, administration, or distribution of the Settlement Amount or any portion thereof, including, but not limited to, the duties set forth in Paragraph 28 as well as the costs and expenses of such investment, management, use, administration, or distribution of the Settlement Amount, and any Taxes arising therefrom or relating thereto. Nothing in this Paragraph 29 shall alter Trustmark's obligations to deliver the Settlement Amount to the Receiver pursuant to the terms of this Agreement.

V. Motion for Scheduling Order, Bar Order, and Judgment and Bar Order and Form and Procedure for Notice

30. Motion: On a date mutually acceptable to the Parties that is not more than twenty (20) days from the Agreement Date, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties in writing, via e-mail or otherwise, the Receiver and the Committee ("Movants") shall submit to the Court a motion requesting entry of an order substantially in the form attached hereto as **Exhibit E** (the "Scheduling Order") (a) preliminarily approving the Settlement; (b) approving the content and plan for publication and dissemination of Notice; (c) setting the date by which any objection to the Settlement or this Agreement must be filed; and (d) scheduling a Hearing to consider final approval

of the Settlement and entry of the orders required by Paragraph 19 of this Agreement. With respect to the content and plan for publication and dissemination of Notice, Movants will propose that Notice in substantially the form attached hereto as **Exhibit A** be sent via electronic mail, first-class mail, or international delivery service to all Interested Parties; sent via electronic service to all counsel of record for any Person who is, at the time of Notice, a party in any case included in *In re Stanford Entities Securities Litigation*, MDL No. 2099 (N.D. Tex.) (the “MDL”), the SEC Action, or the Litigation who are deemed to have consented to electronic service through the CM/ECF System; sent via facsimile transmission and/or first class mail to any other counsel of record for any other Person who is, at the time of service, a party in any case included in the MDL, the SEC Action, or the Litigation; and posted on the websites of the Receiver and the Examiner along with complete copies of this Agreement and all filings with the Court relating to the Settlement, this Agreement, and approval of the Settlement. Movants will further propose that Notice in substantially the form attached hereto as **Exhibit F** be published once in the national edition of *The Wall Street Journal* and once in the international edition of *The New York Times*. In advance of filing the motion papers to accomplish the foregoing, Movants shall provide Trustmark with a reasonable opportunity to review and comment on such motion papers.

31. Notice Preparation and Dissemination: The Receiver shall be solely responsible for the preparation and dissemination of the Notice pursuant to this Agreement and as directed by the Court. In the absence of intentional refusal by the Receiver to prepare and disseminate Notice pursuant to this Agreement or a court order, no Interested Party or any other Person shall have any recourse against the Receiver with respect to any claims that may arise from or relate to the Notice process. In the case of intentional refusal by the Receiver to prepare and disseminate Notice pursuant to this Agreement or a court order, Trustmark shall not have any claim against the

Receiver other than the ability to seek specific performance. The Parties do not intend to give any other Person any right or recourse against the Receiver in connection with the Notice process.

32. No Recourse Against Trustmark: No Interested Party or any other Person shall have any recourse against Trustmark or the Trustmark Released Parties with respect to any claims that may arise from or relate to the Notice process.

33. Motion Contents: In the motion papers referenced in Paragraph 30 above, Movants shall request that the Court, *inter alia*:

- a. approve the Settlement and its terms as set out in this Agreement;
- b. enter an order finding that this Agreement and the releases set forth herein are final and binding on the Parties;
- c. enter the Bar Order in the SEC Action in the form attached hereto as **Exhibit B**; and
- d. enter the Judgment and Bar Order in the Jackson Litigation in the form attached hereto as **Exhibit C**.

34. Parties to Advocate: The Parties shall take all reasonable steps to advocate for and encourage the Court to approve the terms of this Agreement.

35. No Challenge: No Party shall challenge the approval of the Settlement, and no Party will encourage or assist any Interested Party in challenging the Settlement.

VI. Rescission If the Settlement Is Not Finally Approved or the Bar Order and Judgment and Bar Order Are Not Entered

36. Right to Withdraw: The Parties represent and acknowledge that the following were necessary to the Committee's, the Receiver's, and Trustmark's agreement to enter into this Settlement, are each an essential term of the Settlement and this Agreement, and that the Settlement would not have been reached in the absence of these terms: (a) court approval in both the SEC

Action and the Jackson Litigation of the Settlement and the terms of this Agreement without amendment or revision; (b) entry by the court in the SEC Action of the Bar Order in substantially the form attached hereto as **Exhibit B**; (c) entry by the Court in the Jackson Litigation of the Judgment and Bar Order in substantially the form attached hereto as **Exhibit C**; (d) entry in the Rotstain Litigation and the Smith Litigation of orders dismissing Trustmark and all claims against it with prejudice and a final judgment as to Trustmark in both cases; and (e) all such approvals, dismissals, and orders becoming Final pursuant to Paragraphs 7, 19, 25, and 26 of this Agreement. If the court in either the SEC Action or the Jackson Litigation refuses to provide the approvals described in Paragraph 36(a) or refuses to enter the bar orders described in Paragraphs 36(b) or (c) without material modification or limitation; or if the court in either the Rotstain Litigation or the Smith Litigation refuses to enter an order dismissing with prejudice all claims in those cases against Trustmark or refuses to enter a final judgment as to Trustmark and all claims against it as described in Paragraph 36(d); or if the final result of any appeal from the approvals, dismissals, orders, and final judgments described in Paragraphs 36(a), (b), (c), or (d) is that any of the approvals, dismissals, orders, or final judgments are not affirmed in their entirety and without material modification or limitation, then the Receiver, the Committee, and Trustmark each have the right to withdraw their agreement to the Settlement and to this Agreement by providing to all other Parties written notice of such withdrawal within fourteen (14) days of the order or judicial determination giving rise to the right to withdraw. The effective date of the withdrawal will be twenty-one (21) days after the notice of same, during which time the Parties agree to work together in good faith to attempt to negotiate an alternative settlement that either does not require court approval or that addresses the circumstances that led to the denial of the approval of this Settlement Agreement or the request for entry of required approvals and bar orders.

37. In the event that any Party withdraws its agreement to the Settlement or this Agreement as allowed in Paragraph 36, this Agreement and any orders or judgments entered pursuant thereto—even if such orders or judgments have become Final—will be null and void and of no further effect whatsoever except as set forth in Paragraph 38, shall not be admissible in any ongoing or future proceedings for any purpose whatsoever other than to effectuate the terms of Paragraph 38, and shall not be the subject or basis for any claims or defenses by any Party against any other Party other than to enforce the surviving terms of this Agreement. If any Party withdraws from this Agreement pursuant to the terms of Paragraph 36, then each Party shall be returned to such Party's respective position immediately prior to such Party's execution of the Agreement except as set forth in the surviving terms of this Agreement listed in Paragraph 38.

38. The Parties do not have the right to withdraw from, or otherwise terminate, the Agreement for any reason other than the reasons identified in Paragraph 36. The following paragraphs of this Agreement shall survive termination of the Agreement: 36, 37, 38, 49 and 50.

VII. Distribution Plan

39. Duties: The Receiver, with the approval and guidance of the Court, shall be solely responsible for preparing, filing a motion seeking approval of, and implementing the Distribution Plan including, without limitation, receiving, managing, and disbursing the Settlement Amount. The Receiver owes no duties to Trustmark or the Trustmark Released Parties in connection with the distribution of the Settlement Amount or the Distribution Plan except for Paragraph 40 of this Agreement (which duties are enforceable only by specific performance), and if the Receiver complies with all orders issued by the Court relating to the Distribution Plan neither Trustmark nor the Trustmark Released Parties may assert any claim or cause of action against the Receiver in connection with the distribution of the Settlement Amount or the Distribution Plan except for specific performance of Paragraph 40. In no event will the Receiver or the Receivership Estate be

liable for damages or the payment or re-payment of funds of any kind as a result of any deficiency associated with the distribution of the Settlement Amount or the Distribution Plan.

40. Distribution by Check: The Receiver must include the following statement, without alteration (except that additional releasees may be included if the Receiver includes in the distribution check funds from settlements with other releasees), on the reverse of all checks sent to Claimants pursuant to the Distribution Plan above where the endorser will sign:

BY ENDORSING THIS CHECK, I RELEASE ALL CLAIMS, KNOWN OR NOT, AGAINST TRUSTMARK NATIONAL BANK OR REPUBLIC NATIONAL BANK, AND THEIR EMPLOYEES (WHETHER CURRENT OR PAST), ARISING FROM OR RELATING TO STANFORD INTERNATIONAL BANK, LTD. OR ANY OF ITS RELATED ENTITIES AND ACCEPT THIS PAYMENT IN FULL SATISFACTION THEREOF.

41. No Responsibility: Trustmark and the Trustmark Released Parties shall have no responsibility, obligation, duties, or liability whatsoever with respect to the terms, interpretation, or implementation of the Distribution Plan; the administration of the Settlement; the management, investment, or distribution of the Settlement Amount or any other funds paid or received in connection with the Settlement; the payment or withholding of Taxes that may be due or owing by the Receiver or any recipient of funds from the Settlement Amount; the determination, administration, calculation, review, or challenge of claims to the Settlement Amount, any portion of the Settlement Amount, or any other funds paid or received in connection with the Settlement or this Agreement; or any losses, attorneys' fees, expenses, vendor payments, expert payments, or other costs incurred in connection with any of the foregoing matters. As of the Settlement Effective Date, the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs Released Parties, the Interested Parties, and all other individuals, Persons, or entities Plaintiffs represent or on whose behalf Plaintiffs have been empowered to act

by any court fully, finally, and forever release, relinquish, and discharge Trustmark and the Trustmark Released Parties from any and all such responsibility, obligation, duties, and liability.

VIII. Releases, Covenant Not to Sue, and Permanent Injunction

42. Release of Trustmark Released Parties: As of the Settlement Effective Date, each of the Plaintiffs, including, without limitation, the Receiver on behalf of the Receivership Estate (including the Stanford Entities but not including the natural persons listed in Paragraph 20 of this Agreement), fully, finally, and forever release, relinquish, and discharge, with prejudice, all Settled Claims against Trustmark and the Trustmark Released Parties.

43. Release of Plaintiffs Released Parties: As of the Settlement Effective Date, Trustmark fully, finally, and forever releases, relinquishes, and discharges, with prejudice, all Settled Claims against Plaintiffs Released Parties.

44. No Release of Obligations Under Agreement: Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Agreement, the releases and covenants contained in this Agreement do not release the Parties' rights and obligations under this Agreement or the Settlement, nor do they bar the Parties from enforcing or effectuating this Agreement or the Settlement.

45. Covenant Not to Sue: Effective as of the Agreement Date, Plaintiffs covenant not to, directly or indirectly, or through a third party, institute, reinstitute, initiate, commence, maintain, continue, file, encourage, solicit, support, participate in, collaborate in, or otherwise prosecute against any of the Trustmark Released Parties any action, lawsuit, cause of action, claim, investigation, demand, complaint, or proceeding, whether individually, derivatively, on behalf of a class, as a member of a class, or in any other capacity whatsoever, concerning or relating to the Settled Claims, whether in a court or any other Forum. Effective as of the Agreement Date, Trustmark covenants not to, directly or indirectly, or through a third party, institute, reinstitute, initiate, commence, maintain, continue, file, encourage, solicit, support, participate in, collaborate

in, or otherwise prosecute against any of the Plaintiffs Released Parties any action, lawsuit, cause of action, claim, investigation, demand, complaint, or proceeding, whether individually, derivatively, on behalf of a class, as a member of a class, or in any other capacity whatsoever, concerning or relating to the Settled Claims, whether in a court or any other Forum. Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, the Parties retain the right to sue for alleged breaches of this Agreement.

IX. Representations and Warranties

46. No Assignment, Encumbrance, or Transfer: The Plaintiffs, other than the Receiver, represent and warrant that they are the owners of the Settled Claims that they are releasing under this Agreement and that they have not, in whole or in part, assigned, encumbered, sold, pledged as security, or in any manner transferred or compromised any of the Settled Claims that they are releasing under this Agreement. The Receiver represents and warrants that he is the owner of the Settled Claims that he is releasing under this Agreement and that, other than assigning those Settled Claims against Trustmark that the Receiver transferred to the Committee, he has not, in whole or in part, assigned, encumbered, sold, pledged as security, or in any manner transferred or compromised any of the Settled Claims that he is releasing under this Agreement. Trustmark represents that it is the owner of the Settled Claims that it is releasing under this Agreement and that it has not, in whole or in part, assigned, encumbered, sold, pledged as security, or in any manner transferred or compromised any of the Settled Claims that it is releasing under this Agreement.

47. Bar Order. The Parties represent and warrant to each other that, other than the Rotstain Litigation, the Jackson Litigation, and the Smith Litigation, they are not presently aware of (a) any undismissed or otherwise extant claim or action against any of the Trustmark Released Parties concerning (i) the Settled Claims, (ii) the wrongdoing of the Stanford Entities that was the

subject of the Second Amended Complaint, or (b) any Person or entity intending to file such an action. The Parties further represent and warrant to each other that they are not aware of a current decision of the Fifth Circuit or United States Supreme Court invalidating the Bar Order or the Judgment and Bar Order.

48. Authority: Each Person executing this Agreement or any related documents represents and warrants that he or she has the full authority to execute the documents on behalf of the entity each represents and that each has the authority to take appropriate action required or permitted to be taken pursuant to this Agreement to effectuate its terms. The Committee represents and warrants that the Committee has approved this Agreement in accordance with the by-laws of the Committee.

X. No Admission of Fault or Wrongdoing

49. The Settlement, this Agreement, and the negotiation thereof shall in no way constitute, be construed as, or be evidence of an admission or concession of any violation of any statute or law; of any fault, liability, or wrongdoing; or of any infirmity in the claims or defenses of the Parties with regard to any of the complaints, claims, allegations, or defenses asserted or that could have been asserted in the Litigation, or any other proceeding relating to any Settled Claim, or any other proceeding in any Forum. The Settlement and this Agreement are a resolution of disputed claims in order to avoid the risk and substantial expense of protracted litigation. The Settlement, this Agreement, and evidence thereof shall not be used, directly or indirectly, in any way, in the Litigation, the SEC Action, or in any other proceeding, other than to enforce the terms of the Settlement and this Agreement.

XI. Confidentiality

50. Confidentiality: Except as necessary to obtain Court approval of this Agreement, to provide the Notices as required by this Agreement, or to enforce the terms of the

Settlement and this Agreement, the Parties and their counsel will keep confidential and shall not publish, communicate, or otherwise disclose, directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, Confidential Information to any Person except that (i) a Party may disclose Confidential Information to a Person or entity to whom disclosure is required pursuant to law or regulation, but only after providing prompt notice to the other Parties; (ii) Trustmark shall be permitted to disclose to its own officers, shareholders, employees, affiliates, current and potential insurers, insurance brokers, regulators, rating agencies, lawyers, auditors or accountants, on a confidential or attorney-client basis, the Settlement, the Agreement, its terms, the amount of the Settlement, and information about the Settlement negotiations; and (iii) a Party may disclose Confidential Information to a Person or entity if the Party has obtained prior written consent from all other Parties. Notwithstanding anything else in this Agreement or otherwise, such consent may be transmitted by e-mail. Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in the foregoing, the Parties agree that the Trustmark Released Parties may make disclosure regarding the Settlement and this Agreement in Forms 8-K, 10-K, and/or 10-Q filed with the SEC as well as conduct ancillary stakeholder communications, and they need not meet and confer with or provide notice to Plaintiffs before making such disclosure(s).

XII. Non-Disparagement

51. In connection with the Settlement and this Agreement, Plaintiffs and their counsel shall not make, disseminate, or publish any statement outside of Court, including a statement in the press, that would denigrate or embarrass the Trustmark Released Parties or that is otherwise negative or derogatory towards the Trustmark Released Parties. Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the Receiver or his counsel from reporting the Receiver's activities to the Court, the Examiner, or the SEC; from responding as necessary to inquiries from the Court or other governmental authorities; or from carrying out any of the Receiver's duties under any order

addressing the scope of the Receiver's duties, including but not limited to the Second Amended Receivership Order (SEC Action, ECF No. 1130) or other order addressing the scope of the Receiver's duties.

52. In connection with the Settlement and this Agreement, Trustmark and its counsel shall not make, disseminate, or publish any statement outside of Court, including a statement in the press, which would denigrate or embarrass Plaintiffs. Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent Trustmark from reporting its activities to the Court; from responding as necessary to inquiries from the Court or other governmental authorities; from taking any step it believes, in its sole and absolute discretion, is necessary to enforce the Settlement or this Agreement; from responding to any request by Plaintiffs or any other Person for discovery from Trustmark in any other litigation related to the Stanford Entities or any subpoena or request for production; or from discussing the Settled Claims, the Settlement, and this Agreement with its own officers, shareholders, employees, affiliates, current and potential insurers, insurance brokers, regulators, rating agencies, lawyers, auditors or accountants.

XIII. Miscellaneous

53. Final and Complete Resolution: The Parties intend this Agreement and the Settlement to be and constitute a final, complete, and worldwide resolution of all matters and disputes between and among (1) the Plaintiffs Released Parties and the Interested Parties, on the one hand, and (2) the Trustmark Released Parties on the other hand, and this Agreement, including its exhibits, shall be interpreted as one document to effectuate this purpose. For the avoidance of doubt, Trustmark expressly acknowledges that the Release granted by Trustmark to the Plaintiffs Released Parties includes a release of all of Trustmark's claims related to the funds that the Court ordered Trustmark to turn over to the Receiver on or about July 24, 2012, including any and all purported secured claims and the following identified claim numbers in the Receivership claims

process: Stanford 1013301-1, Stanford 1015093-5, Stanford 1015229-6, Stanford 1015268-7, Stanford 1015270-9, Stanford 1015287-3, and Stanford 1015410-8.

54. Binding Agreement: As of the Agreement Date, this Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of the Parties and their respective heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns. No Party may assign any of its rights or obligations under this Agreement without the express written consent of the other Parties.

55. Incorporation of Recitals: The Recitals (i.e. “whereas” clauses) contained in this Agreement are essential terms of this Agreement and are incorporated herein for all purposes.

56. Disclaimer of Reliance: The Parties represent and acknowledge that in negotiating and entering into the Settlement and this Agreement they have not relied on, and have not been induced by, any representation, warranty, statement, estimate, communication, information, or lack thereof, of any nature whatsoever, whether written or oral, by, on behalf of, or concerning any Party, any agent of any Party, or otherwise, except as expressly set forth in this Agreement. To the contrary, each of the Parties affirmatively represents and acknowledges that the Party is relying solely on the express terms contained within this Agreement. The Parties have each consulted with legal counsel and advisors, have considered the advantages and disadvantages of entering into the Settlement and this Agreement, and have relied solely on their own judgment and the advice of their respective legal counsel in negotiating and entering into the Settlement and this Agreement.

57. Third-Party Beneficiaries: This Agreement is not intended to and does not create rights enforceable by any Person other than the Parties (or their respective heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns, as provided in Paragraph 54 of this Agreement), except that the Trustmark Released Parties and the Plaintiff Released Parties are third-party beneficiaries of and may enforce the release or covenant not to sue as it relates to said Person.

58. Negotiation, Drafting, and Construction: The Parties agree and acknowledge that they each have reviewed and cooperated in the preparation of this Agreement, that no Party should or shall be deemed the drafter of this Agreement or any provision hereof, and that any rule, presumption, or burden of proof that would construe this Agreement, any ambiguity, or any other matter, against the drafter shall not apply and is waived. The Parties are entering into this Agreement freely, after good-faith, arm's-length negotiation, with the advice of counsel, and in the absence of coercion, duress, and undue influence. The titles and headings in this Agreement are for convenience only, are not part of this Agreement, and shall not bear on the meaning of this Agreement. The words "include," "includes," or "including" shall be deemed to be followed by the words "without limitation." The words "and" and "or" shall be interpreted broadly to have the most inclusive meaning, regardless of any conjunctive or disjunctive tense. Words in the masculine, feminine, or neuter gender shall include any gender. The singular shall include the plural and vice versa. "Any" shall be understood to include and encompass "all," and "all" shall be understood to include and encompass "any."

59. Cooperation: The Parties agree to execute any additional documents reasonably necessary to finalize and carry out the terms of this Agreement. In the event a third party or any Person other than a Party at any time challenges any term of this Agreement or the Settlement, including the Bar Order and the Judgment and Bar Order, the Parties agree to cooperate with each other, including using reasonable efforts to make documents or personnel available as needed, to defend any such challenge. Further, the Parties shall reasonably cooperate to defend and enforce each of the orders required under Paragraph 19 of this Agreement.

60. Notice: Any notices, documents, or correspondence of any nature required to be sent pursuant to this Agreement shall be transmitted by both e-mail and overnight delivery to the

following recipients, and will be deemed transmitted upon receipt by the overnight delivery service.

If to Trustmark:

Trustmark National Bank
Attn: Michael A. King
Senior Vice President and General Counsel
P.O. Box 291
Jackson, MS 39205-0291
Telephone: (601) 208-5088
Facsimile: (601) 208-6424
Email: MKing@trustmark.com

and

Robin C. Gibbs
Gibbs & Bruns LLP
1100 Louisiana St., Suite 5300
Houston, Texas 77002
Telephone: (713) 650-8805
Facsimile: (713) 750-0903
E-mail: rgibbs@gibbsbruns.com

and

Ashley M. Kleber
Gibbs & Bruns LLP
1100 Louisiana St., Suite 5300
Houston, Texas 77002
Telephone: (713) 650-8805
Facsimile: (713) 750-0903
E-mail: akleber@gibbsbruns.com

If to Plaintiffs:

James R. Swanson
Fishman Haygood, L.L.P.
201 St. Charles Avenue, 46th Floor
New Orleans, Louisiana 70170-4600
T: (504) 586-5252
F: (504) 586-5250
jswanson@fishmanhaygood.com

and

Edward C. Snyder
Castillo Snyder, PC
One Riverwalk Place
700 N. St. Mary's, Suite 405
San Antonio, Texas 78205
Telephone: 210-630-4200
Fax: 210-630-4210
E-mail: esnyder@casnlaw.com

and

John J. Little
John J. Little Law, PLLC
8150 N. Central Expressway, 10th Floor
Dallas, Texas 75206
Telephone: 214.989.4180
Cell: 214.573.2307
Fax: 214.367.6001
E-mail: john@johnlittlelaw.com

and

Ralph S. Janvey
2100 Ross Ave
Suite 2600
Dallas, TX 75201
E-mail: rjanvey@kjllp.com

and

Kevin Sadler
Baker Botts
1001 Page Mill Road
Building One, Suite 200

Palo Alto, California 94304-1007
E-mail: kevin.sadler@bakerbotts.com

Each Party shall provide notice of any change to the service information set forth above to all other Parties by the means set forth in this paragraph.

61. Choice of Law: This Agreement shall be governed by and construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of Texas, without regard to the choice-of-law principles of Texas or any other jurisdiction.

62. Mandatory, Exclusive Forum Selection Clause: Any dispute, controversy, or claim arising out of or related to the Settlement or this Agreement, including breach, interpretation, effect, or validity of this Agreement, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, shall be brought exclusively in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. With respect only to any such action, the Parties irrevocably stipulate and consent to personal and subject matter jurisdiction and venue in such court, and waive any argument that such court is inconvenient, improper, or otherwise an inappropriate forum.

63. United States Currency: All dollar amounts in this Agreement are expressed in United States dollars.

64. Timing: If any deadline imposed by this Agreement falls on a non-business day, then the deadline is extended until the next business day.

65. Waiver: The waiver by a Party of any breach of this Agreement by another Party shall not be deemed a waiver of any other prior or subsequent breach of this Agreement.

66. Exhibits: The exhibits annexed to this Agreement are incorporated by reference as though fully set forth in and a part of this Agreement.

67. Integration and Modification: This Agreement sets forth the entire understanding and agreement of the Parties with respect to the subject matter of this Agreement and supersedes

all prior agreements, understandings, negotiations, communications, or lack thereof, whether oral or written, with respect to such subject matter. Neither this Agreement, nor any provision or term of this Agreement, may be amended, modified, revoked, supplemented, waived, or otherwise changed except by a writing signed by all of the Parties.

68. Counterparts and Signatures: This Agreement may be executed in one or more counterparts, each of which for all purposes shall be deemed an original but all of which taken together shall constitute one and the same instrument. A signature delivered by fax or other electronic means shall be deemed to be, and shall have the same binding effect as, a handwritten, original signature.

IN WITNESS HEREOF, the Parties have executed this Agreement signifying their agreement to the foregoing terms.

Ralph S. Janvey, in his capacity as the Receiver for the Stanford Receivership Estate

Ralph S Janvey

Date: 11/13/23

John J. Little, in his capacity as Examiner

Date: _____

Official Stanford Investors Committee

Date: _____

By: John J. Little, Chairperson

all prior agreements, understandings, negotiations, communications, or lack thereof, whether oral or written, with respect to such subject matter. Neither this Agreement, nor any provision or term of this Agreement, may be amended, modified, revoked, supplemented, waived, or otherwise changed except by a writing signed by all of the Parties.

68. Counterparts and Signatures: This Agreement may be executed in one or more counterparts, each of which for all purposes shall be deemed an original but all of which taken together shall constitute one and the same instrument. A signature delivered by fax or other electronic means shall be deemed to be, and shall have the same binding effect as, a handwritten, original signature.

IN WITNESS HEREOF, the Parties have executed this Agreement signifying their agreement to the foregoing terms.

Ralph S. Janvey, in his capacity as the Receiver for the Stanford Receivership Estate


_____ Date: _____

John J. Little, in his capacity as Examiner


_____ Date: Jan 13, 2023


Official Stanford Investors Committee


_____ Date: Jan. 13, 2023
By: John J. Little, Chairperson




Guthrie Abbott
by James R. Swanson, attorney-in-fact

Date: 1/13/2023




Steven Queyrouze
by James R. Swanson, attorney-in-fact

Date: 1/13/2023




Salim Estefenn Uribe
by James R. Swanson, attorney-in-fact

Date: 1/13/2023




Sarah Elson-Rogers
by James R. Swanson, attorney-in-fact

Date: 1/13/2023




Diana Suarez
by James R. Swanson, attorney-in-fact

Date: 1/13/2023



Ruth Alfille de Penhos
by James R. Swanson, attorney-in-fact

Date: 1/13/2023



The Smith Investor Plaintiffs
(as defined in the Agreement)
Fishman Haygood, L.L.P.
by James R. Swanson, attorney-in-fact

Date: 1/13/2023

Trustmark National Bank

Date: _____

By: Michael A. King
Title: Senior Vice President and General
Counsel

Guthrie Abbott
by James R. Swanson, attorney-in-fact

Date: _____

Steven Queyrouze
by James R. Swanson, attorney-in-fact

Date: _____

Salim Estefenn Uribe
by James R. Swanson, attorney-in-fact

Date: _____

Sarah Elson-Rogers
by James R. Swanson, attorney-in-fact

Date: _____

Diana Suarez
by James R. Swanson, attorney-in-fact

Date: _____

Ruth Alfille de Penhos
by James R. Swanson, attorney-in-fact


Date: _____

The Smith Investor Plaintiffs
(as defined in the Agreement)
Fishman Haygood, L.L.P.
by James R. Swanson, attorney-in-fact

Date: _____

Trustmark National Bank

Date: January 13, 2023



By: Michael A. King
Title: Senior Vice President and General
Counsel

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION**

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE	§	
COMMISSION,	§	
	§	
Plaintiff,	§	
	§	
v.	§	Civil Action No. 3:09-CV-0298-N
	§	
STANFORD INTERNATIONAL BANK,	§	
LTD., <i>et al.</i> ,	§	
	§	
Defendants.	§	

NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AND BAR ORDER PROCEEDINGS

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Ralph S. Janvey, in his capacity as the Court-appointed Receiver for the Stanford Receivership Estate (the “Receiver”) and the Official Stanford Investors Committee (the “Committee”) (the Receiver and the Committee, collectively, the “Movants”), have reached an agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”) to settle all claims asserted or that could have been asserted against Trustmark National Bank (“Trustmark”) in *Rotstain, et al. v. Trustmark National Bank, et al.*, Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-00800 (S.D. Tex.) (the “Rotstain Litigation”), *Jackson, et al. v. Cox, et al.*, Civil Action No. 3:10-cv-00328-N (N.D. Tex.) (the “Jackson Litigation”), or *Smith, et al. v. Independent Bank, et al.*, Civil Action No. 4:20-cv-00675 (S.D. Tex.) (the “Smith Litigation”) (the Rostain Litigation, the Jackson Litigation, and the Smith Litigation are referred to collectively herein as the “Litigation”).

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that the Movants have filed an Expedited Request for Entry of Scheduling Order and Motion to Approve Proposed Settlement with Trustmark, to Approve the Proposed Notice of Settlement with Trustmark, to Enter the Bar Order, and to Enter the Rule 54(b) Final Judgment and Bar Order (the “Motion”), filed in *SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank,*

**TRUSTMARK SETTLEMENT
EXHIBIT A**

Ltd., No. 3:09-cv-0298-N (N.D. Tex.) (the “SEC Action”). Copies of the Settlement Agreement, the Motion, and other supporting papers may be obtained from the Court’s docket in the SEC Action (ECF No. [REDACTED]), and are also available on the websites of the Receiver (<http://www.stanfordfinancialreceivership.com>) and the Examiner (www.lpf-law.com/examiner-stanford-financial-group/). Copies of these documents may also be requested by email, by sending the request to Lara Richards at lrichards@fishmanhaygood.com; or by telephone, by calling (504) 586-5252. All capitalized terms not defined in this Notice of Settlement and Bar Order Proceedings are defined in the Settlement Agreement, attached as Exhibit 1 of the Appendix to the Motion.

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that the Motion requests that the Court approve the Settlement and enter a bar order permanently enjoining, among others, Interested Parties,¹ including Stanford Investors,² Plaintiffs,³ Claimants,⁴ and Joint Liquidators⁵ from pursuing Settled Claims,⁶ including claims you may possess, against Trustmark.

¹ “Interested Parties” means the Receiver; the Receivership Estate; the Committee; the members of the Committee; the Plaintiffs; the Stanford Investors; the Claimants; the Examiner; the Joint Liquidators; the Jackson Investor Plaintiffs; or any Person or Persons alleged by the Receiver, the Committee, or other Person or entity on behalf of the Receivership Estate to be liable to the Receivership Estate, whether or not a formal proceeding has been initiated.

² “Stanford Investors” means customers of Stanford International Bank, Ltd. (“SIB”), who, as of February 16, 2009, had funds on deposit at SIB, and/or were holding certificates of deposit issued by SIB.

³ “Plaintiffs” means the Receiver, the Committee, the individual plaintiffs in the Rostain Litigation (Guthrie Abbott, Steven Queyrouze, Salim Estefenn Uribe, Sarah Elson-Rogers, Diana Suarez, and Ruth Alfille de Penhos), and each of the plaintiffs in the Smith Litigation.

⁴ “Claimants” means any Persons who have submitted a Claim to the Receiver or to the Joint Liquidators.

⁵ “Joint Liquidators” means Hugh Dickson and Mark McDonald, in their capacities as the joint liquidators appointed by the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court in Antigua and Barbuda to take control of and manage the affairs and assets of SIB or any of their successors or predecessors.

⁶ “Settled Claim” generally means any action, cause of action, suit, liability, claim, right of action, right of levy or attachment, or demand whatsoever, whether or not currently asserted, known, suspected, existing, or discoverable, and whether based on federal law, state law, foreign law, common law, or otherwise, and whether based on contract, tort, statute, law, equity or otherwise, that a Releasor ever had, now has, or hereafter can, shall, or may

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that the settlement amount is one hundred million U.S. dollars (\$100,000,000.00) (the “Settlement Amount”). The Settlement Amount, less any fees and costs awarded by the Court to the attorneys for Plaintiffs and expenses paid by the Receiver (the “Net Settlement Amount”), will be deposited with and distributed by the Receiver pursuant to a Distribution Plan hereafter to be approved by the Court in the SEC Action (*see* subparagraph f below).

This matter may affect your rights and you may wish to consult an attorney.

The material terms of the Settlement Agreement include the following:

- a) Trustmark will pay \$100 million, which will be deposited with the Receiver as required pursuant to the Settlement Agreement;
- b) Plaintiffs will fully release the Trustmark Released Parties⁷ from Settled Claims, *e.g.*, claims arising from or relating to Robert Allen Stanford, the

have, directly, representatively, derivatively, or in any other capacity, for, upon, arising from, relating to, or by reason of any matter, cause, or thing whatsoever, that, in full or in part, concerns, relates to, arises out of, or is in any manner connected with (i) the Stanford Entities; (ii) any CD, depository account, or investment of any type with any one or more of the Stanford Entities; (iii) Trustmark’s relationship with any one or more of the Stanford Entities and/or any of their personnel or any Person acting by, through, or in concert with any Stanford Entity; (iv) Trustmark’s or any of the Trustmark Released Parties’ provision of services to or for the benefit of or on behalf of any one or more of the Stanford Entities; or (v) any matter that was asserted in, could have been asserted in, or relates to the subject matter of the SEC Action, the Litigation, or any proceeding concerning any of the Stanford Entities pending or commenced in any Forum. “Settled Claims” specifically includes, without limitation, all claims each Releasor does not know or suspect to exist in his, her, or its favor at the time of release, which, if known by that Person, might have affected their decisions with respect to this Agreement and the Settlement (“Unknown Claims”). Each Releasor expressly waives, releases, and relinquishes any and all provisions, rights, and benefits conferred by any law or principle, in the United States or elsewhere, which governs or limits the release of unknown or unsuspected claims, including, without limitation, California Civil Code § 1542. *See* Paragraph 16 of the Settlement Agreement for a complete definition of Settled Claim. (ECF No. .)

⁷ “Trustmark Released Parties” generally means Trustmark National Bank and all of its predecessor banks, including without limitation Republic National Bank, and, for each of the foregoing, all of their respective past and present subsidiaries, parents, predecessors, affiliates, related entities and divisions, and all of the foregoings’ respective past, present, and future successors, and all of their respective current and former partners, members, counsel, principals, participating principals, associates, managing or other agents, management personnel, officers, directors, shareholders, administrators, servants, employees, staff, consultants, advisors, attorneys, accountants, lenders, insurers and reinsurers, representatives, successors and assigns, known or unknown, in their

Stanford Entities,⁸ or any conduct by the Trustmark Released Parties relating to Robert Allen Stanford or the Stanford Entities, with prejudice;

- c) The Settlement Agreement seeks entry of a Judgment and Bar Order in the Jackson Litigation, and entry of a Bar Order in the SEC Action, each of which permanently enjoins, among others, Interested Parties, including all Stanford Investors, Investor Plaintiffs, and Claimants, from bringing, encouraging, assisting, continuing, or prosecuting, against Trustmark or any of the Trustmark Released Parties, the Litigation, or any action, lawsuit, cause of action, claim, investigation, demand, complaint, or proceeding of any nature, including, without limitation, contribution or indemnity claims, arising from or relating to a Settled Claim;
- d) The Committee and the Rotstain Investor Plaintiffs will fully and finally dismiss their claims against Trustmark in the Rotstain Litigation with prejudice. The Smith Investor Plaintiffs will fully and finally dismiss their claims against Trustmark in the Smith Litigation with prejudice.
- e) The Receiver will disseminate notice of the Settlement Agreement (i.e. this Notice) to Interested Parties, through one or more of the following: mail, email, international delivery, CM/ECF notification, facsimile transmission, and/or

representative capacity or individual capacity. See Paragraph 22 of the Settlement Agreement for a complete definition of Trustmark Released Parties. (ECF No. [REDACTED].)

⁸ “Stanford Entities” means Robert Allen Stanford; James M. Davis; Laura Pendergest-Holt; Gilbert Lopez; Mark Kuhrt; SIB; Stanford Group Company; Stanford Capital Management, LLC; Stanford Financial Group; the Stanford Financial Bldg Inc.; the entities listed in Exhibit D to the Settlement Agreement (ECF No. [REDACTED]); and any entity of any type that was owned, controlled by, or affiliated with Robert Allen Stanford, James M. Davis, Laura Pendergest-Holt, Gilbert Lopez, Mark Kuhrt, SIB, Stanford Group Company, Stanford Capital Management, LLC, Stanford Financial Group, or the Stanford Financial Bldg Inc., on or before February 16, 2009.

publication on the websites maintained by the Examiner (www.lpf-law.com/examiner-stanford-financial-group/) and the Receiver (<http://www.stanfordfinancialreceivership.com>);

- f) The Receiver will develop and submit to the Court for approval a plan for distributing the Net Settlement Amount (the “Distribution Plan”);
- g) Under the Distribution Plan, once approved, the Net Settlement Amount will be distributed by the Receiver, under the supervision of the Court, to Stanford Investors who have submitted Claims that have been allowed by the Receiver;
- h) Persons who accept funds from the Settlement Amount will, upon accepting the funds, fully release the Trustmark Released Parties from any and all Settled Claims; and
- i) The Litigation will be dismissed with prejudice as to Trustmark, with each party bearing its own costs and attorneys’ fees.

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs seek a fee award based upon 25% of the Settlement Amount, pursuant to 25% contingency fee agreements with the Plaintiffs. Twenty-Five percent of the net recovery from the Settlement is to be calculated but shall not exceed \$25,000,000.00.

The final hearing on the Motion is set for [REDACTED] (the “Final Approval Hearing”). Any objection to the Settlement Agreement or its terms, the Motion, the Judgment and Bar Order, the Bar Order, or the request for approval of the Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees must be filed, in writing, with the Court in the SEC Action no later than [insert date of 21st day before Final Approval Hearing] with such written objection complying with the requirements of Paragraph 4 of the Scheduling Order (ECF No. [REDACTED]) in the SEC Action. Any objections not filed by this date will be deemed waived and will not be considered by the Court. Those wishing to appear and to

orally present their written objections at the Final Approval Hearing must include a request to so appear within their written objections.

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION**

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

v.

STANFORD INTERNATIONAL BANK,
LTD., *et al.*,

Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 3:09-CV-0298-N

FINAL BAR ORDER

Before the Court is the Expedited Request for Entry of Scheduling Order and Motion to Approve Proposed Settlement with Trustmark, to Approve the Proposed Notice of Settlement with Trustmark, to Enter the Bar Order, and to Enter Rule 54(b) Final Judgment and Bar Order (ECF No. [REDACTED], the “Motion”) filed by Ralph S. Janvey, in his capacity as the Court-appointed Receiver for the Stanford Receivership Estate (the “Receiver”), and the Court-appointed Official Stanford Investors Committee (the “Committee”), the latter being a plaintiff in *Rotstain, et al. v. Trustmark National Bank, et al.*, Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-00800 (S.D. Tex.) (the “Rotstain Litigation”). The Motion concerns a proposed settlement (the “Settlement”) between and among, on the one hand, the Receiver, the Committee, each of the individual plaintiffs in the Rotstain Litigation (the “Rotstain Investor Plaintiffs”), each of the plaintiffs in *Smith, et al. v. Independent Bank, et al.*, Civil Action No. 4-20-CV-00675 (S.D. Tex) (the “Smith Investor Plaintiffs” and the “Smith Litigation”), and on the other hand, Trustmark National Bank (“Trustmark”). The Receiver, the Committee, the Rotstain Investor Plaintiffs, and the Smith Investor Plaintiffs are collectively referred to as the “Plaintiffs.” Plaintiffs, on the one hand, and Trustmark, on the other hand, are referred to individually as a “Party” and together as the “Parties.” John J. Little signed the

Settlement Agreement as chair of the Committee.¹ Mr. Little, the Court-appointed Examiner (the “Examiner”), also signed the Settlement Agreement in his capacity as Examiner solely to evidence his support and approval of the Settlement and to confirm his obligation to post the Notice on his website; but Mr. Little as Examiner is not otherwise individually a party to the Settlement Agreement or any of the above-referenced litigation.

Following notice and a hearing, and having considered the filings and heard the arguments of counsel, the Motion is hereby **GRANTED**.

I. INTRODUCTION

This litigation as well as the Rotstain Litigation, the Smith Litigation, and *Jackson, et al. v. Cox et al.*, Civil Action No. 3:10-cv-0328 (N.D. Tex.) (the “Jackson Litigation” brought by individual plaintiffs herein referred to collectively as the “Jackson Investor Plaintiffs”) arise from a series of events leading to the collapse of Stanford International Bank, Ltd. (“SIBL”) and other companies owned or controlled by Robert Allen Stanford (with SIBL, the “Stanford Entities”).² On February 16, 2009, this Court appointed Ralph S. Janvey to be the Receiver for the Stanford Entities. (ECF No. 10). After years of investigation, the Plaintiffs believe that they have identified claims against a number of third parties, including Trustmark, which Plaintiffs allege enabled the Stanford Ponzi scheme. In the Rotstain Litigation, the plaintiffs assert claims against Trustmark and other defendants for (1) aiding, abetting, or participation in violations of the Texas Securities

¹ The Settlement Agreement is attached as Exhibit 1 of the Appendix to the Motion (ECF No. [REDACTED]).

² All references in this Order to the Rotstain Litigation, the Smith Litigation, and the Jackson Litigation shall also apply to any actions severed from either of those cases.

Act (“TSA”) and (2) aiding, abetting, or participation in breach of fiduciary duty.³ In the Smith Litigation, the plaintiffs assert claims against Trustmark and other defendants for (1) aiding, abetting, or participation in a fraudulent scheme; (2) aiding, abetting, or participation in violations of the TSA; (3) aiding, abetting, or participation in breach of fiduciary duty; (4) aiding, abetting, or participation in conversion; and (5) civil conspiracy. In the Jackson Litigation, the plaintiffs assert claims against Trustmark and other defendants for (1) negligence, (2) breach of contract, (3) violations of Uniform Fiduciaries Law, (4) negligent misrepresentation, (5) detrimental reliance, (6) violations and/or aiding and abetting violations of the Louisiana Securities Act, (7) violations of the Louisiana Racketeering Act, and (8) conspiracy. Trustmark denies that it is liable under any of those claims and asserts numerous defenses to each of those claims.

Settlement negotiations occurred in 2022 and 2023. In these negotiations, potential victims of the Stanford Ponzi scheme were well-represented. The Committee—which the Court appointed to “represent[] in this case and related matters” the “customers of SIBL who, as of February 16, 2009, had funds on deposit at SIBL and/or were holding certificates of deposit issued by SIBL (the ‘Stanford Investors’)” (ECF No. 1149)—the Receiver, and the Examiner—who the Court appointed to advocate on behalf of “investors in any financial products, accounts, vehicles or ventures sponsored, promoted or sold by any Defendant in this action” (ECF No. 322)—all participated in these extensive, arm’s-length negotiations. On December 31, 2022, the Parties

³ Originally, claims were also brought against Trustmark for (1) avoidance and recovery of fraudulent transfers under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act; (2) aiding, abetting, or participation in fraudulent transfers; (3) aiding, abetting, or participation in a fraudulent scheme; (4) aiding, abetting, or participation in conversion; and (5) civil conspiracy. Those claims were either dismissed by the MDL Court or abandoned by the plaintiffs over the course of the litigation. In addition, the plaintiffs in the Rotstain Litigation continue to bring a claim for avoidance and recovery of fraudulent transfers against certain defendants but not Trustmark.

reached an agreement in principle resulting in the Settlement. For a short time thereafter, the Parties continued negotiating in order to document the exact terms of the Settlement in the written Settlement Agreement.

Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Trustmark will pay \$100 million (the “Settlement Amount”) to the Receivership Estate, which (less attorneys’ fees and expenses) will be distributed to Stanford Investors. In return, Trustmark is to obtain total peace with respect to all claims that have been, or could have been, asserted against Trustmark or any of the Trustmark Released Parties arising in any respect out of the events leading to these proceedings. Accordingly, the Settlement is conditioned on the Court’s approval and entry of this Final Bar Order enjoining Interested Parties and other Persons holding any potential claim against Trustmark relating to these proceedings from asserting or prosecuting claims against Trustmark or any of the Trustmark Released Parties.

On [REDACTED], 2023, the Receiver and the Committee (the “Movants”) filed the Motion. (ECF No. [REDACTED]). The Court thereafter entered a Scheduling Order on [REDACTED], 2023. (ECF No. [REDACTED]), which, *inter alia*, authorized the Receiver to provide notice of the Settlement, established a briefing schedule on the Motion, and set the date for a hearing. On [REDACTED], 2023, the Court held the scheduled hearing. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that the terms of the Settlement Agreement are adequate, fair, reasonable, and equitable, and that the Settlement should be and is hereby **APPROVED**. The Court further finds that entry of this Final Bar Order is appropriate and necessary.

II. ORDER

It is hereby **ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED** as follows:

1. Terms used in this Final Bar Order that are defined in the Settlement Agreement, unless expressly otherwise defined herein, have the same meaning as in the Settlement Agreement (which is deemed incorporated herein by reference).

2. The Court has “broad powers and wide discretion to determine the appropriate relief in [this] equity receivership,” including the authority to enter the Final Bar Order. *SEC v. Kaleta*, 530 F. App’x 360, 362 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations omitted); *see also Zacarias v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd.*, 945 F.3d 883, 897 (5th Cir. 2019) (receivership court authority includes entering “bar orders foreclosing suit against third-party defendants with whom the receiver is also engaged in litigation”). Moreover, the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action, and the Receiver and the Committee are proper parties to seek entry of this Final Bar Order.

3. The Court finds that the methodology, form, content, and dissemination of the Notice (i) were implemented in accordance with the requirements of the Scheduling Order; (ii) constituted the best practicable notice; (iii) were reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise all Interested Parties of the Settlement, the releases and dismissals therein, and the injunctions provided for in this Final Bar Order as well as in the Rule 54(b) Final Judgment and Bar Order to be entered in the Jackson Litigation; (iv) were reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise all Interested Parties of the right to object to the Settlement, this Final Bar Order, and the Rule 54(b) Final Judgment and Bar Order to be entered in the Jackson Litigation as well as to appear at the final approval Hearing; (v) were reasonable and constituted due, adequate, and sufficient notice; (vi) met all applicable requirements of law, including, without limitation, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the United States Constitution (including Due Process), and the Rules of the Court; and (vii) provided to all Persons a full and fair opportunity to be heard on these matters.

4. The Court finds that the Settlement, including without limitation, the Settlement Amount, was reached following an extensive investigation of the facts and resulted from vigorous, good faith, arm's-length negotiations involving experienced and competent counsel. The Court further finds that (i) significant issues exist as to the merits and value of the claims asserted against Trustmark by Plaintiffs and by others whose potential claims are foreclosed by this Final Bar Order; (ii) such claims contain complex and novel issues of law and fact that would require a substantial amount of time and expense to litigate, with uncertainty regarding whether such claims would be successful; (iii) a significant risk exists that future litigation costs would dissipate Receivership Assets and that Plaintiffs and other persons who have submitted claims to the Receiver may not ultimately prevail on their claims; (iv) Plaintiffs and Claimants who have filed Claims with the Receiver will receive partial satisfaction of their claims from the Settlement Amount being paid pursuant to the Settlement; and (v) Trustmark would not have agreed to the terms of the Settlement in the absence of this Final Bar Order and the assurance of "total peace" with respect to all claims that have been, or could be, asserted by any Persons arising from any aspect of Trustmark's relationship with the Stanford Entities. *See SEC v. Kaleta*, No. 4:09-3674, 2012 WL 401069, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2012), *aff'd*, 530 F. App'x 360 (5th Cir. 2013) (approving these factors for consideration in evaluating whether a settlement and bar order are sufficient, fair, and necessary). The injunction against such claims as set forth herein is, therefore, a necessary and appropriate order ancillary to the relief obtained for victims of the Stanford Ponzi scheme pursuant to the Settlement. *See Kaleta*, 530 F. App'x at 362 (affirming a bar order and injunction against investor claims as "ancillary relief" to a settlement in an SEC receivership proceeding). After careful consideration of the record and applicable law, the Court concludes

that the Settlement is the best option for maximizing the net amount recoverable from Trustmark for the Receivership Estate, Plaintiffs, and the Claimants.

5. Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement and upon motion by the Receiver, this Court will approve a Distribution Plan that will fairly and reasonably distribute the net proceeds of the Settlement to Stanford Investors who have Claims approved by the Receiver. The Court finds that the Receiver's claims process and the Distribution Plan contemplated in the Settlement Agreement have been designed to ensure that all Stanford Investors have received an opportunity to pursue their Claims through the Receiver's claims process previously approved by the Court. (ECF No. 1584).

6. The Court further finds that the Parties and their counsel have at all times complied with the requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

7. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Settlement is, in all respects, fair, reasonable, and adequate, and in the best interests of all Persons claiming an interest in, having authority over, or asserting a claim against Trustmark, the Stanford Entities, or the Receivership Estate, including but not limited to the Plaintiffs and the Interested Parties. The Court also finds that this Final Bar Order is a necessary component to achieve the Settlement. The Settlement, the terms of which are set forth in the Settlement Agreement, is hereby fully and finally approved. The Parties are directed to implement and consummate the Settlement in accordance with the terms and provisions of the Settlement Agreement and this Final Bar Order.

8. Pursuant to the provisions of Paragraph 42 of the Settlement Agreement, as of the Settlement Effective Date, Trustmark and the Trustmark Released Parties shall be completely released, acquitted, and forever discharged from any action, cause of action, suit, liability, claim, right of action, right of levy or attachment, or demand whatsoever, whether or not currently

asserted, known, suspected, existing, or discoverable, and whether based on federal law, state law, foreign law, common law, or otherwise, and whether based on contract, tort, statute, law, equity or otherwise, that the Plaintiffs, including without limitation the Receiver on behalf of the Receivership Estate (including the Stanford Entities); the Claimants; and the Persons, entities, and interests represented by those parties ever had, now has, or hereafter can, shall, or may have, directly, representatively, derivatively, or in any other capacity, for, upon, arising from, relating to, or by reason of any matter, cause, or thing whatsoever, that, in full or in part, concerns, relates to, arises out of, or is in any manner connected with (i) the Stanford Entities; (ii) any certificate of deposit, depository account, or investment of any type with any one or more of the Stanford Entities; (iii) Trustmark's or any of the Trustmark Released Parties' relationship with any one or more of the Stanford Entities and/or any of their personnel or any Person acting by, through, or in concert with any Stanford Entity; (iv) Trustmark's or any of the Trustmark Released Parties' provision of services to or for the benefit of or on behalf of any one or more of the Stanford Entities; or (v) any matter that was asserted in, could have been asserted in, or relates in any respect to the subject matter of this action, the Rotstain Litigation, the Smith Litigation, the Jackson Litigation, or any proceeding concerning any of the Stanford Entities pending or commenced in any Forum.

9. Pursuant to the provisions of Paragraph 43 of the Settlement Agreement, as of the Settlement Effective Date, the Plaintiffs Released Parties shall be completely released, acquitted, and forever discharged from all Settled Claims by Trustmark.

10. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Final Bar Order, the foregoing releases do not release the Parties' rights and obligations under the Settlement Agreement or bar the Parties from enforcing or effectuating the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Further, the foregoing releases do not bar or release any claims, including but not limited to the Settled Claims,

that Trustmark may have against any Trustmark Released Party, including but not limited to Trustmark's insurers, reinsurers, employees, and agents.

11. The Court hereby permanently bars, restrains, and enjoins the Plaintiffs, the Claimants, the Interested Parties, and all other Persons or entities anywhere in the world, whether acting in concert with the foregoing or claiming by, through, or under the foregoing, or otherwise, all and individually, from directly, indirectly, or through a third party, instituting, reinstating, intervening in, initiating, commencing, maintaining, continuing, filing, encouraging, soliciting, supporting, participating in, collaborating in, or otherwise prosecuting, against Trustmark or any of the Trustmark Released Parties any action, lawsuit, cause of action, claim, investigation, demand, levy, complaint, or proceeding of any nature in any Forum, including, without limitation, any court of first instance or any appellate court, whether individually, derivatively, on behalf of a class, as a member of a class, or in any other capacity whatsoever, that in any way relates to, is based upon, arises from, or is connected with the Stanford Entities; this case; the subject matter of this case, the Rotstain Litigation, the Smith Litigation, and/or the Jackson Litigation; or any Settled Claim. The foregoing specifically includes any claim, however denominated and whether brought in the Rotstain Litigation, the Smith Litigation, the Jackson Litigation, or any other Forum, seeking contribution, indemnity, damages, or other remedy where the alleged injury to such Person, entity, or Interested Party, or the claim asserted by such Person, entity, or Interested Party, is based upon such Person's, entity's, or Interested Party's liability to any Plaintiff, Claimant, or Interested Party arising out of, relating to, or based in whole or in part upon money owed, demanded, requested, offered, paid, agreed to be paid, or required to be paid to any Plaintiff, Claimant, Interested Party, or other Person or entity, whether pursuant to a demand, judgment, claim, agreement, settlement or otherwise. Notwithstanding the foregoing, there shall be no bar of any claims, including but

not limited to the Settled Claims, that Trustmark may have against any Trustmark Released Party, including but not limited to Trustmark's insurers, reinsurers, employees, and agents. Further, the Parties retain the right to sue for alleged breaches of the Settlement Agreement.

12. The releases and the covenants not to sue set forth in the Settlement Agreement, and the releases, bars, injunctions, and restraints set forth in this Final Bar Order, do not limit in any way the evidence that Plaintiffs may offer against the remaining defendants in the Rotstain Litigation or the Smith Litigation.

13. Nothing in this Final Bar Order shall impair, affect, or be construed to impair or affect in any way whatsoever any right of any Person, entity, or Interested Party to (a) claim a credit or offset, however determined or quantified, if and to the extent provided by any applicable statute, code, or rule of law, against any judgment amount, based upon the Settlement or payment of the Settlement Amount; (b) designate a "responsible third party" or "settling person" under Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code; or (c) take discovery under applicable rules in litigation; provided for the avoidance of doubt that nothing in this paragraph shall be interpreted to permit or authorize any action or claim seeking to impose any liability of any kind (including but not limited to liability for contribution, indemnification or otherwise) upon Trustmark or any Trustmark Released Party.

14. Trustmark and the Trustmark Released Parties have no responsibility, obligation, or liability whatsoever with respect to the content of the Notice; the notice process; the Distribution Plan; the implementation of the Distribution Plan; the administration of the Settlement; the management, investment, distribution, allocation, or other administration or oversight of the Settlement Amount, any other funds paid or received in connection with the Settlement, or any portion thereof; the payment or withholding of Taxes; the determination, administration,

calculation, review, or challenge of claims to the Settlement Amount, any portion of the Settlement Amount, or any other funds paid or received in connection with the Settlement or the Settlement Agreement; or any losses, attorneys' fees, expenses, vendor payments, expert payments, or other costs incurred in connection with any of the foregoing matters. No appeal, challenge, decision, or other matter concerning any subject set forth in this paragraph shall operate to terminate or cancel the Settlement, the Settlement Agreement, or this Final Bar Order.

15. Nothing in this Final Bar Order or the Settlement Agreement and no aspect of the Settlement or negotiation thereof is or shall be construed to be an admission or concession of any violation of any statute or law; of any fault, liability, or wrongdoing; or of any infirmity in the claims or defenses of the Parties with regard to any of the complaints, claims, allegations, or defenses in the Rotstain Litigation, the Smith Litigation, the Jackson Litigation, or any other proceeding.

16. The Committee, the Rotstain Investor Plaintiffs, and Trustmark are ordered to file the agreed motion to dismiss and motion for final judgment in the Rotstain Litigation as specified in Paragraph 25 of the Settlement Agreement by the deadline set forth in that paragraph. The Smith Investor Plaintiffs and Trustmark are ordered to file the agreed motion to dismiss and motion for final judgment in the Smith Litigation as specified in Paragraph 26 of the Settlement Agreement by the deadline set forth in that paragraph. Trustmark is hereby ordered to deliver or cause to be delivered the Settlement Amount (\$100 million) pursuant to the terms of and subject to the conditions of the Settlement Agreement. Further, the Parties are ordered to act in conformity with all other provisions of the Settlement Agreement.

17. Without in any way affecting the finality of this Final Bar Order, the Court retains continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over the Parties for purposes of, among other things, the

administration, interpretation, consummation, and enforcement of the Settlement, the Settlement Agreement, the Scheduling Order, and this Final Bar Order, including without limitation, the injunctions, bar orders, and releases herein, and to enter orders concerning implementation of the Settlement, the Settlement Agreement, the Distribution Plan, and any payment of attorneys' fees and expenses to Plaintiffs' counsel.

18. The Court expressly finds and determines, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), that there is no just reason for any delay in the entry of this Final Bar Order, which is both final and appealable, and immediate entry by the Clerk of the Court is expressly directed.

19. This Final Bar Order shall be served by counsel for the Plaintiffs, via email, first class mail or international delivery service, on any person or entity that filed an objection to approval of the Settlement, the Settlement Agreement, or this Final Bar Order.

20. This is a final Rule 54(b) judgment. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter Judgment as to Trustmark in conformity herewith.

Signed on _____

DAVID C. GODBEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION**

HAROLD JACKSON, *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JAMES KEITH COX., *et al.*,

Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 3:10-cv-0328

RULE 54(B) FINAL JUDGMENT AND BAR ORDER

Before the Court is the Expedited Request for Entry of Scheduling Order and Motion to Approve Proposed Settlement with Trustmark, to Approve the Proposed Notice of Settlement with Trustmark, to Enter the Bar Order, and to Enter Rule 54(b) Final Judgment and Bar Order (ECF No. [REDACTED], the “Motion”) filed by Ralph S. Janvey, in his capacity as the Court-appointed Receiver for the Stanford Receivership Estate (the “Receiver”), and the Court-appointed Official Stanford Investors Committee (the “Committee”), the latter being a plaintiff in *Rotstain, et al. v. Trustmark National Bank, et al.*, Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-00800 (S.D. Tex.) (the “Rotstain Litigation”). The Motion concerns a proposed settlement (the “Settlement”) between and among, on the one hand, the Receiver, the Committee, each of the individual plaintiffs in the Rotstain Litigation (the “Rotstain Investor Plaintiffs”), each of the plaintiffs in *Smith, et al. v. Independent Bank, et al.*, Civil Action No. 4-20-CV-00675 (S.D. Tex) (the “Smith Investor Plaintiffs” and the “Smith Litigation”), and on the other hand, Trustmark National Bank (“Trustmark”). The Receiver, the Committee, the Rotstain Investor Plaintiffs, and the Smith Investor Plaintiffs are collectively referred to as the “Plaintiffs.” Plaintiffs, on the one hand, and Trustmark, on the other hand, are referred to individually as a “Party” and together as the “Parties.” John J. Little signed the

Settlement Agreement as chair of the Committee.¹ Mr. Little, the Court-appointed Examiner (the “Examiner”), also signed the Settlement Agreement in his capacity as Examiner solely to evidence his support and approval of the Settlement and to confirm his obligation to post the Notice on his website; but Mr. Little as Examiner is not otherwise individually a party to the Settlement Agreement or any of the above-referenced litigation.

Following notice and a hearing, and having considered the filings and heard the arguments of counsel, the Motion is hereby **GRANTED**.

I. INTRODUCTION

This litigation (the “Jackson Litigation” brought by individual plaintiffs herein referred to collectively as the “Jackson Investor Plaintiffs”) as well as the Rotstain Litigation, the Smith Litigation, and *SEC v. SIBL, et al.*, Civil Action No. 3:09-cv-0298-N (N.D. Tex.) (the “SEC Action”) arise from a series of events leading to the collapse of Stanford International Bank, Ltd. (“SIBL”) and other companies owned or controlled by Robert Allen Stanford (with SIBL, the “Stanford Entities”).² On February 16, 2009, this Court appointed Ralph S. Janvey to be the Receiver for the Stanford Entities. (ECF No. 10). After years of investigation, the Plaintiffs believe that they have identified claims against a number of third parties, including Trustmark, which Plaintiffs allege enabled the Stanford Ponzi scheme. In the Jackson Litigation, the plaintiffs assert claims against Trustmark and other defendants for (1) negligence, (2) breach of contract, (3) violations of Uniform Fiduciaries Law, (4) negligent misrepresentation, (5) detrimental reliance,

¹ The Settlement Agreement is attached as Exhibit 1 of the Appendix to the Motion (ECF No. [REDACTED]).

² The Plaintiffs’ Petition in the Jackson Litigation incorrectly names Trustmark as “Trust National Bank.” For the avoidance of confusion, this Rule 54(b) Final Judgment and Bar Order applies to Trustmark even as incorrectly named by Plaintiffs.

(6) violations and/or aiding and abetting violations of the Louisiana Securities Act, (7) violations of the Louisiana Racketeering Act, and (8) conspiracy. In the Rotstain Litigation, the plaintiffs assert claims against Trustmark and other defendants for (1) aiding, abetting, or participation in violations of the Texas Securities Act (“TSA”) and (2) aiding, abetting, or participation in breach of fiduciary duty.³ In the Smith Litigation, the plaintiffs assert claims against Trustmark and other defendants for (1) aiding, abetting, or participation in a fraudulent scheme; (2) aiding, abetting, or participation in violations of the TSA; (3) aiding, abetting, or participation in breach of fiduciary duty; (4) aiding, abetting, or participation in conversion; and (5) civil conspiracy. Trustmark denies that it is liable under any of those claims and asserts numerous defenses to each of those claims.

Settlement negotiations occurred in 2022 and 2023. In these negotiations, potential victims of the Stanford Ponzi scheme were well-represented. The Committee—which the Court appointed to “represent[] in this case and related matters” the “customers of SIBL who, as of February 16, 2009, had funds on deposit at SIBL and/or were holding certificates of deposit issued by SIBL (the ‘Stanford Investors’)” (ECF No. 1149)—the Receiver, and the Examiner—who the Court appointed to advocate on behalf of “investors in any financial products, accounts, vehicles or ventures sponsored, promoted or sold by any Defendant in this action” (ECF No. 322)—all participated in these extensive, arm’s-length negotiations. On December 31, 2022, the Parties

³ Originally, claims were also brought against Trustmark for (1) avoidance and recovery of fraudulent transfers under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act; (2) aiding, abetting, or participation in fraudulent transfers; (3) aiding, abetting, or participation in a fraudulent scheme; (4) aiding, abetting, or participation in conversion; and (5) civil conspiracy. Those claims were either dismissed by the MDL Court or abandoned by the plaintiffs over the course of the litigation. In addition, the plaintiffs in the Rotstain Litigation continue to bring a claim for avoidance and recovery of fraudulent transfers against certain defendants but not Trustmark.

reached an agreement in principle resulting in the Settlement. For a short time thereafter, the Parties continued negotiating in order to document the exact terms of the Settlement in the written Settlement Agreement.

Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Trustmark will pay \$100 million (the “Settlement Amount”) to the Receivership Estate, which (less attorneys’ fees and expenses) will be distributed to Stanford Investors. In return, Trustmark is to obtain total peace with respect to all claims that have been, or could have been, asserted against Trustmark or any of the Trustmark Released Parties arising in any respect out of the events leading to these proceedings. Accordingly, the Settlement is conditioned on the Court’s approval and entry of this Rule 54(b) Final Judgment and Bar Order enjoining the Jackson Investor Plaintiffs and other Persons holding any potential claim against Trustmark relating to these proceedings from asserting or prosecuting claims against Trustmark or any of the Trustmark Released Parties.

On [REDACTED], 2023, the Receiver and the Committee (the “Movants”) filed the Motion. (ECF No. [REDACTED]). The Court thereafter entered a Scheduling Order on [REDACTED], 2023. (ECF No. [REDACTED]), which, *inter alia*, authorized the Receiver to provide notice of the Settlement, established a briefing schedule on the Motion, and set the date for a hearing. On [REDACTED], 2023, the Court held the scheduled hearing. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that the terms of the Settlement Agreement are adequate, fair, reasonable, and equitable, and that the Settlement should be and is hereby **APPROVED**. The Court further finds that entry of this Rule 54(b) Final Judgment and Bar Order is appropriate and necessary.

II. ORDER

It is hereby **ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED** as follows:

1. Terms used in this Rule 54(b) Final Judgment and Bar Order that are defined in the Settlement Agreement, unless expressly otherwise defined herein, have the same meaning as in the Settlement Agreement (which is deemed incorporated herein by reference).

2. The Court has “broad powers and wide discretion to determine the appropriate relief in [this] equity receivership,” including the authority to enter the Rule 54(b) Final Judgment and Bar Order. *SEC v. Kaleta*, 530 F. App’x 360, 362 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations omitted); *see also Zacarias v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd.*, 945 F.3d 883, 897 (5th Cir. 2019) (receivership court authority includes entering “bar orders foreclosing suit against third-party defendants with whom the receiver is also engaged in litigation”). Moreover, the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action, and the the Receiver and the Committee are proper parties to seek entry of this Rule 54(b) Final Judgment and Bar Order.

3. The Court finds that the methodology, form, content, and dissemination of the Notice (i) were implemented in accordance with the requirements of the Scheduling Order; (ii) constituted the best practicable notice; (iii) were reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise all Interested Parties of the Settlement, the releases and dismissals therein, and the injunctions provided for in this Rule 54(b) Final Judgment and Bar Order as well as the Final Bar Order to be entered in the SEC Action; (iv) were reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise all Interested Parties of the right to object to the Settlement, the Final Bar Order, and this Rule 54(b) Final Judgment and Bar Order as well as to appear at the final approval Hearing; (v) were reasonable and constituted due, adequate, and sufficient notice; (vi) met all applicable requirements of law, including, without limitation, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the United States Constitution (including Due Process), and the Rules of the Court; and (vii) provided to all Persons a full and fair opportunity to be heard on these matters.

4. The Court finds that the Settlement, including without limitation, the Settlement Amount, was reached following an extensive investigation of the facts and resulted from vigorous, good faith, arm's-length negotiations involving experienced and competent counsel. The Court further finds that (i) significant issues exist as to the merits and value of the claims asserted against Trustmark by the Jackson Plaintiffs and by others whose potential claims are foreclosed by this Rule 54(b) Final Judgment and Bar Order; (ii) such claims contain complex and novel issues of law and fact that would require a substantial amount of time and expense to litigate, with uncertainty regarding whether such claims would be successful; (iii) a significant risk exists that future litigation costs would dissipate Receivership Assets and that Plaintiffs and other persons who have submitted claims to the Receiver may not ultimately prevail on their claims; (iv) Plaintiffs and Claimants who have filed Claims with the Receiver will receive partial satisfaction of their claims from the Settlement Amount being paid pursuant to the Settlement; and (v) Trustmark would not have agreed to the terms of the Settlement in the absence of this Rule 54(b) Final Judgment and Bar Order and the assurance of "total peace" with respect to all claims that have been, or could be, asserted by any Persons arising from any aspect of Trustmark's relationship with the Stanford Entities. *See SEC v. Kaleta*, No. 4:09-3674, 2012 WL 401069, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2012), *aff'd*, 530 F. App'x 360 (5th Cir. 2013) (approving these factors for consideration in evaluating whether a settlement and bar order are sufficient, fair, and necessary). The injunction against such claims as set forth herein is, therefore, a necessary and appropriate order ancillary to the relief obtained for victims of the Stanford Ponzi scheme pursuant to the Settlement. *See Kaleta*, 530 F. App'x at 362 (affirming a bar order and injunction against investor claims as "ancillary relief" to a settlement in an SEC receivership proceeding). After careful consideration of the record and applicable law, the Court concludes that the Settlement is the best

option for maximizing the net amount recoverable from Trustmark for the Receivership Estate, Plaintiffs, and the Claimants (including the Jackson Investor Plaintiffs).

5. The Court finds that the Parties and their counsel have at all times complied with the requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

6. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Settlement is, in all respects, fair, reasonable, and adequate, and in the best interests of all Persons claiming an interest in, having authority over, or asserting a claim against Trustmark, the Stanford Entities, or the Receivership Estate, including but not limited to the Plaintiffs, the Interested Parties, and the Jackson Investor Plaintiffs. The Court also finds that this Rule 54(b) Final Judgment and Bar Order is a necessary component to achieve the Settlement. The Settlement, the terms of which are set forth in the Settlement Agreement, is hereby fully and finally approved. The Parties are directed to implement and consummate the Settlement in accordance with the terms and provisions of the Settlement Agreement and this Rule 54(b) Final Judgment and Bar Order.

7. The Court hereby permanently bars, restrains, and enjoins the Jackson Investor Plaintiffs, all and individually, from directly, indirectly, or through a third party, instituting, reinstating, intervening in, initiating, commencing, maintaining, continuing, filing, encouraging, soliciting, supporting, participating in, collaborating in, or otherwise prosecuting, against Trustmark or any of the Trustmark Released Parties any action (including without limitation the Jackson Litigation), lawsuit, cause of action, claim, investigation, demand, levy, complaint, or proceeding of any nature in any Forum, including, without limitation, any court of first instance or any appellate court, whether individually, derivatively, on behalf of a class, as a member of a class, or in any other capacity whatsoever, that in any way relates to, is based upon, arises from, or is connected with the Stanford Entities; this case; the subject matter of this case, the Rotstain

Litigation, the Smith Litigation, and/or the SEC Action; or any Settled Claim. The foregoing specifically includes any claim, however denominated and whether brought in the Jackson Litigation or any other Forum, seeking contribution, indemnity, damages, or other remedy where the alleged injury to such Person, entity, or Interested Party, or the claim asserted by such Person, entity, or Interested Party, is based upon such Person's, entity's, or Interested Party's liability to any Plaintiff, Claimant, or Interested Party arising out of, relating to, or based in whole or in part upon money owed, demanded, requested, offered, paid, agreed to be paid, or required to be paid to any Plaintiff, Claimant, Interested Party, or other Person or entity, whether pursuant to a demand, judgment, claim, agreement, settlement or otherwise. Notwithstanding the foregoing, there shall be no bar of any claims, including but not limited to the Settled Claims, that Trustmark may have against any Trustmark Released Party, including but not limited to Trustmark's insurers, reinsurers, employees, and agents. Further, the Parties retain the right to sue for alleged breaches of the Settlement Agreement.

8. The releases and the covenants not to sue set forth in the Settlement Agreement, and the releases, bars, injunctions, and restraints set forth in this Rule 54(b) Final Judgment and Bar Order, do not limit in any way the evidence that the Jackson Investor Plaintiffs may offer against the remaining defendants in the Jackson Litigation.

9. Nothing in this Rule 54(b) Final Judgment and Bar Order shall impair, affect, or be construed to impair or affect in any way whatsoever any right of any Person, entity, or Interested Party to (a) claim a credit or offset, however determined or quantified, if and to the extent provided by any applicable statute, code, or rule of law, against any judgment amount, based upon the Settlement or payment of the Settlement Amount; (b) designate a "responsible third party" or "settling person" under Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code; or (c) take

discovery under applicable rules in litigation; provided for the avoidance of doubt that nothing in this paragraph shall be interpreted to permit or authorize any action or claim seeking to impose any liability of any kind (including but not limited to liability for contribution, indemnification or otherwise) upon Trustmark or any Trustmark Released Party.

10. Nothing in this Rule 54(b) Final Judgment and Bar Order or the Settlement Agreement and no aspect of the Settlement or negotiation thereof is or shall be construed to be an admission or concession of any violation of any statute or law; of any fault, liability, or wrongdoing; or of any infirmity in the claims or defenses of the Parties with regard to any of the complaints, claims, allegations, or defenses in the Rotstain Litigation, the Smith Litigation, the Jackson Litigation, or any other proceeding.

11. Without in any way affecting the finality of this Rule 54(b) Final Judgment and Bar Order, the Court retains continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over the Parties for purposes of, among other things, the administration, interpretation, consummation, and enforcement of the Settlement, the Settlement Agreement, the Scheduling Order, and this Rule 54(b) Final Judgment and Bar Order, including without limitation, the injunctions, bar orders, and releases herein, and to enter orders concerning implementation of the Settlement and the Settlement Agreement.

12. The Court expressly finds and determines, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), that there is no just reason for any delay in the entry of this Rule 54(b) Final Judgment and Bar Order, which is both final and appealable, and immediate entry by the Clerk of the Court is expressly directed.

13. This Rule 54(b) Final Judgment and Bar Order shall be served by counsel for the Plaintiffs, via email, first class mail or international delivery service, on any person or entity that

filed an objection to approval of the Settlement, the Settlement Agreement, or this Rule 54(b) Final Judgment and Bar Order.

14. This is a final Rule 54(b) judgment. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter Judgment as to Trustmark in conformity herewith.

Signed on _____

DAVID C. GODBEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Receivership Entities

16NE Huntington, LLC	International Fixed Income Stanford Fund, Ltd.
20/20 Ltd.	The Island Club, LLC
Antigua Athletic Club Limited	The Islands Club, Ltd.
The Antigua Sun Limited	JS Development, LLC
Apartment Household, Inc.	Maiden Island Holdings Ltd.
Asian Village Antigua Limited	Miller Golf Company, L.L.C.
Bank of Antigua Limited	Parque Cristal Ltd.
Boardwalk Revitalization, LLC	Pelican Island Properties Limited
Buckingham Investments A.V.V.	Pershore Investments S.A.
Caribbean Aircraft Leasing (BVI) Limited	Polygon Commodities A.V.V.
Caribbean Airlines Services Limited	Porpoise Industries Limited
Caribbean Airlines Services, Inc.	Productos y Servicios Stanford, C.A.
Caribbean Star Airlines Holdings Limited	R. Allen Stanford, LLC
Caribbean Star Airlines Limited	Robust Eagle Limited
Caribbean Sun Airlines Holdings, Inc.	Sea Eagle Limited
Casuarina 20 LLC	Sea Hare Limited
Christiansted Downtown Holdings, LLC	SFG Majestic Holdings, LLC
Crayford Limited	SG Ltd.
Cuckfield Investments Limited	SGV Asesores C.A.
Datcom Resources, Inc.	SGV Ltd.
Devinhouse, Ltd.	Stanford 20*20, LLC
Deygart Holdings Limited	Stanford 20/20 Inc.
Foreign Corporate Holdings Limited	Stanford Acquisition Corporation

Guardian International Investment Services No. One, Inc.	Stanford Aerospace Limited
Guardian International Investment Services No. Three, Inc.	Stanford Agency, Ltd. [Louisiana] ⁱ
Guardian International Investment Services No. Two, Inc.	Stanford Agency, Inc. [Texas]
Guardian One, Ltd.	Stanford Agresiva S.A. de C.V.
Guardian Three, Ltd.	Stanford Aircraft, LLC
Guardian Two, Ltd.	Stanford American Samoa Holding Limited
Guiana Island Holdings Limited	Stanford Aviation 5555, LLC
Harbor Key Corp.	Stanford Aviation II, LLC
Harbor Key Corp. II	Stanford Aviation III, LLC
Idea Advertising Group, Inc.	Stanford Aviation Limited
Stanford Bank Holdings Limited	Stanford Aviation LLC
Stanford Bank, S.A. Banco Comercial	Stanford Bank (Panama), S.A. ⁱⁱ
Stanford Capital Management, LLC	Stanford Galleria Buildings Management, LLC
Stanford Caribbean Investments, LLC	Stanford Gallows Bay Holdings, LLC
Stanford Caribbean Regional Management Holdings, LLC	Stanford Global Advisory, LLC
Stanford Caribbean, LLC	Stanford Group (Antigua) Limited
Stanford Casa de Valores, S.A.	Stanford Group (Suisse) AG
Stanford Cobertura, S.A. de C.V.	Stanford Group Aruba, N.V.
Stanford Coins & Bullion, Inc.	Stanford Group Bolivia
The Stanford Condominium Owners' Association, Inc.	Stanford Group Casa de Valores, S.A.
Stanford Corporate Holdings International, Inc.	Stanford Group Company

Stanford Corporate Services (BVI) Limited	Stanford Group Company Limited
Stanford Corporate Services (Venezuela), C.A.	Stanford Group Holdings, Inc.
Stanford Corporate Services, Inc.	Stanford Group Mexico, S.A. de C.V.
Stanford Corporate Ventures (BVI) Limited	Stanford Group Peru, S.A., Sociedad Agente de Bolsa
Stanford Corporate Ventures, LLC	Stanford Group Venezuela Asesores de Inversion, C.A.
Stanford Crecimiento Balanceado, S.A. de C.V.	Stanford Group Venezuela, C.A.
Stanford Crecimiento, S.A. de C.V.	Stanford Holdings Venezuela, C.A.
Stanford Development Company (Grenada) Ltd.	Stanford International Bank Holdings Limited
Stanford Development Company Limited	Stanford International Bank Limited
Stanford Development Corporation	Stanford International Holdings (Panama) S.A.
Stanford Eagle, LLC	Stanford International Management Ltd.
Stanford Family Office, LLC	Stanford International Resort Holdings, LLC
The Stanford Financial Group Building, Inc.	Stanford Investment Advisory Services, Inc.
Stanford Financial Group Company	Stanford Leasing Company, Inc.
Stanford Financial Group Global Management, LLC	Stanford Management Holdings, Ltd.
Stanford Financial Group (Holdings) Limited	Stanford Real Estate Acquisition, LLC
Stanford Financial Group Limited	Stanford S.A. Comisionista de Bolsa
Stanford Financial Group Ltd.	Stanford Services Ecuador, S.A.
Stanford Financial Partners Advisors, LLC	Stanford South Shore Holdings, LLC
Stanford Financial Partners Holdings, LLC	Stanford Sports & Entertainment Holdings, LLC

Stanford Financial Partners Securities, LLC	Stanford St. Croix Marina Operations, LLC
Stanford Financial Partners, Inc.	Stanford St. Croix Resort Holdings, LLC
Stanford Fondos, S.A. de C.V.	Stanford St. Croix Security, LLC
The Stanford Galleria Buildings, LP	Stanford Trust Company
Stanford Trust Holdings Limited	Stanford Trust Company Administradora de Fondos y Fideicomisos S.A.
Stanford Venture Capital Holdings, Inc.	Stanford Trust Company Limited
The Sticky Wicket Limited	Torre Oeste Ltd.
Sun Printing & Publishing Limited	Torre Senza Nome Venezuela, C.A.
Sun Printing Limited	Trail Partners, LLC
Stanford Puerto Rico, Inc	Two Islands One Club (Grenada) Ltd.
Stanford Latin America LLC	Two Islands One Club Holdings Ltd.
Stanford Casa de Valores Panama	Stanford Financial Group Services, LLC
Stanford Group Venezuela a/k/a Stanford Group Venezuela C.A.	Stanford Group Columbia a/k/a Stanford Bolsa Y Banca
Stanford Bank Venezuela	Guardian International Bank Ltd.
Stanford Trust Company Limited d/b/a Stanford Fiduciary Investment Services	Guardian Trust Company
Stanford Advisory Board	Guardian Development Corporation
Two Islands One Club (Antigua) Ltd.	Guardian International Investment Services
Stanford Caribbean Investment Partners, LP	Casuarina Holdings, Inc.
Stanford Caribbean Advisors	Stanford Caribbean Investment Fund
Stanford Group Panama a/k/a Stanford Bank Panama	Stanford Caribbean Investment Fund I, LP

ⁱ Locations in brackets are included to differentiate between legal entities with the same name but different locations or other identifying information.

ⁱⁱ Locations in parentheses are included in the legal name of an entity or other identifying information.

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION**

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

v.

STANFORD INTERNATIONAL BANK,
LTD., *et al.*,

Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 3:09-CV-0298-N

SCHEDULING ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Expedited Request for Entry of Scheduling Order and Motion to Approve Proposed Settlement with Trustmark, to Approve the Proposed Notice of Settlement with Trustmark, to Enter the Bar Order, and to Enter the Rule 54(b) Final Judgment and Bar Order (the “Motion”) of Ralph S. Janvey (the “Receiver”), as Receiver for the Receivership Estate in *SEC v. Stanford International Bank, Ltd.*, No. 3:09-CV-0298-N (N.D. Tex.) (the “SEC Action”), and the Official Stanford Investors Committee (the “Committee”), as a party to the SEC Action and as a plaintiff in *Rotstain, et al. v. Trustmark National Bank, et al.*, Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-00800 (S.D. Tex.) (the “Rotstain Litigation”). The Receiver and the Committee are referred to herein collectively as the Movants.

The Motion concerns a proposed settlement (the “Settlement”) among and between, on the one hand, the Receiver, the Committee, the individual plaintiffs in the Rotstain Litigation, and the plaintiffs in *Smith, et al. v. Independent Bank, et al.*, Civil Action No. 4:20-cv-00675 (S.D. Tex.)

(the “Smith Litigation”);¹ and, on the other hand, Trustmark National Bank (“Trustmark”), as a defendant in the Rotstain Litigation, the Smith Litigation, and *Jackson, et al. v. Cox, et al.*, Civil Action No. 3:10-cv-00328-N (N.D. Tex.) (the “Jackson Litigation”; the Rostain Litigation, the Jackson Litigation, and the Smith Litigation are referred to collectively herein as the “Litigation”). Capitalized terms not otherwise defined in this order shall have the meaning assigned to them in the settlement agreement attached to the Motion (the “Settlement Agreement”).

In the Motion, the Movants seek the Court’s approval of the terms of the Settlement, including entry of a bar order in the SEC Action (the “Bar Order”) and a final judgment and bar order in the Jackson Litigation (the “Judgment and Bar Order”). After reviewing the terms of the Settlement and considering the arguments presented in the Motion, the Court preliminarily approves the Settlement as adequate, fair, reasonable, and equitable. Accordingly, the Court enters this scheduling order to: (i) provide for notice of the terms of the Settlement, including the proposed Bar Order in the SEC Action and the proposed Judgment and Bar Order in the Jackson Litigation; (ii) set the deadline for filing objections to the Settlement, the Bar Order, the Judgment and Bar Order, or Movants’ request for approval of Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees; (iii) set the deadline for responding to any objection so filed; and (iv) set the date of the final approval hearing regarding the Settlement, the Bar Order in the SEC Action, the Judgment and Bar Order in the Jackson Litigation, and Movants’ request for approval of Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees (the “Final Approval Hearing”), as follows:

¹ John J. Little signed the Settlement Agreement as chair of the Committee. Mr. Little, the Court-appointed Examiner (the “Examiner”), also signed the Settlement Agreement in his capacity as Examiner solely to evidence his support and approval of the Settlement and to confirm his obligation to post the Notice on his website, but Mr. Little as Examiner is not otherwise individually a party to the Settlement Agreement or any of the above-referenced litigation.

1. Preliminary Findings on Potential Approval of the Settlement: Based upon the Court's review of the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the arguments presented in the Motion, and the Motion's accompanying appendices and exhibits, the Court preliminarily finds that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and equitable; has no obvious deficiencies; and is the product of serious, informed, good-faith, and arm's-length negotiations. The Court, however, reserves a final ruling with respect to the terms of the Settlement until after the Final Approval Hearing referenced below in Paragraph 2.

2. Final Approval Hearing: The Final Approval Hearing will be held before the Honorable David C. Godbey of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, United States Courthouse, 1100 Commerce Street, Dallas, Texas 75242, in Courtroom 1505, at : .m. on , which is a date at least ninety (90) calendar days after entry of this Scheduling Order. The purposes of the Final Approval Hearing will be to: (i) determine whether the terms of the Settlement should be approved by the Court; (ii) determine whether the Bar Order attached as Exhibit B to the Settlement Agreement should be entered by the Court in the SEC Action; (iii) determine whether the Judgment and Bar Order attached as Exhibit C to the Settlement Agreement should be entered by the Court in the Jackson Litigation; (iv) rule upon any objections to the Settlement, Bar Order, or the Judgment and Bar Order; (v) rule upon Movants' request for approval of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees; and (vi) rule upon such other matters as the Court may deem appropriate.

3. Notice: The Court approves the form of Notice attached as Exhibit A to the Settlement Agreement and finds that the methodology, distribution, and dissemination of Notice described in the Motion: (i) constitute the best practicable notice; (ii) are reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise all Interested Parties of the Settlement, the releases therein,

and the injunctions provided for in the Bar Order and Judgment and Bar Order; (iii) are reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise all Interested Parties of the right to object to the Settlement, the Bar Order, or the Judgment and Bar Order, and to appear at the Final Approval Hearing; (iv) constitute due, adequate, and sufficient notice; (v) meet all requirements of applicable law, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the United States Constitution (including Due Process), and the Rules of the Court; and (vi) will provide to all Persons a full and fair opportunity to be heard on these matters. The Court further approves the form of the publication Notice attached as Exhibit F to the Settlement Agreement. Therefore:

a. The Receiver is hereby directed, no later than twenty-one (21) calendar days after entry of this Scheduling Order, to cause the Notice in substantially the same form attached as Exhibit A to the Settlement Agreement to be sent via electronic mail, first class mail, or international delivery service to all Interested Parties; to be sent via electronic service to all counsel of record for any Person who is, at the time of Notice, a party in any case included in *In re Stanford Entities Securities Litigation*, MDL No. 2099 (N.D. Tex.) (the “MDL”), the SEC Action, or the Litigation, who are deemed to have consented to electronic service through the CM/ECF System; and to be sent via facsimile transmission and/or first class mail to any other counsel of record for any other Person who is, at the time of service, a party in any case included in the MDL, the SEC Action, or the Litigation.

b. The Receiver is hereby directed, no later than twenty-one (21) calendar days after entry of this Scheduling Order, to cause the notice in substantially the same form attached as Exhibit F to the Settlement Agreement to be published once in the national edition of *The Wall Street Journal* and once in the international edition of *The New York Times*.

c. The Receiver is hereby directed, no later than ten (10) calendar days after entry of this Scheduling Order, to cause the Settlement Agreement, the Motion, this Scheduling Order, the Notice, and all exhibits and appendices attached to these documents, to be posted on the Receiver's website (<http://stanfordfinancialreceivership.com>). The Examiner is hereby directed, no later than ten (10) calendar days after entry of this Scheduling Order, to cause the Settlement Agreement, the Motion, this Scheduling Order, the Notice, and all exhibits and appendices attached to these documents, to be posted on the Examiner's website (<http://lpf-law.com/examiner-stanford-financial-group>).

d. The Receiver is hereby directed promptly to provide the Settlement Agreement, the Motion, this Scheduling Order, the Notice, and all exhibits and appendices attached to these documents, to any Person who requests such documents via email to Lara Richards at lrichards@fishmanhaygood.com, or via telephone by calling (504) 586-5252. The Receiver may provide such materials in the form and manner that the Receiver deems most appropriate under the circumstances of the request.

e. No less than ten (10) days before the Final Approval Hearing, the Receiver shall cause to be filed with the Clerk of this Court written evidence of compliance with subparts (a) through (d) of this Paragraph, which may be in the form of an affidavit or declaration.

4. Objections and Appearances at the Final Approval Hearing: Any Person who wishes to object to the terms of the Settlement, the Bar Order, the Judgment and Bar Order, or Movants' request for approval of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, or who wishes to appear at the Final Approval Hearing, must do so by filing an objection, in writing, with the Court in the SEC Action (3:09-CV-0298-N), by ECF or by mailing the objection to the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, 1100 Commerce Street, Dallas, Texas 75242, no later

than [insert date of 21st day before Final Approval Hearing] . All objections filed with the Court must:

- a. contain the name, address, telephone number, and (if applicable) an email address of the Person filing the objection;
- b. contain the name, address, telephone number, and email address of any attorney representing the Person filing the objection;
- c. be signed by the Person filing the objection, or his or her attorney;
- d. state, in detail, the basis for any objection;
- e. attach any document the Court should consider in ruling on the Person's objection, the Settlement, the Bar Order, the Judgment and Bar Order, or Plaintiffs' request for approval of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees; and
- f. if the Person filing the objection wishes to appear at the Final Approval Hearing, make a request to do so.

No Person will be permitted to appear at the Final Approval Hearing without filing a written objection and request to appear at the Final Approval Hearing as set forth in subparts (a) through (f) of this Paragraph. Copies of any objections filed must be served by ECF, or by email or first class mail, upon each of the following:

Trustmark National Bank
Attn: Michael A. King
Senior Vice President and General Counsel
P.O. Box 291
Jackson, MS 39205-0291
Telephone: (601) 208-5088
Facsimile: (601) 208-6424
Email: MKing@trustmark.com

and

Robin C. Gibbs
Gibbs & Bruns LLP
1100 Louisiana St., Suite 5300
Houston, Texas 77002
Telephone: (713) 650-8805
Facsimile: (713) 750-0903
E-mail: rgibbs@gibbsbruns.com

and

Ashley M. Kleber
Gibbs & Bruns LLP
1100 Louisiana St., Suite 5300
Houston, Texas 77002
Telephone: (713) 650-8805
Facsimile: (713) 750-0903
E-mail: akleber@gibbsbruns.com

and

James R. Swanson
Fishman Haygood, L.L.P.
201 St. Charles Avenue, 46th Floor
New Orleans, Louisiana 70170-4600
T: (504) 586-5252
F: (504) 586-5250
jswanson@fishmanhaygood.com

and

Edward C. Snyder
Castillo Snyder, PC
One Riverwalk Place
700 N. St. Mary's, Suite 405
San Antonio, Texas 78205
Telephone: 210-630-4200
Fax: 210-630-4210
E-mail: esnyder@casnlaw.com

and

John J. Little Law, PLLC
8150 N. Central Expressway, 10th Floor
Dallas, Texas 75206
Telephone: 214.989.4180
Cell: 214.573.2307
Fax: 214.367-6001
E-mail: john@johnjlittlelaw.com

and

Ralph Janvey
2100 Ross Ave
Suite 2600
Dallas, TX 75201
E-mail: rjanvey@kjllp.com

and

Kevin Sadler
Baker Botts
1001 Page Mill Road
Building One, Suite 200
Palo Alto, California 94304-1007
E-mail: kevin.sadler@bakerbotts.com

Any Person filing an objection shall be deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court for all purposes of that objection, the Settlement, the Bar Order, and the Judgment and Bar Order. Potential objectors who do not present opposition by the time and in the manner set forth above shall be deemed to have waived the right to object (including any right to appeal) and to appear at the Final Approval Hearing and shall be forever barred from raising such objections in this action or any other action or proceeding. Persons do not need to appear at the Final Approval Hearing or take any other action to indicate their approval.

5. Responses to Objections: Any Party to the Settlement may respond to an objection filed pursuant to Paragraph 4 by filing a response in the SEC Action no later than [insert date of

7th day before the Final Approval Hearing]. To the extent any Person filing an objection cannot be served by action of the Court's CM/ECF system, a response must be served to the email and/or mailing address provided by that Person.

6. Adjustments Concerning Hearing and Deadlines: The date, time, and place for the Final Approval Hearing, and the deadlines and date requirements in this Scheduling Order, shall be subject to adjournment or change by this Court without further notice other than that which may be posted by means of ECF in the MDL, the SEC Action, and the Litigation.

7. Retention of Jurisdiction: The Court shall retain jurisdiction to consider all further applications arising out of or connected with the proposed Settlement.

8. Entry of Injunction: If the Settlement is approved by the Court, the Court will enter the Bar Order in the SEC Action and the Judgment and Bar Order in the Jackson Litigation. If entered, each order will permanently enjoin, among others, Interested Parties, including Stanford Investors and Claimants, from bringing, encouraging, assisting, continuing, or prosecuting, against Trustmark or any of the Trustmark Released Parties, the Litigation, or any other action, lawsuit, cause of action, claim, investigation, demand, complaint, or proceeding of any nature, including, without limitation, contribution or indemnity claims, arising from or relating to a Settled Claim.

9. Stay of Proceedings: The Jackson Litigation shall remain stayed as to Trustmark, except to the extent necessary to give effect to the Settlement.

10. Use of Order: Under no circumstances shall this Scheduling Order be construed, deemed, or used as an admission, concession, or declaration by or against Trustmark of any fault, wrongdoing, breach or liability. Nor shall the Order be construed, deemed, or used as an admission, concession, or declaration by or against Plaintiffs that their claims lack merit or that the relief requested is inappropriate, improper, or unavailable, or as a waiver by any party of any

defenses or claims he or she may have. Neither this Scheduling Order, nor the proposed Settlement Agreement, or any other settlement document, shall be filed, offered, received in evidence, or otherwise used in these or any other actions or proceedings or in any arbitration, except to give effect to or enforce the Settlement or the terms of this Scheduling Order.

11. Entry of This Order: This Scheduling Order shall be entered separately on the dockets both in the SEC Action and in the Jackson Litigation. The Committee and the plaintiffs in the Smith Litigation shall cause a notice of the Scheduling Order to be entered on the docket of the Rotstain Litigation and the Smith Litigation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed on _____, 2023

DAVID C. GODBEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Publication Notice

To be published once in the national edition of *The Wall Street Journal* and once in the international edition of *The New York Times*:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Court-appointed Receiver for Stanford International Bank, Ltd. (“SIB”) and related entities (“Stanford Entities”), and certain Plaintiffs, have reached an agreement to settle all claims asserted or that could have been asserted against Trustmark National Bank relating to or in any way concerning SIB (the “Settlement Agreement”). As part of the Settlement Agreement, the Receiver and Plaintiffs have requested orders that permanently enjoin, among others, all Interested Parties, including Stanford Investors (i.e., customers of SIB, who, as of February 16, 2009, had funds on deposit at SIB and/or were holding certificates of deposit issued by SIB), and all other Persons from bringing any legal proceeding or cause of action arising from or relating to the Stanford Entities against Trustmark National Bank or the Trustmark Released Parties.

Complete copies of the Settlement Agreement, the proposed bar orders, and settlement documents are available on the Receiver’s website <http://www.stanfordfinancialreceivership.com>. All capitalized terms not defined in this Notice are defined in the Settlement Agreement.

Interested Parties may file written objections with the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas on or before [insert date of 21st day before Final Approval Hearing].

EXHIBIT G

1. *Janvey v. Alguire, et al.*, No. 3:09-cv-0724 (N.D. Tex.)
2. *Janvey v. Venger et al.*, No. 3:10-cv-00366 (N.D. Tex.)
3. *Janvey v. Rodriguez Posada, et al.*, No. 3:10-cv-00415 (N.D. Tex.)
4. *Janvey v. Gilbe Corp., et al.*, , No. 3:10-cv-00478 (N.D. Tex.)
5. *Janvey v. Buck's Bits Service, Inc., et al.*, No. 10-cv-00528 (N.D. Tex.)
6. *Janvey v. Johnson, et al.*, No. 10-cv-00617 (N.D. Tex)
7. *Janvey v. Barr, et al.*, No. 10-cv-00725 (N.D. Tex.)
8. *Janvey v. Indigo Trust, et al.*, No. 3:10-cv-00844 (N.D. Tex.)
9. *Janvey v. Dokken, et al.*, No. 3:10-cv-00931 (N.D. Tex.)
10. *Janvey v. Fernandez et al.*, No. 3:10-cv-01002 (N.D. Tex.)
11. *Janvey v. Wieselberg, et al.*, No. 3:10-cv-1394 (N.D. Tex.)
12. *Janvey & OSIC v. Giusti*, No. 3:11-cv-292 (N.D. Tex.)
13. *Janvey v. Stanford*, No. 3:11-cv-1199 (N.D. Tex.)

EXHIBIT H

1. *Janvey v. GMAG, L.L.C., et al.*, No. 22-10235 (5th Cir.)
2. *GMAG, L.L.C., et al. v. Janvey*, No. 22-10429 (5th Cir.)

EXHIBIT 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

v.

STANFORD INTERNATIONAL BANK, LTD,
et al.,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:09-cv-00298-N

**DECLARATION OF EDWARD C. SNYDER
IN SUPPORT OF RECEIVER AND OSIC'S MOTION FOR ORDER
APPROVING PROPOSED SETTLEMENT WITH TRUSTMARK, TO ENTER
THE BAR ORDER, TO ENTER THE FINAL JUDGMENT AND BAR ORDER,
AND TO APPROVE APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND EXPENSES**

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I, Edward C. Snyder, hereby declare under penalty of perjury that I have personal knowledge of the following facts:

I. OVERVIEW

I am submitting this Declaration in support of the Receiver and the Official Stanford Investors Committee ("OSIC") (collectively, the "Plaintiffs") Expedited Request for Entry of Scheduling Order and Motion to Approve Proposed Settlement with Trustmark National Bank ("Trustmark"), to Approve the Proposed Notice of Settlement with Trustmark, to Enter the Final Judgment and Bar Order, and for Plaintiffs' Attorneys' Fees and Expenses (the "Motion").¹

¹ Capitalized Terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the meaning ascribed to them in the Motion.

A. Trustmark National Bank

1. The settlement for which approval is sought in the Motion settles all claims against Trustmark in exchange for payment of **\$100 million** by Trustmark to the Receiver for ultimate distribution to the Stanford investor victims.

2. My law firm along with co-counsel Fishman Haygood, LLP, (together with my law firm, "Plaintiffs' Counsel") was retained by OSIC to litigate its claims in the case against Trustmark and Independent Bank f/k/a Bank of Houston ("BOH") denominated *Rotstain, et al. v. Trustmark National Bank, et al.* (the "*Rotstain Case*"), in 2019. Since that time Plaintiffs' Counsel has been actively and extensively involved in the prosecution of the Plaintiffs' claims in the *Rotstain Case*, including all phases of discovery, motion practice including responses to dispositive motions, and preparation for the upcoming February 27, 2023 trial.

B. Curriculum Vitae

3. I was a named shareholder of the law firm Castillo Snyder P.C. from 2006 until the end of 2022, and as of January 1, 2023 I am the sole owner of Edward C. Snyder Attorney at Law PLLC ("ECS PLLC") based in San Antonio, Texas, and have been practicing law for over twenty-eight (28) years. I presently serve as co-counsel for the Plaintiffs in the *Rotstain Case*, and I have actively participated in all material aspects of said case over the last almost four years.

4. I received my law degree from the University of Texas School of Law in 1994 and my law license also in 1994. After law school, I served as Legal Advisor to the former Chairman of the U.S. International Trade Commission in Washington, D.C. Since entering private practice in 1996, I have been involved principally in commercial litigation and trial work and have handled major cases for both corporate and individual clients, as both plaintiff's and defendant's counsel. I am admitted to practice in the Western, Eastern, Northern and Southern federal districts of the

State of Texas as well as the Fifth and Ninth Circuit courts of appeal and the United States Supreme Court.

5. My areas of specialization consist of complex commercial litigation, including everything from contract, corporate and partnership disputes, securities litigation, real estate litigation, oil and gas litigation and other commercial and business cases. My former law partner Jesse Castillo and I have tried dozens of complex commercial matters to verdict and judgment, including commercial cases tried in U.S. courts under foreign laws.

6. One of my specialized practice areas over the last 24 years has been the pursuit of third parties such as banks, accounting firms, law firms and others accused of aiding and abetting complex international (typically offshore) securities fraud schemes. From 1999 through 2006 I served as lead class counsel for Mexican investors who had been defrauded by a Dallas-based Investment Adviser firm named Sharp Capital Inc. (“Sharp”) that operated what amounted to an illegal offshore “fund” in the Bahamas but that was run from Dallas. The SEC intervened and filed suit against Sharp and appointed Ralph Janvey as the receiver for Sharp. Sharp lost over \$50 million of Mexican investor funds. Through various lawsuits I brought under the Texas Securities Act (“TSA”), we were able to eventually recover millions of dollars for the Sharp investors. See *Melo v. Gardere Wynne*, 2007 WL 92388 (N.D. Tex. 2007). I also represented Ralph Janvey, as receiver for Sharp, in litigation arising from the Sharp case, which was also settled. See *Janvey v. Thompson & Knight*, 2004 WL 51323 (N.D. Tex. 2004).

7. Beginning in late 1999, my prior law firm and I also served as lead and/or co-lead class counsel for a putative Class of primarily Mexican investors of the InverWorld group of companies, which was an investment group based in San Antonio that operated what amounted to an offshore fund in the Cayman Islands. We filed class action lawsuits against several Defendants,

including a French bank, New York law firm Curtis Mallet-Prevost, and accounting firm Deloitte & Touche. See *Nocando Mem Holdings v. Credit Comercial de France*, 2004 WL 2603739 (W.D. Tex. 2004); *Gutierrez v. the Cayman Islands Firm of Deloitte & Touche*, 100 S.W.3d 261 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 2002). Those class cases proceeded in tandem with estate litigation filed by the bankruptcy trustee for InverWorld. All of those class cases were premised on TSA aider and abettor claims and all of them eventually settled for eight figure sums each.

8. In 2003 I was retained by a group of Mexican investors who had been defrauded in yet another \$400 million offshore investment fraud committed by a Houston-based investment firm called InterAmericas that, like Stanford, ran an offshore bank (in Curacao, Netherlands Antilles) through which primarily Mexican investors invested. I filed litigation under the TSA aider and abettor provisions against Deloitte & Touche and a few other Defendants, resulting in seven figure settlements. See *Deloitte & Touche Netherlands Antilles and Aruba v. Ulrich*, 172 S.W.3d 255 (Tex. App. – Beaumont 2005).

9. Besides the Stanford cases, I have in recent years been involved in three (3) other SEC Ponzi scheme cases. I served as a Special Litigation Counsel to an SEC Receiver in the Central District of California in a Ponzi scheme case styled *Securities and Exchange Commission v. Westmoore Management LLC et al*, Case No. 08:10-CV-00849-AG-MLG. In that capacity I represented the Receiver with respect to all third-party litigation activities. I also represented several foreign investors in an alleged Ponzi scheme case in McAllen, Texas styled *Securities & Exchange Commission v. USA Now, LLC., USA Now Energy Capital Group, LLC., and Now. Co. Loan Services, LLC*; In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas – McAllen Division; Case No. 7:13-cv-00531. In the last two years I also served as litigation counsel for SEC Receiver Tom Taylor in lawyer malpractice and accounting malpractice cases before

Judge Fitzwater in the Northern District of Texas, styled *Thomas L. Taylor v. Rothstein Kass et al.*, Civ. Action No. 3:19-cv-01594-D (N.D. Tex.) and *Taylor v. Scheef & Stone, LLP, et al.*, Civil Action No. 3:19-cv-02602-D (N.D. Tex.), which cases resulted in a combined eight figure recovery for the Receiver.

10. Based on my experience in SEC receivership and offshore fraud cases generally, as well as my experience in the Stanford cases, I am often invited to speak at seminars on securities litigation issues (including liability under the TSA) by the Texas State Bar.

C. Involvement with the Stanford Cases Since 2009

11. I have been heavily involved with the Stanford cases since February 2009. As soon as Stanford collapsed in February 2009, I was retained by hundreds of investors from Mexico. I immediately began investigating claims against various third-party potential defendants connected with the collapse of Stanford.

12. After OSIC was created, I was asked to be a member of OSIC and continue to serve on OSIC today, without compensation. My service on OSIC has consumed thousands of hours of my time over 12+ years including time spent communicating with other OSIC members on weekends and late at night.

13. My investigations and efforts eventually led myself and the other counsel to file multiple class action lawsuits on behalf of Stanford investors, as well as companion litigation on behalf of OSIC and the Receiver, including the following cases: *Troice v. Willis of Colorado et al*, Case No. 3:09-cv-01274; *Janvey v. Willis of Colorado, Inc.*, Case No. 3:13-cv-03980; *Troice v. Proskauer Rose et al.*, Case No. 3:09-cv-01600; *Janvey v. Proskauer Rose, LLP*, Case No. 3:13-cv-477; *Janvey v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP*, Civil Action No. 3:12-cv-04641-N, in the Northern District of Texas – Dallas Division; *Philip Wilkinson, et al v. BDO USA, LLP, et al*, Case No. 3:11-

cv-1115; *The Official Stanford Investors Committee v. BDO USA, LLP, et al*, Case No. 3:12-cv-01447; *Wilkinson, et al. v. Breazeale, Sachse, & Wilson, LLP*, Case No. 3:11-cv-00329; and *Janvey v. Adams & Reese, LLP, et al.*, Case No. 3:12-cv-00495 (the “Stanford Cases”). All of the Stanford Cases were resolved favorably after over a decade of hard-fought litigation, resulting in the recovery of roughly \$400 million.

14. I have served as either lead counsel or co-lead counsel with other counsel in the Stanford Cases and I have been actively involved in every facet of the cases, including the investigation of the facts and legal theories that form the bases for the suits, responding to motions to dismiss and litigating class certification. I served as co-lead counsel in the successful appeals of the dismissal of the related *Troice* class action cases under SLUSA to the Fifth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court.

II. THE CLAIMS AGAINST TRUSTMARK AND SETTLEMENT

A. The Claims Against Trustmark and Procedural History of the Litigation

In my view, my involvement in all of the related Stanford Cases has proven invaluable to the successful resolution of the claims against Trustmark. Given the inherent overlap of factual and legal issues in third party litigation arising from the Stanford fraud, much of the work performed by myself and my associated counsel (including the Fishman Haygood firm) in related Stanford litigation since 2009 laid the groundwork for the successful resolution of the claims against Trustmark here. Plaintiffs’ Counsel has zealously prosecuted and pursued claims against Trustmark in the *Rotstain Case*, both on behalf of the putative investor class and on behalf of OSIC. The claims filed against Trustmark have included the following:

Category	Claim
OSIC Claims	Aiding and Abetting Violations of the TSA
	Participation in Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Investor Class Claims	Aiding and Abetting Violations of the TSA
	Aiding and Abetting / Participating in Breach of Fiduciary Duty
	Aiding and Abetting / Participating in a Fraudulent Scheme
	Aiding and Abetting / Participating in Conversion
	Civil Conspiracy

1. Putative Investor Class Case

15. The investor class case was originally filed in Harris County District Court as a putative class action on August 23, 2009, against Trustmark and co-Defendants Independent Bank f/k/a Bank of Houston, Toronto-Dominion Bank, HSBC, PLC, and Société Générale Private Banking (Suisse), S.A. and Blaise Friedli [ECF No 1]. The matter was removed to the USDC for the Southern District of Texas and subsequently transferred to this Court [ECF No 6]. In 2011, OSIC sought the right to intervene in the case [ECF No 96], which was granted in 2012, whereupon OSIC filed its intervenor complaints [ECF Nos 129, 130, 133]. On March 2, 2015, this Court issued a scheduling order [ECF No. 228]. Pursuant to that order, my co-counsel Fishman Haygood researched, drafted, and filed a highly detailed Second Amended Class Action Complaint that required many hundreds of hours of research and document review [ECF No 279]. The parties then engaged in substantial class action discovery and took numerous expert and fact witness depositions, and the parties then submitted their highly voluminous class certification pleadings – running to thousands of pages of pleadings and exhibits – to the court on October 26, 2015 [ECF Nos 338-342]. On July 27, 2016, this Court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss the Second Amended Class Action Complaint [ECF No 387]. On November 7, 2017, this Court denied the putative class’s motion for class certification and lifted the discovery stay it had previously imposed in this case [ECF No 428].

The Investor Plaintiffs/OSIC Case Proceeds

16. After class certification was denied, the six individual Investor Plaintiffs and OSIC continued to pursue the case. On July 27, 2018, the parties filed an agreed order regarding document production protocols and the court entered an amended confidentiality order [ECF Nos. 482, 483]. In September 2019, OSIC filed a motion to amend its intervenor complaint, which the Court granted [ECF Nos 557, 733]. On or around October 1, 2019, OSIC and Plaintiffs' Counsel agreed that Plaintiffs' Counsel (Fishman Haygood and my former firm Castillo Snyder PC) would direct the prosecution of OSIC's claims in the case against Trustmark and Bank of Houston. Plaintiffs' Counsel split their time between pursuit of these two sets of claims in this case. Fact discovery continued during this period and between October 2019 and January 2021. Plaintiffs' Counsel took or defended over two dozen fact and expert witness depositions related to the claims against Trustmark. Plaintiffs' Counsel also filed numerous pleadings pursuant to the fact and expert witness discovery, including motions to quash and for protective order [ECF No 626], to compel production of documents [ECF Nos 678, 789, 862] to amend the scheduling order [ECF No 730], and for sanctions [ECF No 815], as well as supplying expert disclosures [see ECF No. 732] and filing *Daubert* motions [ECF No 939]. Plaintiffs' Counsel also responded to the lengthy summary judgment and *Daubert* motions that Trustmark filed separately and jointly with its co-defendants. [ECF Nos 977, 983, 985, 998, 1040].

17. On January 20, 2022, this Court issued an order granting in part and denying in part defendants' summary judgment motions [ECF No 1152]. On January 28, 2022, the JPML issued a conditional remand order returning this case to its transferor court, the USDC for the Southern District of Texas [ECF No 1152; see *Rotstain, et al. v. Trustmark National Bank, et al.*, Case No. 4:22-cv-00800 (S.D. Tex.)]. Following remand, Trustmark along with its co-defendants re-urged

their prior motions to dismiss [ECF Nos 1168, 1173, 1175], to which Plaintiffs' Counsel responded [ECF Nos 1231, 1233]. The court denied these motions [ECF No 1327, 1328] and denied Trustmark's *Daubert* challenge to OSIC's expert witness while granting OSIC's *Daubert* challenge to one of Trustmark's expert witnesses [ECF Nos 13113, 1316].

B. Settlement Negotiations

18. Settlement negotiations occurred in 2022 and 2023. In these negotiations, potential victims of the Stanford Ponzi scheme were well-represented. The Committee—which the Court appointed to “represent[] in this case and related matters” the “customers of SIBL who, as of February 16, 2009, had funds on deposit at SIBL and/or were holding certificates of deposit issued by SIBL (the ‘Stanford Investors’)” (ECF No. 1149)—the Receiver, and the Examiner—who the Court appointed to advocate on behalf of “investors in any financial products, accounts, vehicles or ventures sponsored, promoted or sold by any Defendant in this action” (ECF No. 322)—all participated in these extensive, arm’s-length negotiations. On December 31, 2022, the Parties reached an agreement in principle resulting in the Settlement. For a short time thereafter, the Parties continued negotiating in order to document the exact terms of the Settlement in the written Settlement Agreement. The parties executed the Trustmark Settlement Agreement on January 13, 2023.

C. Plaintiffs' Counsel Have Sufficient Basis to Evaluate and Recommend this Settlement

19. Plaintiffs' Counsel have spent substantial time and energy since 2009 investigating Stanford's business operations and relationships with third parties, including Trustmark, which involved the review of hundreds of thousands if not millions of pages of documents (including hundreds of hours spent at the Receiver's document warehouse in Houston), interviews of dozens of witnesses across the globe, coordination of efforts with the Receiver and Examiner, and

researching case law to establish viable theories of liability and damages and then defending those theories through dispositive motion practice before this Court. All that work paved the way for the proposed settlement with Trustmark, which could not have been achieved without the substantial amount of time and effort expended by Plaintiffs' Counsel and their tireless efforts in the Stanford Cases overall.

20. Plaintiffs' Counsel collectively have spent nearly a decade and thousands of hours zealously pursuing claims against Trustmark on behalf of the Stanford Receivership Estate and the Stanford investors prior to reaching the settlement in January 2023. As part of the investigation of claims against Trustmark, Plaintiffs' Counsel reviewed voluminous documents, including thousands upon thousands of pages of bank statements, wire records, account monitoring data, internal and external correspondence, internal reviews and policies, and account opening records detailing Trustmark's – and its predecessor entity Republic National Bank's – relationship with and services provided to Stanford over nearly a decade. The documents reviewed included documents from the Receivership, documents obtained from Trustmark and other banks, and documents from third parties. Plaintiffs' Counsel researched relevant case law to develop claims against Trustmark, including claims under the TSA and other common law claims belonging to the Stanford investors and OSIC, to determine how the facts surrounding Trustmark's conduct supported such claims. The investigation of claims further required formulation of viable damage models and causation theories for both the Receivership Estate claims and the investor claims, and Plaintiffs' Counsel spent considerable time researching and working up damage models for this case.

21. Plaintiffs' Counsel could not have successfully prosecuted and resolved the claims asserted against Trustmark without having spent thousands of additional hours investigating and

understanding the background and history of the complex web of Stanford companies, the operations, financial transactions, interrelationship, and dealings between and among the various Stanford entities, and the facts relating to the Ponzi scheme and how it was perpetrated through the various Stanford entities. Without a comprehensive investigation and understanding of this background, it would not have been possible to formulate viable claims against Trustmark and prosecute them successfully to conclusion.

22. Finally, Plaintiffs' Counsel have diligently and aggressively litigated the claims against Trustmark and BOH for the last decade by investigating the claims and amending the complaint as additional details merited further refinement of the claims. Plaintiffs' Counsel engaged in extensive class certification discovery and voluminous briefing of class certification issues that included numerous complex and novel issues regarding foreign law. Plaintiffs' Counsel further engaged in extensive fact and expert discovery, as well as briefed and largely prevailed on Trustmark's and its co-defendants' Motions to Dismiss, Motions for Summary Judgment, and *Daubert* Motions. Plaintiffs' Counsel are uniquely qualified to evaluate the merits of the claims against Trustmark and the value of this settlement and have acquired knowledge and expertise regarding Trustmark's involvement with Stanford sufficient to provide a sound basis for their recommendation of approval of the instant settlement.

D. The Settlement is Fair and Reasonable and Should be Approved

23. It is my opinion based upon years of experience prosecuting and settling complex litigation matters, including securities litigation matters, that the Trustmark Settlement is fair and reasonable and in the best interests of the Stanford Receivership Estate and the Stanford investors and should be approved by the Court.

24. More importantly, I believe that the Trustmark Settlement represents the best result

that could be achieved given all the circumstances. Indeed, and as evidenced by the district court's denial of class certification after intense effort and the Bank Defendants' wave after wave of dismissal and summary judgment motions, this was by no means an "easy" case. Consequently, the result obtained should be considered highly favorable. Considering all the factors outlined in the Motion, the Trustmark Settlement represents an extremely good result for the Stanford receivership estate and its investors. Therefore, I believe the Trustmark Settlement is in the best interests of the Stanford receivership estate and its investors and should be approved.

III. ATTORNEYS' FEES

A. The Contingency Fee Agreement

25. Plaintiffs' Counsel have been jointly handling OSIC's claims against Trustmark pursuant to a twenty-five percent (25%) contingency fee agreement with OSIC.

26. As stated in the Motion, the Movants seek Court approval to pay Plaintiffs' Counsel a fee equal to an aggregate of twenty-five percent (25%) of the Net Recovery (*i.e.*, the settlement amount less allowable expense disbursements) in the Trustmark Settlement. This is the fee agreed to be paid to Plaintiffs' Counsel by the Receiver and OSIC, as acknowledged by the Receiver and Examiner, and this is the amount of the fee for which approval is sought in the Motion.

B. The 25% Contingency Fee is Fair and Reasonable

27. It is my opinion that the fee requested in the Motion is reasonable in comparison to the total net amount to be recovered for the benefit of the Stanford investors. The twenty-five percent (25%) contingency fee was heavily negotiated between OSIC and Plaintiffs' Counsel and is substantially below the typical market rate contingency fee percentage of 33% to 40% that most law firms typically require to handle cases of this complexity and magnitude. The claims against Trustmark and the other third-party lawsuits are extraordinarily large and complex, involving

voluminous records and electronic data and requiring many years of investigation, discovery, and dispositive motions to get to trial.

28. Moreover, as described above, the litigation against Trustmark has been hard fought and has gone on for over 10 years. As a result, Plaintiffs' Counsel have collectively invested thousands of hours of time; indeed, myself and my firm have invested over 2,000 hours of time worth more than **\$1.3 million** over the last 3½ years (up to December 22, 2022) working on the *Rotstain Case* without compensation. Plaintiffs' Counsel has, for many years now, borne significant risk of loss throughout this process after years of work for no compensation. A twenty-five percent (25%) contingency fee is reasonable given the time and effort that was expended, the complexity of the matter and the risks involved.

C. Time and Effort of Plaintiffs' Counsel

29. Since February 2009, myself and my law firm have dedicated thousands of hours of time to the prosecution of Stanford litigation on a contingent fee basis. This includes time spent investigating and understanding the background and history of the complex web of Stanford companies, the operations, financial transactions, interrelationship, and dealings between and among the various Stanford entities and the defendants we have sued, the facts relating to the Ponzi scheme and how it was perpetrated through the various Stanford entities, and the involvement of the third-party defendants in the foregoing cases with Stanford. Without a comprehensive investigation and understanding of this background, it would not have been possible to formulate viable claims against the third-party defendants and prosecute them successfully.

30. Even a cursory review of the Court's docket, which runs to over 1,100 entries, reveals the immense amount of work that Plaintiffs' Counsel have invested in the prosecution of the *Rotstain Case*. However, the docket and pleadings only reveal the work that is filed with the

Court. As discussed further herein, and as the Court is aware, the prosecution of lawsuits of this magnitude and complexity has required a tremendous amount of time and effort to investigate the facts, research the relevant legal issues, coordinate, and strategize with counsel and clients regarding the handling of the cases, conduct discovery, prepare the briefs and motions, attempt to negotiate settlements, and prepare cases for summary judgment and trial. Plaintiffs' Counsel have collectively spent thousands of hours in the last 10 years in their investigation and prosecution of Stanford-related claims in the *Rotstain Case*, split roughly evenly between OSIC's claims against Trustmark and BOH.

31. Over the last decade, myself and other attorneys from my law firm have spent thousands of hours in uncompensated time worth millions of dollars investigating and prosecuting Stanford Cases. Myself and my team have worked through many late nights, weekends, and holidays on Stanford cases or Stanford-related matters without compensation.

32. Given the length of time involved working on the Trustmark litigation since October 2019 (when OSIC assigned primary responsibility for the cases against Trustmark and BOH to my firm and my co-counsel at the Fishman Haygood firm) through December 22, 2022, my firm has invested over 2,000 hours of time worth over \$1.3 million at our applicable hourly rates for complex cases of this nature consisting of time that was dedicated directly to OSIC's claims against Trustmark and BOH.


33. I anticipate investing additional time dedicated to the finalization of the instant Settlement, including finalizing the motion for approval documents, monitoring, and responding to any objections where applicable, and attending and arguing at the approval hearing. Therefore, I believe that my law firm's total time dedicated to OSIC's claims against Trustmark will eventually exceed **\$1.4 million**. And the claims against BOH still remain pending with a trial date

of February 27, 2023.

34. The proposed settlement is the result of many years of effort and thousands of hours of work by the Receiver, OSIC, Investor Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' Counsel as described herein. But for the efforts of these parties, and the efforts of myself and my law firm described herein, there would be no Trustmark Settlement, which will net the Receivership estate and the Stanford investors many tens of millions of dollars they would not have otherwise had.

35. In light of the tremendous time and effort myself and my law firm and the other Plaintiffs' Counsel have put into the overall effort to recover monies for the Stanford Receivership Estate and the investors, all of which was necessary to the successful prosecution and resolution of the Trustmark matter, it is my opinion that the twenty-five percent (25%) fee to be paid to counsel for OSIC for the settlement of the Trustmark matter is reasonable and well merited. Myself and my team, and the other Plaintiffs' Counsel, have worked tirelessly to attempt to recover money for the benefit of Stanford's investors.

Dated: January 18, 2023



Edward C. Snyder

EXHIBIT 3

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION**

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

v.

STANFORD INTERNATIONAL BANK, LTD., *et al.*,

Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 3:09-CV-0298-N

**DECLARATION OF JAMES R. SWANSON
IN SUPPORT OF RECEIVER AND OSIC’S MOTION FOR ORDER
APPROVING PROPOSED SETTLEMENT WITH TRUSTMARK, TO ENTER
THE BAR ORDER, TO ENTER THE FINAL JUDGMENT AND BAR ORDER,
AND TO APPROVE APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND EXPENSES**

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I, James R. Swanson, hereby declare under penalty of perjury that I have personal knowledge of the following facts:

I. OVERVIEW

I am submitting this Declaration in support of the Receiver and the Official Stanford Investors Committee (“OSIC”) (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) Expedited Request for Entry of Scheduling Order and Motion to Approve Proposed Settlement with Trustmark National Bank (“Trustmark”), to Approve the Proposed Notice of Settlement with Trustmark, to Enter the Final Judgment and Bar Order, and for Plaintiffs’ Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses (the “Motion”).¹

A. Trustmark National Bank

1. The settlement for which approval is sought in the Motion settles all claims against Trustmark in exchange for payment of **\$100 million** by Trustmark to the Receiver for ultimate distribution to the Stanford investor victims.

¹ Capitalized Terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the meaning ascribed to them in the Motion.

2. My law firm has been litigating claims against Trustmark on behalf of a putative class of Stanford investors and later 6 individual Investor Plaintiffs since 2012, and along with co-counsel Castillo Snyder P.C. (“Castillo Snyder”) (together with my firm Fishman Haygood, LLP, “Plaintiffs’ Counsel”), on behalf of OSIC against Trustmark and Independent Bank f/k/a Bank of Houston (“Bank of Houston”) since 2019.

B. Curriculum Vitae

3. I am a senior partner of the law firm Fishman Haygood, LLP, based in New Orleans, Louisiana, and have been practicing law for thirty-five (35) years. I presently serve as co-lead counsel for OSIC and the individual Stanford Investor Plaintiffs (former putative class representatives) with respect to claims against Trustmark. I have actively participated in all material aspects regarding the Trustmark matter.

4. I received my law degree from Tulane University School of Law in 1987 and my law license also in 1987. Since entering private practice in 1987, I have been involved principally in commercial litigation and trial work and have handled major cases for both corporate and individual clients, as both plaintiff’s and defendant’s counsel. I am admitted to practice in the Western, Eastern, and Middle federal districts of the State of Louisiana as well as the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuit courts of appeal and the United States Supreme Court.

5. Fishman Haygood is a mid-size boutique firm providing both commercial litigation and transactional services, based in New Orleans and with offices in Baton Rouge. Fishman Haygood’s litigation section, of which I am the senior partner, handles a variety of complex commercial litigation matters, including securities litigation, consumer class action litigation, bankruptcy litigation, environmental litigation, international arbitration, construction litigation, employment litigation, tax litigation, and other commercial and business cases. We have tried

numerous complex commercial matters to verdict and judgment, in both state and federal courts across the U.S. and before arbitral tribunals both in the U.S. and abroad.

6. I have been involved on the plaintiffs' and defense side in numerous lawsuits and arbitrations involving allegations of financial fraud and securities fraud. Among other matters I have tried as lead counsel are: a securities fraud case arising out of issuance of auction rate securities on behalf of the Baylor College of Medicine; a securities fraud case involving pension obligation bonds on behalf of the City of New Orleans; a corporate income tax case for the State of Louisiana, which resulted in a \$26 million verdict; a business tort case on behalf of Rouse's Enterprises, Louisiana's largest grocer; and a mass action securities arbitration lasting over 90 days, resulting in a \$23 million judgment.

7. I successfully pursued a series of cases involving Auction Rate Securities, representing states, notably New Jersey and Louisiana, cities and counties, including Houston and Dallas, and various other institutions that generated over \$100 million in recoveries for my clients. I have also represented various pension funds, such as the Louisiana Municipal Employees and the Louisiana Firefighters in actions involving securities fraud. I have been hired also to defend such cases for clients like U.S. Unwired and Amedysis.

8. I am designated as a "Band One" lawyer in Louisiana in the field of securities litigation and I have been a frequent speaker at continuing legal education seminars on the topic of securities litigation. I have also been recognized as one of Louisiana's most accomplished commercial lawyers by Chambers, Benchmark Litigation and Best Lawyers. I have taught courses at Tulane University Law School and Loyola University (New Orleans) Law School. I have served on the board for various important Louisiana non-profits and currently serve as the Chairman of the Investment Committee for Xavier University of Louisiana.

C. Involvement with the Stanford Cases Since 2009

9. I and my law firm have been heavily involved with the Stanford cases since February 2009.

10. As soon as Stanford collapsed in February 2009, I was retained by dozens of investors from Louisiana. I immediately began investigating claims against various third-party potential defendants connected with the collapse of Stanford and brought such cases in Louisiana state court, and later pursued those cases in private arbitration.

11. As a result of my efforts on behalf of individual plaintiffs, I was hired in June 2014 to take the role of lead counsel for the putative class of plaintiffs in the *Rotstain* case against Trustmark and the other defendant banks. After the class certification motion was denied, I was asked by OSIC to apply my knowledge and efforts to further pursuit of the claims against the defendants on OSIC's behalf.

12. I am co-lead counsel with Castillo Snyder in this matter, with particular emphasis on the domestic bank defendants, Trustmark and Bank of Houston. I have been actively involved in every facet of the case, including the investigation of the facts and legal theories that form the bases for the suits, responding to motions to dismiss, litigating class certification, responding to motions for summary judgment and *Daubert* motions, and preparing for trial of this matter.

13. I believe that my law firm's involvement in prior Stanford Cases and the putative class representation in this matter have greatly contributed to the successful resolution of the claims against Trustmark.

II. THE CLAIMS AGAINST TRUSTMARK AND SETTLEMENT

A. The Claims Against Trustmark and Procedural History of the Litigation

14. Plaintiffs' Counsel have zealously prosecuted and pursued claims against

Trustmark in both in the Putative Investor Class Litigation and in the OSIC Litigation. The claims filed against Trustmark included the following:

Category	Claim
OSIC Claims	Aiding and Abetting Violations of the TSA
	Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Investor Class Claims	Aiding and Abetting Violations of the TSA
	Aiding and Abetting / Participating in Breach of Fiduciary Duty
	Aiding and Abetting / Participating in a Fraudulent Scheme
	Aiding and Abetting / Participating in Conversion
	Civil Conspiracy

Putative Investor Class Case

15. The investor class case was originally filed in Harris County District Court as a putative class action on August 23, 2009, against Trustmark and co-Defendants Independent Bank f/k/a Bank of Houston, Toronto-Dominion Bank, HSBC, PLC, and Société Générale Private Banking (Suisse), S.A. and Blaise Friedli. [ECF No 1] The matter was removed to the USDC for the Southern District of Texas and subsequently transferred to this Court. [ECF No 6] In 2011, OSIC sought the right to intervene in the case [ECF No 96], which was granted in 2012, whereupon OSIC filed its intervenor complaints. [ECF Nos 129, 130, 133] On March 2, 2015, this Court issued a scheduling order [ECF No. 228]. Pursuant to that order, Fishman Haygood researched, drafted, and filed a highly detailed Second Amended Class Action Complaint that required many hundreds of hours of research and document review. [ECF No 279] The parties then engaged in substantial class action discovery and took numerous expert and fact witness depositions, and the parties then submitted their highly voluminous class certification pleadings – running to thousands of pages of pleadings and exhibits – to the Court on October 26, 2015. [ECF Nos 338-342] On July 27, 2016, this Court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss the Second Amended Class Action Complaint. [ECF No 387] On November 7, 2017, this Court denied the putative class’s

motion for class certification and lifted the discovery stay it had previously imposed in this case. [ECF No 428]

The Investor Plaintiffs/OSIC Case Proceeds

16. After class certification was denied, the six individual Investor Plaintiffs and OSIC continued to pursue the case. On July 27, 2018, the parties filed an agreed order regarding document production protocols and the court entered an amended confidentiality order. [ECF Nos. 482, 483] In September 2019, OSIC filed a motion to amend its intervenor complaint, which the Court granted. [ECF Nos 557, 733] On or around October 1, 2019, OSIC and Fishman Haygood and Castillo Snyder agreed that Fishman Haygood and Castillo Snyder would direct the prosecution of OSIC's claims in the case against Trustmark and Bank of Houston. Plaintiffs' Counsel split their time between pursuit of these two sets of claims in this case. Fact discovery continued during this period and between October 2019 and January 2021. Fishman Haygood and Castillo Snyder took or defended over two dozen fact and expert witness depositions related to the claims against Trustmark. Fishman Haygood also filed numerous pleadings pursuant to the fact and expert witness discovery, including motions to quash and for protective order [ECF No 626], to compel production of documents [ECF Nos 678, 789, 862] to amend the scheduling order [ECF No 730], and for sanctions [ECF No 815], as well as supplying expert disclosures [see ECF No. 732] and filing *Daubert* motions [ECF No 939]. Fishman Haygood also responded to the lengthy summary judgment and *Daubert* motions that Trustmark filed separately and jointly with its co-defendants. [ECF Nos 977, 983, 985, 998, 1040].

17. On January 20, 2022, this Court issued an order granting in part and denying in part defendants' summary judgment motions. [ECF No 1152] On January 28, 2022, the JPML issued a conditional remand order returning this case to its transferor court, the USDC for the Southern

District of Texas. [ECF No 1152; see *Rotstain, et al. v. Trustmark National Bank, et al.*, Case No. 4:22-cv-00800 (S.D. Tex.)] Following remand, Trustmark along with its co-defendants re-urged their prior motions to dismiss [ECF Nos 1168, 1173, 1175], to which Plaintiffs responded. [ECF Nos 1231, 1233]. The court denied these motions [ECF No 1327, 1328] and denied Trustmark’s *Daubert* challenge to OSIC’s expert witness while granting OSIC’s *Daubert* challenge to one of Trustmark’s expert witnesses. [ECF Nos 13113, 13116].

B. Settlement Negotiations

18. Settlement negotiations occurred in 2022 and 2023. In these negotiations, potential victims of the Stanford Ponzi scheme were well-represented. The Committee—which the Court appointed to “represent[] in this case and related matters” the “customers of SIBL who, as of February 16, 2009, had funds on deposit at SIBL and/or were holding certificates of deposit issued by SIBL (the ‘Stanford Investors’)” (ECF No. 1149)—the Receiver, and the Examiner—who the Court appointed to advocate on behalf of “investors in any financial products, accounts, vehicles or ventures sponsored, promoted or sold by any Defendant in this action” (ECF No. 322)—all participated in these extensive, arm’s-length negotiations. On December 31, 2022, the Parties reached an agreement in principle resulting in the Settlement. For a short time thereafter, the Parties continued negotiating in order to document the exact terms of the Settlement in the written Settlement Agreement. The parties executed the Trustmark Settlement Agreement on January 13, 2023.

C. Plaintiffs’ Counsel Have Sufficient Basis to Evaluate and Recommend this Settlement

19. Plaintiffs’ Counsel have spent substantial time and energy since 2009 investigating Stanford’s business operations and relationships with third parties, including Trustmark, which involved the review of hundreds of thousands if not millions of pages of documents (including

hundreds of hours at the Receiver's document warehouse in Houston), interviews of dozens of witnesses across the globe, coordination of efforts with the Receiver and Examiner, and researching case law to establish viable theories of liability and damages and then defending those theories through dispositive motion practice before this Court. All that work paved the way for the proposed settlement with Trustmark, which could not have been achieved without the substantial amount of time and effort expended by Plaintiffs' Counsel and their tireless efforts in the Stanford Cases over all.

20. Plaintiffs' Counsel collectively have spent nearly a decade and thousands of hours zealously pursuing claims against Trustmark on behalf of the Stanford Receivership Estate and the Stanford investors prior to executing the settlement in January 2023. As part of the investigation of claims against Trustmark, we reviewed voluminous documents, including thousands upon thousands of pages of bank statements, wire records, account monitoring data, internal and external correspondence, internal reviews and policies, and account opening records detailing Trustmark's – and its predecessor entity Republic National Bank's – relationship with and services provided to Stanford over nearly a decade. The documents reviewed included documents from the Receivership, documents obtained from Trustmark and other banks, and documents from third parties. We researched relevant case law to develop claims against Trustmark, including claims under the TSA and other common law claims belonging to the Stanford investors, as well as claims that could be asserted by OSIC, to determine how the facts surrounding Trustmark's conduct supported such claims. The investigation of claims further required formulation of viable damage models and causation theories for both the Receivership Estate claims and the investor claims, and Plaintiffs' Counsel spent considerable time researching and working up damage models for this case.

21. Plaintiffs' Counsel could not have successfully prosecuted and resolved the claims asserted against Trustmark without having spent thousands of additional hours investigating and understanding the background and history of the complex web of Stanford companies, the operations, financial transactions, interrelationship, and dealings between and among the various Stanford entities, and the facts relating to the Ponzi scheme and how it was perpetrated through the various Stanford entities. Without a comprehensive investigation and understanding of this background, it would not have been possible to formulate viable claims against Trustmark and prosecute them successfully to conclusion.

22. Finally, Plaintiffs' Counsel have diligently and aggressively litigated the claims for the last decade by investigating the claims and amending the complaint as additional details merited further refinement of the claims. Plaintiffs' Counsel engaged in extensive class certification discovery and voluminous briefing of class certification issues that included numerous complex and novel issues regarding foreign law. Plaintiffs' Counsel further engaged in extensive fact and expert discovery, as well as briefed and largely prevailed on Trustmark's and its co-defendants' Motions to Dismiss, Motions for Summary Judgment, and *Daubert* Motions. Plaintiffs' Counsel are uniquely qualified to evaluate the merits of the claims against Trustmark and the value of this settlement and have acquired knowledge and expertise regarding Trustmark's involvement with Stanford sufficient to provide a sound basis for their recommendation of approval of the instant settlement.

D. The Settlement is Fair and Reasonable and Should be Approved

23. It is my opinion based upon years of experience prosecuting and settling complex litigation matters, including securities litigation matters, that the Trustmark Settlement is fair and reasonable and in the best interests of the Stanford Receivership Estate and the Stanford investors

and should be approved by the Court.

24. More importantly, I believe that the Trustmark Settlement represents the best result that could be achieved given all the circumstances. Indeed, and as evidenced by the district court's denial of class certification after intense effort and the defendants' wave after wave of dismissal and summary judgment motions, this was by no means an "easy" case. Consequently, the result obtained should be considered highly favorable. Considering all the factors outlined in the Motion, the Trustmark Settlement represents an extremely good result for the Stanford receivership estate and its investors. Therefore, I believe the Trustmark Settlement is in the best interests of the Stanford receivership estate and its investors and should be approved.

III. ATTORNEYS' FEES

A. The Contingency Fee Agreement

25. Plaintiffs' Counsel have been jointly handling OSIC's claims against Trustmark pursuant to twenty-five percent (25%) contingency fee agreement with OSIC.

26. As stated in the Motion, the Movants seek Court approval to pay Plaintiffs' Counsel a fee equal to an aggregate of twenty-five percent (25%) of the Net Recovery (*i.e.*, the settlement amount less allowable expense disbursements) in the Trustmark Settlement. This is the fee agreed to be paid to Plaintiffs' Counsel by the Receiver and OSIC, as acknowledged by the Receiver and Examiner, and this is the amount of the fee for which approval is sought in the Motion.

B. The 25% Contingency Fee is Fair and Reasonable

27. It is my opinion that the fee requested in the Motion is reasonable in comparison to the total net amount to be recovered for the benefit of the Stanford investors. The twenty-five percent (25%) contingency fee was heavily negotiated between OSIC and Plaintiffs' Counsel and is substantially below the typical market rate contingency fee percentage of 33% to 40% that most

law firms typically require to handle cases of this complexity and magnitude. The claims against Trustmark and the other third-party lawsuits are extraordinarily large and complex, involving voluminous records and electronic data and requiring many years of investigation, discovery, and dispositive motions to get to trial.

28. Moreover, as described above, the litigation against Trustmark has been hard fought and has gone on for over 10 years. As a result, Plaintiffs' Counsel have collectively invested thousands of hours of time; indeed, Fishman Haygood has invested time worth nearly \$11 million over the last decade working on this matter. Fishman Haygood began its efforts pursuing this matter as a putative class action on behalf of all investors against Trustmark, Bank of Houston, Toronto-Dominion, HSBC, and Societe Generale. More than 50% of Fishman Haygood's time at the class certification stage was devoted to investigating and pursuing the claims against Trustmark and Bank of Houston, without compensation. Subsequent to the denial of class certification, 100% of Fishman Haygood's time has been devoted to investigation and pursuit of the claims asserted against Trustmark and Bank of Houston, without compensation. Plaintiffs' Counsel has, for many years now, borne significant risk of loss throughout this process after years of work for no compensation. A sampling of the detailed work that Plaintiffs' Counsel performed is listed in the Motion to Approve the Trustmark Settlement at Section IV.C.1. A twenty-five percent (25%) contingency fee is reasonable given the time and effort that was expended, the complexity of the matter and the risks involved.

C. Time and Effort of Plaintiffs' Counsel

29. Since February 2009, myself and my law firm have dedicated thousands of hours of time to the prosecution of Stanford litigation on a contingent fee basis. This includes time spent investigating and understanding the background and history of the complex web of Stanford

companies, the operations, financial transactions, interrelationship, and dealings between and among the various Stanford entities and the defendants we have sued, the facts relating to the Ponzi scheme and how it was perpetrated through the various Stanford entities, and the involvement of the third-party defendants in the foregoing cases with Stanford. Without a comprehensive investigation and understanding of this background, it would not have been possible to formulate viable claims against the third-party defendants and prosecute them successfully.

30. Even a cursory review of the Court's docket, which runs to over 1,100 entries, reveals the immense amount of work that Plaintiffs' Counsel have put into the prosecution of this lawsuit. However, the docket and pleadings only reveal the work that is filed with the Court. As discussed further herein, and as the Court is aware, the prosecution of lawsuits of this magnitude and complexity has required a tremendous amount of time and effort to investigate the facts, research the relevant legal issues, coordinate, and strategize with counsel and clients regarding the handling of the cases, conduct discovery, prepare the briefs and motions, attempt to negotiate settlements, and prepare cases for summary judgment and/or trial. Plaintiffs' Counsel have collectively spent thousands of hours in their investigation and prosecution of Stanford-related claims, more than 75% of which has been devoted to investigation and pursuit of the claims against Trustmark and Bank of Houston.

31. Over the last decade, myself and other attorneys from my law firm have spent thousands of hours in uncompensated time worth millions of dollars investigating and prosecuting Stanford Cases. Myself and my team have worked through many late nights, weekends, and holidays on Stanford cases or Stanford-related matters without compensation.

32. Given the length of time involved working on the *Rotstain* litigation through today's date, my firm has invested nearly \$11 million worth of time. Specifically, as of December

31, 2022, my firm has spent over **20,000 hours** of attorney time worth approximately **\$10,807,090.00** at our applicable hourly rates for complex cases of this nature, which rates are consistent with the prevailing hourly rates for similarly qualified attorneys in this region, consisting of time that was dedicated directly to the *Rotstain* claims against the bank defendants, as can be seen in the chart below:

	<i>Biller</i>		<i>Hourly Rate</i>	<i>Hours Recorded</i>	<i>Total</i>
JRS	James R. Swanson		\$700.00	4822.7	\$3,375,890.00
BDR	Benjamin D. Reichard		\$600.00	5947.2	\$3,568,200.00
LCM	Lance C. McCardle		\$600.00	361.8	\$217,080.00
MLW	Molly L. Wells		\$500.00	2508.2	\$1,254,100.00
LKR	Lara K. Richards		\$400.00	2712.5	\$1,085,000.00
JCS	Jesse C. Stewart		\$300.00	2262	\$678,600.00
CHP	C. Hogan Paschal		\$300.00	1631.6	\$489,480.00
	Paralegal		\$200.00	693.7	\$138,740
				20,939.7	\$10,807,090.00

33. More than 75% of this time, amounting to over 15,000 hours and exceeding \$8 million, was dedicated to pursuit of the claims against Trustmark and Bank of Houston. I anticipate investing additional time dedicated to the finalization of the instant Settlement, including finalizing the motion for approval documents, monitoring, and responding to any objections where applicable, and attending and arguing at the approval hearing. Therefore, I believe that my law firm's total time dedicated to the *Rotstain* matter will eventually exceed **\$11 million** of which the time dedicated to the claims against Trustmark and Bank of Houston will approach **\$9 million**.

34. The proposed settlement is the result of many years of effort and thousands of hours of work by the Receiver, OSIC, Investor Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' Counsel as described herein. But for the efforts of these parties, and the efforts of myself and my law firm described herein, there would be no Trustmark Settlement, which will net the Receivership estate and the Stanford investors approximately \$72,567,818 (should the Court approve the attorneys' fee request) they

would not have otherwise had.

35. In light of the tremendous time and effort myself and my law firm and the other Plaintiffs' Counsel have put into the overall effort to recover monies for the Stanford Receivership Estate and the investors, all of which was necessary to the successful prosecution and resolution of the Trustmark matter, it is my opinion that the twenty-five percent (25%) fee to be paid to counsel for OSIC for the settlement of the Trustmark matter is reasonable and well merited. Myself and my team, and the other Plaintiffs' Counsel, have worked tirelessly to attempt to recover money for the benefit of Stanford's investors.

Dated: January 18, 2023



James R. Swanson

EXHIBIT 4

DECLARATION OF SCOTT D. POWERS

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I, Scott D. Powers, hereby declare under penalty of perjury that I have personal knowledge of the following facts:

1. My name is Scott D. Powers. I am over the age of eighteen (18) and am competent to make this Declaration.

2. I am admitted to practice law in the State of Texas, and am admitted to practice before various federal courts, including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. I have been licensed to practice law since 2000, and I am a partner in the law firm of Baker Botts L.L.P. (“Baker Botts”).

3. Baker Botts has served as lead counsel to Ralph S. Janvey, in his capacity as the Court-appointed Receiver in the Stanford Financial Group SEC receivership proceedings, since those proceedings were initiated in 2009 in the case styled *SEC v. Stanford International Bank, Ltd., et al.*, Civil Action No. 3:09-CV-0298-N. In its role as lead counsel, Baker Botts has reviewed litigation-related fees and expenses incurred by, and paid to, the Receiver, counsel for the Receiver, the Official Stanford Investors Committee, counsel for the Official Stanford Investors Committee, and expert witnesses and/or related firms, including fees and expenses related to lawsuits such as *Rotstain et al. v. Trustmark National Bank et al.*, No. 4:22-CV-000800 (the “Rotstain Litigation”).

4. I have reviewed records of the Receivership related to the litigation fees and expenses incurred by the Receiver, counsel for the Receiver, the Official Stanford Investors Committee, counsel for the Official Stanford Investors Committee, and expert witnesses and/or related firms in the Rotstain Litigation, which are summarized in the following tables. Because Trustmark National Bank (“Trustmark”) is only one of several defendants in the Rotstain

Litigation, the following allocation has been applied: (1) for fees and expenses attributable to the Rotstain Litigation as a whole, 20% is allocated to Trustmark, because Trustmark is one of five bank defendants in the Rotstain Litigation; and (2) for fees and expenses that are clearly attributable only to the two domestic bank defendants in the Rotstain Litigation—Trustmark and Bank of Houston—50% is allocated to Trustmark.

5. The following table presents fees that are 20% allocable to Trustmark, based on the above-described allocation methodology.

Amount	Notes
2,204.45	Baker Botts expenses – April 2018 (Invoice No. 1599233)
250.82	Baker Botts expenses – September 2018 (Invoice No. 1620841)
94.72	Baker Botts expenses – October 2018 (Invoice No. 1628260)
2,491.53	Baker Botts expenses – November 2018 (Invoice No. 1629635)
2,351.11	Baker Botts expenses – January 2019 (Invoice No. 1634792)
2,059.00	Baker Botts expenses – March 2019 (Invoice No. 1645041)
21,470.83	Baker Botts expenses – April 2019 (Invoice No. 1650669)
28,883.65	Baker Botts expenses – May 2019 (Invoice No. 1653747)
36,959.10	Baker Botts expenses – June 2019 (Invoice No. 1656707)
108,924.90	Baker Botts expenses – July 2019 (Invoice No. 1661796)
127,695.52	Baker Botts expenses – August 2019 (Invoice No. 1666662)
86,280.44	Baker Botts expenses – September 2019 (Invoice No. 1671446)
64,695.98	Baker Botts expenses – October 2019 (Invoice No. 1674607)
67,741.05	Baker Botts expenses – November 2019 (Invoice No. 1681337)
76,889.78	Baker Botts expenses – December 2019 (Invoice No. 1684626)
87,846.74	Baker Botts expenses – January 2020 (Invoice No. 1688050)
105,978.74	Baker Botts expenses – February 2020 (Invoice No. 1690270)
90,502.13	Baker Botts expenses – March 2020 (Invoice No. 1697398)
115,606.50	Baker Botts expenses – April 2020 (Invoice No. 1698767)
102,571.50	Baker Botts expenses – May 2020 (Invoice No. 1705148)
126,539.25	Baker Botts expenses – June 2020 (Invoice No. 1709866)
132,780.86	Baker Botts expenses – July 2020 (Invoice No. 1711821)
82,434.40	Baker Botts expenses – August 2020 (Invoice No. 1717394)
73,797.64	Baker Botts expenses – September 2020 (Invoice No. 1721749)
74,792.20	Baker Botts expenses – October 2020 (Invoice No. 1726397)
70,897.05	Baker Botts expenses – November 2020 (Invoice No. 1730323)

Amount	Notes
67,007.29	Baker Botts expenses – December 2020 (Invoice No. 1732893)
73,905.23	Baker Botts expenses – January 2021 (Invoice No. 1736544)
71,860.52	Baker Botts expenses – February 2021 (Invoice No. 1740251)
74,717.00	Baker Botts expenses – March 2021 (Invoice No. 1745510)
65,765.60	Baker Botts expenses – April 2021 (Invoice No. 1748097)
51,748.00	Baker Botts expenses – May 2021 (Invoice No. 1754075)
48,163.20	Baker Botts expenses – June 2021 (Invoice No. 1756439)
47,321.70	Baker Botts expenses – July 2021 (Invoice No. 16000288)
45,221.70	Baker Botts expenses – August 2021 (Invoice No. 16000275)
43,778.87	Baker Botts expenses – September 2021 (Invoice No. 16000736)
42,161.70	Baker Botts expenses – October 2021 (Invoice No. 16000738)
41,981.70	Baker Botts expenses – November 2021 (Invoice No. 16000743)
40,901.70	Baker Botts expenses – December 2021 (Invoice No. 16000744)
40,901.70	Baker Botts expenses – January 2022 (Invoice No. 16001112)
41,684.25	Baker Botts expenses – February 2022 (Invoice No. 16001113)
42,210.17	Baker Botts expenses – March 2022 (Invoice No. 16001114)
42,819.36	Baker Botts expenses – April 2022 (Invoice No. 16001367)
43,391.43	Baker Botts expenses – May 2022 (Invoice No. 16001368)
41,739.35	Baker Botts expenses – June 2022 (Invoice No. 16001369)
43,728.00	Baker Botts expenses – July 2022 (Invoice No. 16001655)
45,130.04	Baker Botts expenses – August 2022 (Invoice No. 16001656)
63,030.70	Baker Botts expenses – September 2022 (Invoice No. 16001657)
47,219.00	Baker Botts expenses – October 2022
47,467.46	Baker Botts expenses – November 2022
45,357.80	Baker Botts expenses – December 2022
3,262.50	BDO fees – December 2018 (Invoice No. 001162342)
9,776.25	BDO fees – January 2019 (Invoice No. 001087015)
712.50	BDO fees – February 2019 (Invoice No. 001094287)
1,325.00	BDO fees – March 2019 (Invoice No. 001133895)
20,356.25	BDO fees – April 2019 (Invoice No. 001134082)
24,537.50	BDO fees – May 2019 (Invoice No. 001163314)
56,426.25	BDO fees – June 2019 (Invoice No. 001172664)
237,675.00	BDO fees – July 2019 (Invoice No. 001181910)
90,802.50	BDO fees – August 2019 (Invoice No. 001196423)
86,015.00	BDO fees – September 2019 (Invoice No. 001232607)
62,197.50	BDO fees – October 2019 (Invoice No. 001251695)
133,995.00	BDO fees – November 2019 (Invoice No. 001279020)
159,918.07	BDO fees and expenses – December 2019 (Invoice No. 001283615)

Amount	Notes
196,432.50	BDO fees – January 2020 (Invoice No. 001302746)
580,140.79	BDO fees and expenses – February 2020 (Invoice No. 001317337)
894,932.28	BDO fees and expenses – March 2020 (Invoice No. 001337448)
734,025.00	BDO fees – April 2020 (Invoice No. 001338165)
810,771.25	BDO fees – May 2020 (Invoice No. 001406904)
190,772.50	BDO fees – June 2020 (Invoice No. 001372932)
262,695.00	BDO fees – July 2020 (Invoice No. 001381977)
273,192.50	BDO fees – August 2020 (Invoice No. 001393127)
358,220.00	BDO fees – September 2020 (Invoice No. 001408802)
537,093.75	BDO fees – October 2020 (Invoice No. 001437334)
177,772.50	BDO fees – November 2020 (Invoice No. 001454113)
136,350.00	BDO fees – December 2020 (Invoice No. 001454453)
249,875.00	BDO fees – January 2021 (Invoice No. 001482286)
54,172.50	BDO fees – February 2021 (Invoice No. 001487622)
57,577.50	BDO fees – March 2021 (Invoice No. 001541227)
15,432.50	BDO fees – April 2021 (Invoice No. 001541228)
9,215.00	BDO fees – May 2021 (Invoice No. 001577071)
33,237.00	JS Held fees – June 2022 (Invoice No. 1404907)
26,871.50	JS Held fees – July 2022 (Invoice No. 1416523)
42,422.50	JS Held fees – August 2022 (Invoice No. 1429891)
9,744.00	JS Held fees – September 2022 (Invoice No. 1436023)
4,752.00	JS Held fees – October 2022 (Invoice No. 1454746)
12,649.00	JS Held fees – November 2022 (Invoice No. 1469234)
68,648.00	JS Held fees – December 2022 (Invoice No. 1481560)
86,552.06	Ankura fees and expenses – August 2018 (Invoice No. 2400000680)
69,659.17	Ankura fees and expenses – September 2018 (Invoice No. 2400000725)
104,192.50	Ankura fees – October 2018 (Invoice No. 2400000759)
52,425.51	Ankura fees and expenses – November 2018 (Invoice No. 2400000763)
10,924.26	Ankura fees and expenses – December 2018-January 2019 (Invoice No. 2400000921)
416.00	Navigant fees – February 2016 (Invoice No. 494908)
5,980.00	Navigant fees – December 2017 (Invoice No. 2400000238)
27,223.59	Navigant fees and expenses – January 2018 (Invoice No. 2400000339)
17,546.00	Navigant fees – February 2018 (Invoice No. 2400000350)
20,768.50	Navigant fees – March 2018 (Invoice No. 2400000418)
10,736.00	Navigant fees – April 2018 (Invoice No. 2400000508)
5,220.00	Navigant fees – May 2018 (Invoice No. 2400000603)

Amount	Notes
3,800.00	Navigant fees – June 2018 (Invoice No. 2400000602)
51,319.72	Navigant fees and expenses – July 2018 (Invoice No. 2400000604)
3,486.00	FTI fees – April 2015 (Invoice No. 7381071)
218.00	FTI fees – May 2015 (Invoice No. 7383366)
2,441.60	FTI fees – June 2015 (Invoice No. 7385480)
4,846.40	FTI fees – July 2015 (Invoice No. 7388536)
14,287.43	FTI fees and expenses – August 2015 (Invoice No. 7390924)
17,737.03	FTI fees and expenses – September 2015 (Invoice No. 7392725)
728.00	FTI fees – November 2015 (Invoice No. 7398443)
2,740.40	FTI fees – December 2015 (Invoice No. 7401391)
870.00	FTI fees – January 2016 (Invoice No. 7403841)
9,705.20	FTI fees – February 2016 (Invoice No. 7407298)
2,507.60	FTI fees – March 2016 (Invoice No. 7410771)
1,032.00	FTI fees – April 2016 (Invoice No. 7413391)
1,432.00	FTI fees – May 2016 (Invoice No. 7415841)
2,068.00	FTI fees – September 2016 (Invoice No. 7426729)
3,948.00	FTI fees – November 2016 (Invoice No. 7432302)
4,714.00	FTI fees – December 2016 (Invoice No. 7434499)
8,024.00	FTI fees – January 2017 (Invoice No. 7437774)
360.00	FTI fees – February 2017 (Invoice No. 7440402)
6,926.40	FTI fees – March 2017 (Invoice No. 7442705)
176.00	FTI fees – June 2017 (Invoice No. 7451623)
11,264.40	FTI fees – December 2017 (Invoice No. 7467133)
1,702.00	FTI fees – January 2018 (Invoice No. 7469947)
3,706.00	FTI fees – February 2018 (Invoice No. 7472495)
8,066.00	FTI fees – March 2018 (Invoice No. 7475447)
9,380.40	FTI fees – April 2018 (Invoice No. 7478511)
15,543.60	FTI fees – May 2018 (Invoice No. 7485189)
3,735.60	FTI fees – June 2018 (Invoice No. 7483974)
3,470.00	FTI fees – July 2018 (Invoice No. 7486619)
11,734.00	FTI fees – August 2018 (Invoice No. 7489034)
2,523.60	FTI fees – September 2018 (Invoice No. 7491856)
21,026.00	FTI fees – October 2018 (Invoice No. 7494649)
14,441.20	FTI fees – November 2018 (Invoice No. 7497727)
17,868.40	FTI fees – December 2018 (Invoice No. 7501095)
14,347.20	FTI fees – January 2019 (Invoice No. 7502675)
8,485.60	FTI fees – February 2019 (Invoice No. 7505311)
5,531.20	FTI fees – March 2019 (Invoice No. 7508909)

Amount	Notes
10,804.00	FTI fees – April 2019 (Invoice No. 7511619)
21,318.80	FTI fees – May 2019 (Invoice No. 7515448)
22,412.00	FTI fees – June 2019 (Invoice No. 7518546)
4,997.60	FTI fees – July 2019 (Invoice No. 7519989)
7,468.00	FTI fees – August 2019 (Invoice No. 7522894)
10,346.80	FTI fees – September 2019 (Invoice No. 7525910)
10,703.20	FTI fees – October 2019 (Invoice No. 7528713)
22,713.20	FTI fees – November 2019 (Invoice No. 7532157)
86,825.60	FTI fees – December 2019 (Invoice No. 7535752)
51,445.60	FTI fees – January 2020 (Invoice No. 7538411)
137,925.60	FTI fees – February 2020 (Invoice No. 7541325)
217,361.20	FTI fees – March 2020 (Invoice No. 7544630)
284,561.20	FTI fees – April 2020 (Invoice No. 7546716)
165,366.40	FTI fees – May 2020 (Invoice No. 7549535)
230,995.20	FTI fees – June 2020 (Invoice No. 7552794)
392,019.20	FTI fees – July 2020 (Invoice No. 7555639)
283,462.00	FTI fees – August 2020 (Invoice No. 7558724)
381,780.00	FTI fees – September 2020 (Invoice No. 7561736)
310,612.00	FTI fees – October 2020 (Invoice No. 7564266)
23,476.00	FTI fees – November 2020 (Invoice No. 7566935)
6,668.00	FTI fees – December 2020 (Invoice No. 7570428)
13,575.60	FTI fees – January 2021 (Invoice No. 7573353)
754.00	FTI fees – February 2021 (Invoice No. 7576189)
7,989.60	FTI fees – March 2021 (Invoice No. 7580037)
10,396.40	FTI fees – April 2021 (Invoice No. 7582378)
2,027.20	FTI fees – May 2021 (Invoice No. 7586222)
251.20	FTI fees – June 2021 (Invoice No. 7589264)
451.20	FTI fees – April 2022 (Invoice No. 7625181)
16,057.60	FTI fees – May 2022 (Invoice No. 7628936)
3,407.20	FTI fees – August 2022 (Invoice No. 7640024)
1,348.80	FTI fees – September 2022 (Invoice No. 7643861)
3,680.80	FTI fees – October 2022 (Invoice No. 7648505)
48,462.80	FTI fees – November 2022 (Invoice No. 7652130)
9,272.80	FTI fees – December 2022 (Invoice No. 7656222)
5,525.00	James C. Spindler fees – October 2019 (No Invoice No.)
4,550.00	James C. Spindler fees – November 2019 (No Invoice No.)
6,987.50	James C. Spindler fees – December 2019 (No Invoice No.)
13,812.50	James C. Spindler fees – January 2020 (No Invoice No.)

Amount	Notes
37,375.00	James C. Spindler fees – February 2020 (No Invoice No.)
34,775.00	James C. Spindler fees – March 2020 (No Invoice No.)
27,787.50	James C. Spindler fees – April 2020 (No Invoice No.)
41,437.50	James C. Spindler fees – May 2020 (No Invoice No.)
11,050.00	James C. Spindler fees – September 2020 (No Invoice No.)
18,525.00	James C. Spindler fees – October 2020 (No Invoice No.)
27,950.00	James C. Spindler fees – November 2020 (No Invoice No.)
38,675.00	James C. Spindler fees – December 2020 (No Invoice No.)
44,200.00	James C. Spindler fees – March 2021 (No Invoice No.)
7,475.00	James C. Spindler fees – April 2021 (No Invoice No.)
4,712.50	James C. Spindler fees – June 2021-July 2021 (No Invoice No.)
7,475.00	James C. Spindler fees – September 2021-May 2022 (No Invoice No.)
9,262.50	James C. Spindler fees – October 2022 (No Invoice No.)
23,562.50	James C. Spindler fees – December 2022 (No Invoice No.)
22,521.64	TSG Reporting Inc. – October 2019-December 2019 (numerous invoice numbers)
22,093.72	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – December 2019 (numerous invoice numbers)
27,784.38	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – January 2020 (numerous invoice numbers)
3,962.70	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – January 2020 (numerous invoice numbers)
6,857.00	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – January 2020 (numerous invoice numbers)
26,928.98	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – January 2020 (numerous invoice numbers)
250.00	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – July 2020 (Invoice No. 2024416)
250.00	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – July 2020 (Invoice No. 2024585)
250.00	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – October 2020 (Invoice No. 2031957)
250.00	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – January 2021 (Invoice No. 2038954)
250.00	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – January 2021 (Invoice No. 2038967)
250.00	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – January 2021 (Invoice No. 2038977)
1,139.25	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – January 2021 (Invoice No. 2037559)
521.67	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – January 2021 (Invoice No. 2037562)
2,191.42	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – January 2021 (Invoice No. 2038172)
510.94	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – January 2021 (Invoice No. 2038177)
1,635.27	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – February 2021 (Invoice No. 2038619)
361.67	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – February 2021 (Invoice No. 2038624)

Amount	Notes
1,263.20	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – February 2021 (Invoice No. 2038642)
632.65	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – February 2021 (Invoice No. 2038951)
2,225.35	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – February 2021 (Invoice No. 2038954)
474.69	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – February 2021 (Invoice No. 2038958)
544.90	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – February 2021 (Invoice No. 2038963)
1,071.90	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – February 2021 (Invoice No. 2038967)
418.75	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – February 2021 (Invoice No. 2038970)
2,025.45	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – February 2021 (Invoice No. 2038977)
522.45	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – February 2021 (Invoice No. 2038978)
458.75	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – February 2021 (Invoice No. 2038984)
1,687.29	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – February 2021 (Invoice No. 2039500)
375.01	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – February 2021 (Invoice No. 2039505)
2,038.70	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – February 2021 (Invoice No. 2039573)
463.34	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – February 2021 (Invoice No. 2039581)
1,700.65	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – February 2021 (Invoice No. 2039652)
491.67	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – February 2021 (Invoice No. 2039657)
1,365.10	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – February 2021 (Invoice No. 2039909)
264.37	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – February 2021 (Invoice No. 2039914)
1,891.55	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – February 2021 (Invoice No. 2040095)
460.84	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – February 2021 (Invoice No. 2040100)
1,522.55	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – February 2021 (Invoice No. 2040113)
451.67	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – February 2021 (Invoice No. 2040118)

Amount	Notes
512.92	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – December 2020 (Invoice No. 2036783)
2,564.52	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – April 2021 (Invoice No. 2046624)
505.84	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – April 2021 (Invoice No. 2046629)
450.00	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – April 2021 (Invoice No. 2046632)
221.87	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – April 2021 (Invoice No. 2046637)
2,919.02	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – May 2021 (Invoice No. 2048527)
531.67	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – May 2021 (Invoice No. 2048530)
2,482.90	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – May 2021 (Invoice No. 2050855)
646.67	TSG Reporting Inc. expenses – May 2021 (Invoice No. 2050861)
80,000.00	CSI Litigation Psychology LLC expenses – April 2022 (Invoice No. 2022/0175)
111,170.95	CSI Litigation Psychology LLC expenses – December 2022 (Invoice No. 2022/0536)
56.40	David S Smith, Official US Court Reporter expenses – May 2022 (Invoice No. 202200034)
10,000.00	IMS Consulting & Expert Services (Jason Barnes) expenses – April 2022 (Invoice No. 0168)
13,142.49	IMS Consulting & Expert Services (Jason Barnes) expenses – May 2022 (Invoice No. 1006)
30,977.46	IMS Consulting & Expert Services (Jason Barnes) expenses – June 2022 (Invoice No. 1384)
69,210.43	IMS Consulting & Expert Services (Jason Barnes) expenses – July 2022 (Invoice No. 1862)
117,023.74	IMS Consulting & Expert Services (Jason Barnes) expenses – August 2022 (Invoice No. 2239)
111,423.83	IMS Consulting & Expert Services (Jason Barnes) expenses – September 2022 (Invoice No. 2640)
3,977.15	IMS Consulting & Expert Services (Jason Barnes) expenses – October 2022 (Invoice No. 3107)
8,576.82	IMS Consulting & Expert Services (Jason Barnes) expenses – November 2022 (Invoice No. 3565)
14,156,612.27	Total 20% fees

6. Using the 20% allocation noted above for these fees, Trustmark is allocated \$2,831,322.45.

7. The following table presents fees that are 50% allocable to Trustmark, based on the above-described allocation methodology.

Amount	Notes
156,979.18	Fishman Haygood LLP expenses – October 2019-June 2020 (Invoice No. 54334)
27,343.55	Fishman Haygood LLP expenses – June 2020-October 2020 (Invoice No. 56056)
15,533.62	Fishman Haygood LLP expenses – November 2020-December 2020 (Invoice No. 56624)
57,519.61	Fishman Haygood LLP expenses – January 2021-February 2021 (Invoice No. 57388)
9,966.76	Fishman Haygood LLP expenses – March 2021-April 2021 (Invoice No. 58933)
35,099.47	Fishman Haygood LLP expenses – May 2021-September 2022 (Invoice No. 70331)
1,181.25	Thomson Reuters Expert Witness Services - Pat McElroy fees – May 2018 (Invoice No. 41625)
15,811.43	Thomson Reuters Expert Witness Services - Pat McElroy fees and expenses – June 2018 (Invoice No. 41861)
25,467.75	Thomson Reuters Expert Witness Services - Pat McElroy fees – July 2018 (Invoice No. 41982)
1,518.75	Thomson Reuters Expert Witness Services - Pat McElroy fees – August 2018 (Invoice No. 42377)
675.00	Thomson Reuters Expert Witness Services - Pat McElroy fees – September 2018 (Invoice No. 42609)
3,037.50	Thomson Reuters Expert Witness Services - Pat McElroy fees – October 2018 (Invoice No. 42928)
4,218.75	United Expert Holdings, LLC - Pat McElroy fees – May 2019 (Invoice No. 44679)
54,506.25	United Expert Holdings, LLC - Pat McElroy fees – June 2019 (Invoice No. 44914)
53,325.00	United Expert Holdings, LLC - Pat McElroy fees – July 2019 (Invoice No. 45092)
37,462.50	United Expert Holdings, LLC - Pat McElroy fees – August 2019 (Invoice No. 45408)
17,887.50	United Expert Holdings, LLC - Pat McElroy fees – September 2019 (Invoice No. 45696)
12,993.75	United Expert Holdings, LLC - Pat McElroy fees – October 2019 (Invoice No. 45865)
25,181.12	United Expert Holdings, LLC - Pat McElroy fees and expenses – November 2019 (Invoice No. 46183)
6,581.25	United Expert Holdings, LLC - Pat McElroy fees – December 2019 (Invoice No. 46450)
30,206.25	United Expert Holdings, LLC - Pat McElroy fees – January 2020 (Invoice No. 46717)

Amount	Notes
61,222.50	United Expert Holdings, LLC - Pat McElroy fees – February 2020 (Invoice No. 46970)
30,881.25	United Expert Holdings, LLC - Pat McElroy fees – March 2020 (Invoice No. 47232)
35,640.00	United Expert Holdings, LLC - Pat McElroy fees – April 2020 (Invoice No. 47406)
17,266.50	United Expert Holdings, LLC - Pat McElroy fees – May 2020 (Invoice No. 47595)
16,706.25	United Expert Holdings, LLC - Pat McElroy fees – July 2020 (Invoice No. 48024)
4,050.00	United Expert Holdings, LLC - Pat McElroy fees – August 2020 (Invoice No. 48192)
34,425.00	United Expert Holdings, LLC - Pat McElroy fees – September 2020 (Invoice No. 48470)
62,268.75	United Expert Holdings, LLC - Pat McElroy fees – October 2020 (Invoice No. 48745)
28,687.50	United Expert Holdings, LLC - Pat McElroy fees – November 2020 (Invoice No. 49018)
16,875.00	United Expert Holdings, LLC - Pat McElroy fees – December 2020 (Invoice No. 49263)
33,129.73	United Expert Holdings, LLC - Pat McElroy fees and expenses – January 2021 (Invoice No. 49544)
675.00	United Expert Holdings, LLC - Pat McElroy fees – February 2021 (Invoice No. 49845)
2,025.00	United Expert Holdings, LLC - Pat McElroy fees – March 2021 (Invoice No. 49997)
3,037.50	United Expert Holdings, LLC - Pat McElroy fees – March 2021 (Invoice No. 56551)
561.54	Castillo Snyder, P.C. expenses – May 2019 (Invoice No. 2785)
1,630.87	Castillo Snyder, P.C. expenses – September-October 2019 (Invoice No. 2821)
2,438.06	Castillo Snyder, P.C. expenses – December 2019 (Invoice No. 2873)
2,873.01	Castillo Snyder, P.C. expenses – January 2020 (Invoice No. 2879)
4,147.82	Castillo Snyder, P.C. expenses – March 2020 (Invoice No. 2890)
573.91	Castillo Snyder, P.C. expenses – December 2018 (Invoice No. 2720)
851.16	Castillo Snyder, P.C. expenses – July 2020 (Invoice No. 2904)
1,881.77	Edward C. Snyder expenses – September 2022 (No Invoice No.)
954,344.36	Total 50% fees

8. Using the 50% allocation noted above for these fees, Trustmark is allocated \$477,172.18.

9. The total amount of expenses allocated to Trustmark—from the 20% and 50% categories noted above—is \$3,308,494.63.

Executed on January 18, 2023

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "SDP", is written above a horizontal line.

Scott D. Powers

EXHIBIT 5

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION**

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

v.

STANFORD INTERNATIONAL BANK, LTD,
et al.,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:09-cv-00298-N

ORDER APPROVING ATTORNEYS' FEES

Before the Court is the Plaintiffs' Expedited Request for Entry of Scheduling Order and Motion to Approve Proposed Settlement with Trustmark National Bank ("Trustmark"), to Enter the Bar Order, to Enter the Final Judgment and Bar Order, and for Plaintiffs' Attorneys' Fees and Expenses (the "Motion") of the Receiver and the Official Stanford Investors Committee (the "Committee") (the Receiver and the Committee, collectively, the "Plaintiffs"). This Order addresses the request for approval of Plaintiffs' Counsel's (as defined in the Motion) attorneys' fees contained within the Motion. All relief requested in the Motion, other than the request for approval of attorneys' fees, was addressed in the Court's Final Judgment and Bar Order entered on the same date.

Having considered the Motion, the Declarations submitted in support of the Motion, the arguments and the applicable legal authorities, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs' request for approval of attorneys' fees contained within the Motion should be granted. The Court finds that

the 25% contingency fee agreements between Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' Counsel is reasonable and consistent with the percentage charged and approved by courts in other cases of this magnitude and complexity. The Stanford Receivership and the litigation are extraordinarily complex and time-consuming and have involved a great deal of risk and capital investment by Plaintiffs' Counsel as evidenced by the Declarations of Plaintiffs' Counsel submitted in support of the request for approval of their fees. The Motion and the Declarations provide ample evidentiary support for the award of the Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees set forth in this Order.

Trial courts can determine attorneys' fee awards in common fund cases such as this one using different methods. The common-fund doctrine applies when "a litigant or lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee from the fund as a whole." *In re Harmon*, No. 10-33789, 2011 WL 1457236, at *7 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 14, 2011) (quoting *Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert*, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980)).

One method for analyzing the appropriateness of an award for Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees is the percentage method, under which the court awards fees based on a percentage of the common fund. *Union Asset Management Holding A.G. v. Dell, Inc.*, 669 F.3d 632, 642-43 (5th Cir. 2012). The Fifth Circuit is "amenable to [the percentage method's] use, so long as the *Johnson* framework is utilized to ensure that the fee award is reasonable." *Id.* at 643 (citing *Johnson v. Georgia Hwy. Express, Inc.*, 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974)). The *Johnson* factors include: (1) time and labor required; (2) novelty and difficulty of the issues; (3) required skill; (4) whether other employment is precluded; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the attorneys' experience, reputation and ability; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional

relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. See *Johnson*, 488 F.2d at 717-19.

Thus, when considering fee awards in class action cases “district courts in [the Fifth] Circuit regularly use the percentage method blended with a *Johnson* reasonableness check.” *Id.* (internal citations omitted); see *Schwartz v. TXU Corp.*, No. 3:02-CV-2243-K (lead case), 2005 WL 3148350, at *25 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2005) (collecting cases). While the Fifth Circuit has also permitted analysis of fee awards under the lodestar method, both the Fifth Circuit and district courts in the Northern District have recognized that the percentage method is the preferred method of many courts. *Dell*, 669 F.3d at 643; *Schwartz*, 2005 WL 3148350, at *25.

In *Schwartz*, the court observed that the percentage method is “vastly superior to the lodestar method for a variety of reasons, including the incentive for counsel to ‘run up the bill’ and the heavy burden that calculation under the lodestar method places upon the court.” 2005 WL 3148350, at *25. The court also observed that, because it is calculated based on the number of attorney-hours spent on the case, the lodestar method deters early settlement of disputes. *Id.* Thus, there is a “strong consensus in favor of awarding attorneys’ fees in common fund cases as a percentage of the recovery.” *Id.* at *26.

While the Trustmark Settlement is not a class action settlement, because the settlement is structured as a settlement with the Receiver and the Committee, and as a bar order precluding other litigation against Trustmark arising from Stanford, this Court has analyzed the award of attorneys’ fees to Plaintiffs’ Counsel under both the common fund and the *Johnson* approach. Whether analyzed under the common fund approach, the *Johnson* framework, or both, the 25% fee sought by Plaintiffs’ Counsel pursuant to their fee agreements is reasonable and is hereby approved by the Court. Having reviewed the Declarations of Plaintiffs’ Counsel reflecting the investment of thousands of hours and millions of dollars of attorney time by Plaintiffs’ Counsel in the Stanford

Receivership as a whole and in the Trustmark litigation specifically, the Court finds that the proposed 25% fee for Plaintiffs' Counsel is a reasonable percentage of the common fund (*i.e.* the \$100 million settlement).

“The vast majority of Texas federal courts and courts in this District have awarded fees of 25%-33% in securities class actions.” *Schwartz*, 2005 WL 3148350, at *31 (collecting cases). “Indeed, courts throughout this Circuit regularly award fees of 25% and more often 30% or more of the total recovery under the percentage-of-the recovery method.” *Id.*

The Court further finds that the fee is reasonable based upon the Court's analysis of the *Johnson* factors. A review of the *Johnson* factors that are discussed at length in the Motion and supported by Plaintiffs' Counsel's Declarations also demonstrates that the proposed 25% fee is reasonable and should be approved. With respect to the time and labor required, Plaintiffs' Counsel invested a tremendous amount of time and labor in this case as reflected in the Snyder and Swanson Declarations filed in support of the Motion. Mr. Swanson's firm Fishman Haygood, LLP as of December 31, 2022 has spent over **20,000 hours** of attorney time worth approximately **\$10,807,090.00** on the litigation against Trustmark and its co-defendants at their applicable hourly rates for complex cases of this nature, which rates are consistent with the prevailing hourly rates for similarly qualified attorneys in this region [Swanson Decl., at ¶ 32], while Mr. Snyder's firm has invested over **2,000** thousands of attorney time worth over **\$1.3 million** through December 22, 2022 at his firm's applicable hourly rates specifically in the litigation against Trustmark. *See* Snyder Decl., at ¶ 34.

The issues presented in the litigation were novel, difficult and complex. Several of the complex legal and factual issues are outlined in the Motion. Given the complexity of the factual and legal issues presented in this case, the preparation, prosecution and settlement of this case

required significant skill and effort on the part of Plaintiffs' Counsel.

Although participation in the litigation did not necessarily preclude Plaintiffs' Counsel from accepting other employment, the Declarations reveal that the sheer amount of time and resources involved in investigating, preparing, and prosecuting the litigation, as reflected by the hours invested by Plaintiffs' Counsel, significantly reduced Plaintiffs' Counsel's ability to devote time and effort to other matters.

The 25% fee requested is also substantially below the typical market rate contingency fee percentage of 33% to 40% that most law firms would demand to handle cases of this complexity and magnitude. See *Schwartz*, 2005 WL 3148350, at *31 (collecting cases and noting that 30% is standard fee in complex securities cases). "Attorney fees awarded under the percentage method are often between 25% and 30% of the fund." *Klein*, 705 F. Supp. 2d at 675-81 (30% fee for a \$110 million settlement, (citing Manual for Complex Litig. (Fourth) § 14.121 (2010)); see, e.g., *SEC v. Temme*, No. 4:11-cv00655-ALM, at *4-5 (E.D. Tex. November 21, 2012), ECF No. 162 (25% contingent fee for a \$1,335,000 receivership settlement); *Billitteri v. Sec. Am., Inc.*, No. 3:09-cv-01568-F (lead case), 2011 WL 3585983, *4-9 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (25% fee for an \$80 million settlement).

At the time of the Trustmark Settlement, Plaintiffs' Counsel were subject to significant time limitation in the litigation, as Plaintiffs' Counsel were preparing the case against Trustmark and other banks for trial. Given the breadth and scope of activity in the Trustmark litigation as described in the Declarations of Plaintiffs' Counsel, including extensive document production and review, numerous fact and expert witness depositions, and the preparation of briefs in response to comprehensive motions for summary judgment and *Daubert* motions to exclude Plaintiffs' experts and preparation of trial pleadings and materials, Plaintiffs' Counsel has been consistently under

deadlines and time pressure in the litigation against Trustmark.

As set forth in the Declarations, the litigation against Trustmark has consumed nearly all of Plaintiffs' Counsel's time over the last several years. The \$100 million to be paid by Trustmark represents a substantial settlement and value to the Receivership Estate and the Stanford investors. Thus, the amount involved and results obtained also support approval of the requested fee. The Declarations of Plaintiffs' Counsel further reflect that Plaintiffs' Counsel have represented numerous receivers, bankruptcy trustees, and other parties in complex litigation matters related to equity receiverships and bankruptcy proceedings similar to the Stanford receivership proceeding. Plaintiffs' Counsel have also been actively engaged in the Stanford proceeding since its inception. Thus, the attorneys' experience, reputation and ability also support the fee award. Given the complexity of the issues in the Trustmark litigation, the Trustmark Settlement, as well as other settlements achieved by Plaintiffs' Counsel in the Stanford Receivership that have also been approved by this Court, are indicative of Plaintiffs' Counsel's abilities to obtain favorable results in these proceedings.

The nature and length of Plaintiffs' Counsel's professional relationship with the client also supports the fee award. Plaintiffs' Counsel have represented the Receiver, the Committee, and investor plaintiffs in numerous actions pending before the Court in connection with the Stanford Receivership since 2009, all on the same 25% contingency fee arrangement. Finally, awards in similar cases, with which this Court is familiar, as well as those discussed in the *Schwarz* opinion, all support the fee award. A 25% contingency fee has also previously been approved as reasonable by this Court in its order approving the Receiver's agreement with the Committee regarding the joint prosecution of fraudulent transfer and other claims by the Receiver and the Committee (the "OSIC-Receiver Agreement"). *See* SEC Action ECF No. 1267, p. 2 ("The Court finds that the fee

arrangement set forth in the Agreement is reasonable.”); *see also* OSIC-Receiver Agreement SEC Action ECF No. 1208, Ex. A, p. 3 (providing a “contingency fee” of 25% of any Net Recovery in actions prosecuted by the Committee’s designated professionals). This Court has also approved a 25% contingency fee in connection with the Court’s approval of the settlement of the other cases brought by the Receiver against the law firms Greenberg Traurig, Adams & Reese, Chadbourne & Park, Hunton & Williams and Proskauer Rose, as well as the settlements with BDO, Kroll, and Bowen Mclette & Britt (‘BMB’). *See* Order approving attorneys’ fees in connection with the Adams & Reese settlement [SEC Action ECF. No. 2231]; Order approving attorneys’ fees in connection with the Chadbourne & Parke settlement [SEC Action ECF 2366]; Order approving attorneys’ fees in connection with the Hunton settlement [SEC Action ECF No. 2702]; and Order approving attorneys’ fees in connection with the Proskauer settlement [SEC Action ECF No. 2820]; *see also* Official Stanford Inv’rs Comm. v. BDO USA, LLP, No. 3:12-cv01447-N-BG (N.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2015) [ECF No. 80] (order approving 25% contingency fee in connection with BDO settlement); Order approving attorneys’ fees for Kroll settlement [SEC Action, ECF No. 2364]; and Order approving attorneys’ fees for BMB settlement [SEC Action, ECF No. 2567].

For these reasons, the Court finds the 25% contingency fee requested in connection with the Trustmark Settlement is well within the range of reasonableness for cases of the magnitude and complexity as the Trustmark litigation. The Court therefore hereby approves the award of Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees to Plaintiffs’ Counsel in the amount of **\$24,172,876.34** as requested in the Motion. The Court also hereby authorizes the Receiver to reimburse the Receivership Estate from the settlement proceeds the total sum of **\$3,308,494.63** for expenses advanced by the Receiver in the Trustmark litigation.

The Receiver is, therefore: ORDERED to pay Plaintiffs’ Counsel attorneys’ fees in the

amount of **\$24,172,876.34** upon receipt of the Settlement Amount in accordance with the terms of the Trustmark Agreement.

FURTHER ORDERED that the Receiver shall reimburse expenses paid by the Receivership Estate from the settlement proceeds in the amount of **\$3,308,494.63**.

Signed on _____, 2023

DAVID C. GODBEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

EXHIBIT 6

DECLARATION OF EXAMINER JOHN J. LITTLE

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I, John J. Little, hereby declare under penalty of perjury that I have personal knowledge of the following facts:

1. My name is John J. Little. I am over the age of eighteen (18) and am competent to make this Declaration.

2. I am admitted to practice law in the State of Texas, and am admitted to practice before various federal courts, including the United States Supreme Court, the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit, the United States Tax Court and the U.S. District Courts for the Northern and Eastern Districts of Texas. I have been practicing law in Dallas, Texas since 1983. From 1983 until January 1991, I was employed by Hughes & Luce, LLP (n/k/a K&L Gates, LLP) and was a partner in that firm from January 1991 until January 1994. I was one of the founding partners of the Dallas law firm Little Pedersen Fankhauser, LLP, in January 1994 and practiced with that firm until its closure in August 2020. I formed John J. Little Law, PLLC and have practiced with that firm since September 1, 2020.

3. By Order dated April 20, 2009, I was appointed by Judge David C. Godbey (the “Court”) to serve as the Examiner in the Stanford Financial Group receivership proceedings. *SEC v. Stanford International Bank, Ltd., et al.*, Civil Action No. 3:09-CV-0298-N (the “SEC Action”), ECF No. 322 (the “Examiner Order”). Pursuant to the Examiner Order, I was directed to “convey to the Court such information as the Examiner, in his sole discretion, shall determine would be useful to the Court in considering the interests of the investors in any financial products, accounts, vehicles or

ventures sponsored, promoted or sold by any Defendants¹ in this action (the “Investors”).”

4. By Order dated August 10, 2010, the Court created the Official Stanford Investors Committee (the “OSIC”) to represent Stanford Investors in the Stanford Financial Receivership proceedings and all related matters. SEC Action, ECF No. 1149 (the “OSIC Order”). The OSIC Order defined “Stanford Investors” as “the customers of SIBL who, as of February 16, 2009, had funds on deposit at SIBL and/or were holding certificates of deposit issued by SIBL.” OSIC Order at 2. The OSIC Order conferred upon the OSIC “rights and responsibilities similar to those of a committee appointed to serve in a bankruptcy case.” The OSIC Order appointed me, as Examiner, to serve as a member of the OSIC and as its initial Chair. I have served as the Chair of the OSIC since its formation and continue to so serve.

5. The OSIC Order specifically contemplated that the OSIC would cooperate with the Receiver, Ralph Janvey, “in the identification and prosecution of actions and proceedings for the benefit of the Receivership Estate and the Stanford Investors.” OSIC Order at 6. Through a series of assignments, the Receiver assigned to the OSIC all claims that the Receivership had against certain banks, including SG Private Banking (Suisse) S.A. (“SG”), Trustmark National Bank (“TM”), The Toronto-Dominion Bank (“TD”), Bank of Houston (“BofH”), and HSBC Bank PLC (“HSBC”).

¹ The Defendants include Stanford International Bank, Ltd., Stanford Group Company, Stanford Capital Management, LLC, Robert Allen Stanford, James M. Davis, Laura Pendergest-Holt, Stanford Financial Group, The Stanford Financial Group Bldg. Inc. The Receivership encompasses Defendants and all entities they own or control.

A. OSIC Retains Counsel

6. In my capacity as Chair of the OSIC, I negotiated and executed a fee agreement dated December 12, 2012, pursuant to which the OSIC retained Butzel Long, P.C. (“BL”) and Friedman Kaplan Seiler & Adelman LLP (“FKSA”) to represent the OSIC in connection with the prosecution of claims against TM, TD, BofH, HSBC and SG. The December 12, 2012 engagement agreement contemplated that the two law firms would be compensated for their services through a contingent fee of twenty-five percent (25%) of the Net Recovery realized in respect of any claims asserted against the five banks identified in the December 12, 2012 engagement agreement.

7. In my capacity as Chair of the OSIC, I negotiated and executed a revised fee agreement dated April 15, 2014, with BL and FKSA concerning their representation of the OSIC in connection with the prosecution of claims against TM, TD, BofH, HSBC and SG. The April 15, 2014 revised fee agreement contemplated that the two law firms would be compensated for their services through a contingent fee of twenty-five percent (25%) of the Net Recovery realized in respect of the any claims asserted against TM, TD, BofH, HSBC and SG.

8. In my capacity as Chair of the OSIC, I negotiated and executed two additional agreements dated as of October 1, 2019, concerning the OSIC’s prosecution of claims against TM, TD, BofH, HSBC and SG.

9. The first was a Fee Agreement Regarding Claims against Trustmark National Bank and Independent Bank² pursuant to which the OSIC retained the services of Castillo Snyder P.C. (“CS”)³ and Fishman Haygood, LLP (“FH”) to represent the OSIC in the prosecution of claims asserted against TM and BofH. The October 1, 2019 fee agreement contemplated that CS and FH would be compensated for their services through a contingent fee of twenty-five percent (25%) of the Net Recovery realized in respect of the claims asserted against TM and BofH. The Fee Agreement Regarding Claims against Trustmark National Bank and Independent Bank was acknowledged by the Receiver, Ralph Janvey, and by BL and FKSA.

10. The second was a Joint Prosecution Agreement entered into by BL, FKSA, CS and FH. In the Joint Prosecution Agreement, the four law firms addressed how those firms would divide the work to be done in prosecuting the claims asserted against TM, TD, BofH, HSBC and SG and any fees paid with respect to any Net Recovery realized in respect of such claims. In particular, the four law firms agreed that CS and FH would be compensated for their services solely from the Net Recovery realized in respect of the claims asserted by the OSIC against TM and BofH (n/k/a Independent Bank), and that BL and FKSA would be compensated for their services solely from the Net Recovery

² Independent Bank acquired Bank of Houston.

³ It is my understanding that Castillo Snyder, P.C. is winding up its existence and that Castillo Snyder, P.C. has assigned, or will assign, all of its rights and obligations with respect to its representation of the OSIC to Edward C. Snyder Attorney at Law, PLLC.

realized in respect of the claims asserted by the OSIC against TD, HSBC and SG. Both the Receiver and I executed the Joint Prosecution Agreement to acknowledge its terms.

11. In February 2022, I negotiated and executed an additional Engagement Agreement for Bank Case pursuant to which the OSIC retained the services of Baker Botts, LLP (“BB”) as special trial counsel with respect to the OSIC’s claims against TM, BofH, TD, HSBC and SG. The OSIC’s agreement with BB made clear that it was “not intended to alter or amend” the existing engagement agreements between the OSIC and BL, FKSA, CS and/or FH. The OSIC’s agreement with BB also made clear that BB’s work for the OSIC would be billed on an hourly basis and would be submitted for approval by the Receiver as a part of the Receiver’s periodic fee applications. The OSIC’s engagement agreement with BB was effective as of February 25, 2022 when it was executed by me, in my capacity as Chair of the OSIC, by BB, and by the Receiver.

B. Pleadings in the *Rotstain* Action and Related Matters

12. On August 23, 2009, Guthrie Abbott, Steven Queyrrouze, Peggy Roif Rotstain, Juan Olano, Catherine Burnell, and Jaime Alexis Arroyo Bornstein (the latter four of whom were replaced by substitute plaintiffs Sarah Elson-Rogers, Salim Estefenn Uribe, Ruth Alfille de Penhos, and Diana Suarez on May 1, 2015, *Rotstain* ECF No. 237)) (the “*Rotstain* Investor Plaintiffs”) filed their Original Petition in the state district court of Harris County, Texas (*Rotstain* ECF No. 1-4) commencing a putative class action captioned *Rotstain v. Trustmark National Bank, et al.* and naming as defendants TM, HSBC, TD, SG and BofH (the “*Rotstain* Action”). The Original Petition asserted

claims for fraudulent transfer, conspiracy to commit fraud, and aiding and abetting fraud. *Rotstain* ECF No. 1-4.

13. The *Rotstain* Action was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas (the “Transferor Court”) on November 13, 2009. *Rotstain* ECF No. 1. It was then transferred to and consolidated with the Stanford Multidistrict Litigation proceeding in the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of Texas under Civil Action No. 3:09-cv-02384. *Rotstain* ECF No. 6.

14. On December 14, 2009, Harold Jackson, Paul Blaine Smith, Carolyn Bass Smith, Christine Nichols, Ronald Hebert and Ramona Hebert (collectively, the “*Jackson* Investor Plaintiffs”) filed a petition in the district court of Ascension Parish, Louisiana against Trustmark and other defendants captioned *Jackson, et al., v. Cox, et al.* (the “*Jackson* Action”). *Jackson* ECF No. 1-5. The *Jackson* Action was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana on January 11, 2010, *Jackson* ECF No. 1, and was thereafter transferred to and consolidated with the Stanford Multidistrict proceedings in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas under Civil Action No. 3:10-cv-0328. *Jackson* ECF No. 14. The *Jackson* Action was then stayed and has remained stayed. *Jackson* ECF No. 23.

15. The Receiver assigned to the OSIC any and all causes of action the Receivership Estate may have had against Trustmark and the other Bank defendants on January 4, 2011. *Rotstain* ECF No. 865, Ex. 10.

16. The OSIC filed a motion to intervene in the *Rotstain* Action on December 5, 2011. *Rotstain* ECF No. 96. The Court entered its Order granting the OSIC leave to

intervene on December 6, 2012. *Rotstain* ECF No. 129. The OSIC filed its Intervenor Complaint against Trustmark and other defendants on February 15, 2013. *Rotstain* ECF No. 133.

17. The *Rotstain* Investor Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Class Action Complaint against Trustmark and other defendants seeking actual damages, costs, and attorneys' fees on November 15, 2015. *Rotstain* ECF No. 350. That Second Amended Class Action Complaint is the *Rotstain* Investor Plaintiffs' live pleading against Trustmark in the *Rotstain* Action.

18. On November 7, 2017, the Court denied the *Rotstain* Investor Plaintiffs' motion for class certification. *Rotstain* ECF No. 428. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit later declined interlocutory review of that denial. *Rotstain, et al., v. Trustmark National Bank, et al.*, No. 17-0—38 (5th Cir.) (Order, April 20, 2018).

19. Following the denial of the motion for class certification, hundreds of Stanford CD Investors, and putative class members, sought to intervene in the *Rotstain* Action. *See Rotstain* ECF No. 492. The Court entered its Order denying leave to intervene on September 18, 2019. *Rotstain* ECF No. 562.

20. The denial of the motion for leave to intervene caused a large number of Stanford CD Investors to file a separate action against Trustmark and other defendants in the state district court of Harris County, Texas, styled *Smith v. Independent Bank, et al.*, (the "*Smith* Action"). The *Smith* Action was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas and assigned Civil Action No. 4:20-cv-00675. *Smith* ECF No.

1. The *Smith* Action was stayed without opposition from the *Smith* investor plaintiffs in accordance with an order issued in the main SEC Action. *Smith* ECF No. 10.

21. Other would-be intervenors sought immediate review of the denied motions to intervene in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. *Rotstain* ECF No. 574. On February 3, 2021, the Fifth Circuit affirmed this Court's denial of the motion to intervene. *Rotstain v. Mendez*, 986 F.3d 931 (5th Cir. 2021).

22. On June 15, 2020, the OSIC filed its Second Amended Intervenor Complaint against Trustmark and other defendants seeking actual damages, punitive damages, costs and attorneys' fees. *Rotstain* ECF No. 735. The Second Amended Intervenor Complaint is the OSIC's live pleading against Trustmark (and others) in the *Rotstain* Action.

23. The OSIC and the *Rotstain* Investor Plaintiffs filed a notice on March 19, 2021 abandoning all of their respective claims against Trustmark with the exception of (a) their claims for aiding, abetting or participation in violations of the Texas Securities Act ("TSA"), and (b) their claims for knowing participation in breaches of fiduciary duty. *Rotstain* ECF No. 976.

24. Those remaining claims are set for trial in the Transferor Court beginning on February 27, 2023.

C. Efforts to Obtain Class Certification

25. On March 2, 2015, the Court entered its Class Certification Scheduling Order, *Rotstain* ECF No. 228, pursuant to which the Court established a schedule for discovering and briefing the *Rotstain* Investor Plaintiffs motion for class certification, and

staying all other discovery in the *Rotstain* Action. The entry of that Order signaled an enormous amount of work for counsel to the *Rotstain* Investor Plaintiffs, including CS and FH.

26. As a part of the class certification discovery process, each of the *Rotstain* Investor Plaintiffs was deposed by counsel for the Bank defendants, including Trustmark.

27. The *Rotstain* Investor Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, *Rotstain* ECF No. 364, was supported by a brief, *Rotstain* ECF No. 364-1, and an extensive appendix, *Rotstain* ECF Nos. 364-2 through 364-20. The *Rotstain* Investor Plaintiffs' reply in support of their Motion for Class Certification, *Rotstain* ECF No. 365, was similarly supported by an extensive appendix, *Rotstain* ECF Nos. 365-2 through 365-20.

D. Trustmark's Dispositive Motions

28. Throughout the course of the *Rotstain* Action, Trustmark has filed multiple motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. Generally speaking, Trustmark was joined by the other Defendant Banks in every round of dispositive motion practice such that the *Rotstain* Investor Plaintiffs and/or the OSIC were responding to multiple motions to dismiss and/or motions for summary judgment at the same time.

29. Trustmark filed its first motion to dismiss on May 26, 2010. *Rotstain* ECF No. 36. The *Rotstain* Investor Plaintiffs responded to that first motion to dismiss on December 5, 2011, *Rotstain* ECF No. 94, and Trustmark filed a reply brief on December 22, 2011. *Rotstain* ECF No. 105.

30. Trustmark filed a motion to dismiss the OSIC's Intervenor Complaint on July 10, 2013. *Rotstain* ECF No. 162. The OSIC responded to that motion to dismiss on

October 25, 2013, *Rotstain* ECF No. 166, and Trustmark filed its reply on December 4, 2013. *Rotstain* ECF No. 177.

31. On April 21, 2015, the Court entered its Order granting in part and denying in part the motions to dismiss filed by Trustmark (and others). *Rotstain* ECF No. 234. While the Court dismissed certain fraudulent transfer claims asserted by the *Rotstain* Investor Plaintiffs and by the OSIC, it denied Trustmark's motion in all other respects.

32. On May 18, 2015, Trustmark filed a motion to reconsider the Court's order largely denying its motion to dismiss. *Rotstain* ECF No. 251. The *Rotstain* Investor Plaintiffs and the OSIC filed a Response to that motion, *Rotstain* ECF No. 269, and Trustmark filed a reply. *Rotstain* ECF No. 272. On June 23, 2015, the Court denied Trustmark's motion to reconsider. *Rotstain* ECF No. 277.

33. On July 24, 2015, Trustmark filed a motion to dismiss the *Rotstain* Investor Plaintiff's Second Amended Class Complaint. *Rotstain* ECF No. 293. The *Rotstain* Investor Plaintiffs filed a response to that motion (and to similar motions filed by other Bank defendants), *Rotstain* ECF No. 304, and Trustmark filed a reply brief. *Rotstain* ECF No. 307.

34. On April 22, 2016, Trustmark (and other Bank defendants) filed another motion to reconsider the Court's order denying the motion to dismiss. *Rotstain* ECF No. 373. The OSIC filed a response to that motion, *Rotstain* ECF No. 379, and Trustmark (and other Bank defendants) filed a reply. *Rotstain* ECF No. 380.

35. On July 27, 2016, the Court entered an Order denying Trustmark's motion to dismiss the *Rotstain* Investor Plaintiffs' Second Amended Class Complaint and also

denying Trustmark's motion to reconsider the Court's prior order denying its initial motion to dismiss. *Rotstain* ECF No. 387.

36. On February 28, 2019, Trustmark (and other Bank defendants) filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to three of the claims asserted by the OSIC. *Rotstain* ECF Nos. 488 and 489. The OSIC filed a response to that motion, *Rotstain* ECF No. 490, and Trustmark (and other Bank defendants) filed a reply. *Rotstain* ECF No. 491. Trustmark (and other Bank defendants) ultimately withdrew the motion for judgment on the pleadings. *Rotstain* ECF Nos. 738, 761.

37. On February 21, 2021, Trustmark filed a motion for summary judgment as to all claims and causes of action asserted by the OSIC and the *Rotstain* Investor Plaintiffs. *Rotstain* ECF Nos. 860, 864, 875, 884-886, 888, 890-892. The OSIC and the *Rotstain* Investor Plaintiffs filed a response to Trustmark's motion, *Rotstain* ECF Nos. 977-979, 983, and 997, and Trustmark filed a reply in support of its motion. *Rotstain* ECF No. 1064. On January 20, 2022, the Court issued its Memorandum Opinion and Order in which it denied Trustmark's motion for summary judgment. *Rotstain* ECF No. 1150.

38. Following the remand of the *Rotstain* Action to the Transferor Court, Trustmark (and other Bank defendants) filed two additional motions to dismiss. The first asserted that the OSIC lacked standing to bring the claims it was bringing. *Rotstain* ECF No. 1166. The OSIC filed a response to that motion, *Rotstain* ECF No. 1231, and Trustmark (and other Bank defendants) filed a reply. *Rotstain* ECF No. 1258. The second asserted that the Plaintiffs' TSA claims were barred by the TSA's statute of

repose. *Rotstain* ECF No. 1168. The Plaintiffs filed a response to that motion, *Rotstain* ECF No. 1233, and Trustmark (and other Bank defendants) filed a reply. *Rotstain* ECF No. 1260.

39. On November 17, 2022, the Transferor Court entered its order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of standing. *Rotstain* ECF No. 1327. On that same date, the Transferor Court also entered its order denying the motion to dismiss the TSA claims. *Rotstain* ECF No. 1328.

E. Discovery Efforts in the *Rotstain* Action

40. The Plaintiffs and Trustmark conducted an enormous amount of discovery over the course of the *Rotstain* Action. The parties exchanged hundreds of thousands of pages of documents, and extensive written discovery requests and responses.

41. Counsel for the Plaintiffs in the *Rotstain* Action took the depositions of at least seventeen (17) separate fact witnesses and three of Trustmark's expert witnesses. In addition, counsel for the Plaintiffs defended the depositions of the six *Rotstain* Investor Plaintiffs, OSIC members John J. Little and Pam Reed, former OSIC member Dr. John Wade, and the Plaintiffs' expert witnesses James Spindler and Pat McElroy.

42. Plaintiffs and Trustmark also engaged in extensive motion practice concerning Trustmark's discovery responses in the *Rotstain* Action.

F. Motion Practice Concerning Experts in the *Rotstain* Action.

43. Plaintiffs and Trustmark engaged in considerable motion practice concerning the experts designated by each of the parties, with both Plaintiffs and Trustmark filing *Daubert* challenges to the parties' respective experts.

44. Trustmark filed *Daubert* challenges concerning Plaintiffs' experts Karyl Van Tassel, *Rotstain* ECF No. 920, James C. Spindler, *Rotstain* ECF No. 926, and Pat McElroy, Jr. *Rotstain* ECF No. 954. The Plaintiffs filed responses to each of those *Daubert* challenges, *see Rotstain* ECF Nos. 1033 (McElroy), 1035 (Spindler), and 1037 (Van Tassel), and Trustmark filed reply briefs with respect to each of its *Daubert* challenges. *See Rotstain* ECF Nos. 1082 (Van Tassel), 1086 (Spindler) and 1088 (McElroy).

45. The OSIC filed *Daubert* challenges concerning Trustmark's experts Robert A. Ragazzo, *Rotstain* ECF No. 916, and Kenneth M. Lehn, *Rotstain* ECF No. 939. Trustmark (and other Defendant banks) filed responses to those *Daubert* challenges, *see Rotstain* ECF Nos. 1029 (Ragazzo) and 1032 (Lehn), and the OSIC filed a reply in support of its *Daubert* challenge as to Mr. Lehn. *Rotstain* ECF No. 1070.

46. On September 29, 2022, the Transferor Court entered an order denying the *Daubert* challenge as to Plaintiffs' expert Karyl Van Tassel. *Rotstain* ECF No. 1305. On October 3, 2022, the Transferor Court entered orders denying the *Daubert* challenges as to Plaintiffs' experts Pat McElroy, Jr., *Rotstain* ECF No. 1306, and James S. Spindler, *Rotstain* ECF No. 1309.

47. On October 20, 2022, the Transferor Court provisionally granted the OSIC's *Daubert* challenge as to Robert A. Ragazzo, *Rotstain* ECF No. 1314, and granted in part and denied in part the OSIC's *Daubert* challenge as to Kenneth M. Lehn. *Rotstain* ECF No. 1316.

G. Examiner Involvement in the *Rotstain* Action

48. In my capacity as the OSIC Chair, I have worked closely with the Receiver, his counsel, OSIC's counsel, and counsel for the *Rotstain* Investor Plaintiffs to coordinate the prosecution of claims against third parties for the benefit of the Receivership Estate and Stanford Investors, including the claims asserted in the *Rotstain* Action.

49. In that regard, I have been involved, as Chair of OSIC, in the OSIC's prosecution of its claims in the *Rotstain* Action, and have conferred regularly with counsel for the Receiver, the OSIC and the *Rotstain* Investor Plaintiffs concerning every aspect of the *Rotstain* Action.

50. The OSIC's counsel with respect to Trustmark, CS and FH, have spent many years and thousands of hours investigating and pursuing the claims asserted against Trustmark in the *Rotstain* Action. The materials reviewed included, among other materials, thousands of pages of SEC and other investigation materials, thousands of pages of deposition and trial testimony from the prosecution of Allen Stanford and others, thousands of emails of Stanford and Trustmark personnel, and hundreds of boxes of materials, including Trustmark materials and files, that the Receiver secured from Stanford's various offices and law firms.

51. For the last four or five years, the OSIC's counsel at CS and FH have worked full time, or nearly so, to prepare the *Rotstain* Action for trial. That work is described, in part, in paragraphs 25-44, *supra*.

H. Settlement Efforts

52. Settlement discussions with Trustmark began during the Fall of 2022. The Receiver and I, along with counsel, attended a meeting with Trustmark and its counsel in Houston, Texas on November 7, 2022. The parties engaged in a fulsome discussion of the relevant issues but were unable to agree upon any settlement.

53. Settlement discussions continued between the OSIC's lead counsel and Trustmark's counsel throughout November and December, 2022, and an agreement in principle was reached on or about December 31, 2022.

54. The Receiver and I, along with counsel, worked to negotiate and draft the formal settlement agreement with Trustmark on January 2 and 3, 2023, while simultaneously participating in a mediation with the other Bank defendants.

55. The parties fully executed the Trustmark Settlement Agreement as of January 13, 2023. The Trustmark Settlement Agreement calls for Trustmark to pay \$100 million to settle and resolve the *Rotstain* Action, the *Smith* Action, and the *Jackson* Action.

I. Examiner's Opinion Concerning the Trustmark Settlement and The Payment of Attorneys' Fees

56. It is my opinion that the settlement the Receiver and OSIC reached with Trustmark is fair and reasonable, in the best interests of the Stanford Receivership Estate and the Stanford Investors, and should be approved by the Court. My opinion is based upon my involvement in the investigation and prosecution of the claims asserted against Trustmark in the *Rotstain* Actions, the risks and uncertainty inherent in any jury trial, and

the length of time it would likely take to resolve the appeals that would inevitably follow any jury verdict and judgment.

57. Any proceeds recovered from the Trustmark Settlement will be distributed through the Receiver's existing (and already approved and operating) mechanism for identifying and approving claims and making distributions. Using the Receiver's existing process will be far more efficient, and likely result in larger distributions to Stanford Investors.

58. As noted above, the OSIC entered into a Fee Agreement Regarding Claims against Trustmark National Bank and Independent Bank with CS and FH that provided for the payment of a contingent fee of twenty-five percent (25%) of the Net Recovery realized in respect of the claims asserted against Trustmark. It is also worth noting that both CS and FH are continuing to prepare the OSIC's claims against BofH (n/k/a Independent Bank) for trial beginning on February 27, 2023.

59. The Court has previously approved a contingent fee arrangement between OSIC and its counsel that provides for the payment of a 25% contingent fee on net recoveries from certain lawsuits prosecuted by the OSIC.⁴ SEC Action, ECF No. 1267. The Court has also approved 25% contingent fees in connection with the OSIC's settlement of other Stanford-related lawsuits prosecuted by the OSIC. *See Official Stanford Inv'rs Comm. v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP*, No. 3:12-cv-04641-N-BQ (N.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2020) [ECF No. 374] (approving a 25% contingent fee on a \$65 million

⁴ The referenced Order addressed the OSIC's prosecution of certain fraudulent transfer and unjust enrichment actions.

settlement); *Official Stanford Inv'rs Comm. v. BDO USA, LLP*, No. 3:12-cv-01447-N-BG (N.D. Tex. Sep. 23, 2015) [ECF No. 80] (approving a 25% contingent fee on a \$40 million settlement); *Ralph S. Janvey v. Adams & Reese, LLP*, Civil Action No. 3:12-CV-00495-B [SEC Action, ECF No. 2231]; *Ralph S. Janvey v. Proskauer Rose, LLP, et al.*, 3:13-cv-00477 [SEC Action, ECF No. 2366] (approving 25% contingent fee on a \$35 million settlement with Chadbourne & Parke LLP) and [SEC Action, ECF No. 2820] (approving 25% contingent fee on a \$63 million settlement with Proskauer Rose, LLP); and *Ralph S. Janvey v. Willis, et al.* [SEC Action, ECF No. 2567] (approving 25% contingent fee in settlement with BMB Defendants).

60. The Fee Agreement Regarding Claims against Trustmark National Bank and Independent Bank entered between the OSIC and counsel (CS and FH) was modeled after the contingent fee agreement already approved by the Court in the SEC Action. SEC Action, ECF No. 1267.


61. For the same reasons the Court previously found the twenty-five percent (25%) contingent fee agreement between the OSIC and its counsel to be reasonable, *see id.*, p. 2, the Court should find the twenty-five percent (25%) contingent fee applicable to the settlement with Trustmark to be reasonable and approve it for payment.

62. It is my opinion that the attorneys' fee requested is reasonable in comparison to the total net amount to be recovered for the benefit of the Stanford Investors. The twenty-five percent (25%) contingent fee was heavily negotiated between and among the Receiver, OSIC and counsel, and is substantially below the typical market

rate contingency fee percentage of 33% to 40% that most law firms would demand to handle cases of this complexity and magnitude.

63. I respectfully submit that an award of attorneys' fees equal to twenty-five percent (25%) of the Net Recovery from the settlement with Trustmark is reasonable, necessary and appropriate considering the significant time, effort, and resources which CS and FH have invested in investigating the Stanford fraud, prosecuting and resolving the *Rotstain* Action with respect to Trustmark, and prosecuting the other Stanford-related litigation.

Executed on January 18, 2023.



John J. Little